The model of job search involves both employer matches and career matches. Workers may change employers without changing careers but cannot search over possible lines of work while working for one employer. The optimal policy implies a two‐stage search strategy in which workers search over types of work first. The patterns of job changes observed in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth support this two‐stage search policy. Among male workers who are changing jobs, those who have previously changed employers while working in their current career are much less likely to change careers during the current job change.

This article examines the effect of Catholic secondary schooling on high school graduation rates, college graduation rates, and future wages. The article introduces new measures of access to Catholic schools that serve as potential instruments for Catholic school attendance. Catholic secondary schools are geographically concentrated in urban areas and Catholic schooling does increase educational attainment significantly among urban minorities. The gains from Catholic schooling are modest for urban whites and negligible for suburban students. Related analyses suggest that urban minorities benefit greatly from access to Catholic schooling primarily because the public schools available to them are quite poor. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.

Results from the Displaced Worker Surveys show that the wage cost of switching industries following displacement is strongly correlated with predisplacement measures of both work experience and tenure. Workers apparently receive compensation for some skills that are neither completely general nor firm-specific but rather specific to their industry or line of work. Further, among displaced workers who find new jobs in their predisplacement industry, postdisplacement returns to predisplacement job tenure resemble cross-section estimates of the returns to current seniority. This suggests that firm-specific factors may contribute little to the observed slope of wage-tenure profiles. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.

This paper uses supervision data from a supplement to the 1977 wave of the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics to examine differences in supervision and wages across industries and to evaluate relationships between supervision practices and interindustry wage differentials. The results demonstrate that workers in high-wage industries are supervised with equal or greater stringency than secondary sector workers. Further, the results offer no evidence that interindustry differences in monitoring contribute to interindustry wage differentials. Such findings appear to contradict explanations for industry wage premiums that are motivated by efficiency wage models of shirking. Copyright 1993 by MIT Press.

Existing work suggests that black‐white gaps in potential wages are much larger among men than women and further that black‐white differences in patterns of female labor supply are unimportant. However, panel data on wages and income sources demonstrate that the modal young black woman who does not engage in market work is a single mother receiving government aid whereas her white counterpart is a married mother receiving support from a working spouse. The median black‐white gap in log potential wages among young adult women in 1990 was likely at least 60 percent larger than the gap implied by reported earnings and hours worked in the Current Populations Surveys.

Many attempts to measure the wage effects of current labor market discrimination against minorities include controls for worker productivity that (1) could themselves be affected by market discrimination and (2) are very imprecise measures of worker skill. The resulting estimates of residual wage gaps may be biased. Our approach is a parsimoniously specified wage equation that controls for skill with the score of a test administered as teenagers prepared to leave high school and embark on work careers or postsecondary education. Independent evidence shows that this test score is a racially unbiased measure of the skills and abilities these teenagers were about to bring to the labor market. We find that this one test score explains all of the black-white wage gap for young women and much of the gap for young men. For today's young adults, the black-white wage gap primarily reflects a skill gap, which in turn we can trace, at least in part, to observable differences in the family backgrounds.

We propose an incentive scheme for educators that links compensation to the ranks of their students within comparison sets. Under certain conditions, this scheme induces teachers to allocate socially optimal levels of effort. Moreover, because this scheme employs only ordinal information, it allows education authorities to employ completely new assessments at each testing date without ever having to equate various assessments. This removes incentives for teachers to teach to a particular assessment form and eliminates opportunities to influence reward pay by corrupting assessment scales. Education authorities can employ separate no-stakes assessment systems to track trends in scaled measures of student achievement. (JEL I21, I28, J33, J45)