Black and Hispanic homeowners pay significantly higher mortgage interest rates than white and Asian homeowners. We show that the main reason is that white and Asian borrowers are much more likely to exploit periods of falling interest rates by refinancing their mortgages or moving. Black and Hispanic borrowers face challenges refinancing because, on average, they have lower credit scores, equity and income. But even holding those factors constant, Black and Hispanic borrowers refinance less, suggesting that other factors are at play. Because they are more likely to exploit lower interest rates, white borrowers benefit more from monetary expansions. Policies that reduce barriers to refinancing for minority borrowers and alternative mortgage contract designs can reduce racial mortgage pricing inequality.

This study identifies a new economic benefit of common institutional ownership, which refers to the increasingly contentious phenomenon of U.S. firms sharing stockholders with their industry competitors. We find a significantly negative relation between common ownership and insider trading profitability. The disciplinary effect of common ownership on opportunistic insider trading is particularly evident when the information effects of common ownership are greater, when common owners are more likely to benefit from positive governance externalities, and in the subset of trades made by opportunistic insiders. Using the exogenous variations in common ownership induced by financial institution mergers, we conduct a difference-in-differences analysis and find consistent results. We also provide evidence that common owners encourage firms to impose ex-ante restrictions on insider trading and take ex-post actions to discipline opportunistic insiders by voting against management. Overall, our findings suggest that common institutional shareholders have information advantages, governance incentives, and effective means to constrain opportunistic insider trading.

We find that social capital, as captured by associational networks and social norms in US counties where corporate headquarters are located, is positively associated with cash dividend payouts in local firms. The positive effect is incremental to other known local factors affecting dividends, is robust to a range of sensitivity analyses, and extends to corporate decisions about whether to pay dividends or not. Social capital mitigates managerial private financial incentives to limit dividends and encourages higher dividends among firms facing greater free cash flow problems. Social capital also attenuates over-investment of free cash flow.