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An Experimental Investigation of the Effect of Cost Information and Feedback on Product Cost Decisions*

Contemporary Accounting Research 1997 14(1), 99-127
In this paper we report the results of an experiment designed to investigate the potential benefits of more accurate costing systems. Subjects in our experiment participated in one of four single‐person decision making settings, which varied in terms of the accuracy of costing systems (less accurate versus more accurate cost reports) and in the complexity of the economic environment (less heterogeneous versus more heterogeneous products). The costing systems provided imperfect reports that subjects could use to select forecasts of future product costs. Forecast accuracy determined the resulting payoffs for subjects. In addition to having the cost reports when making forecasts, subjects also observed the association between forecasts and actual profits for previous periods and the rank ordering of the products' relative usage of resources at each of the production processes. The results from our experiment indicate that subjects did not select forecasts based only on reported costs. Rather they updated forecasts using profit feedback and the supplemental rank information about the products' relative usage of resources. We found that profits decreased as the complexity of economic environment increased but increased with the accuracy of cost reports. The profits associated with less accurate costing systems, however, were not as low as we would have predicted had the subjects used the cost reports as their forecasts. In fact, using profit feedback, subjects were able to converge toward optimal profits even with imperfect cost information.

An experimental investigation of multi-defendant bargaining in ‘joint and several’ and proportionate liability regimes

Journal of Accounting and Economics 1997 23(2), 189-221
This study uses experimental methods to assess how different legal regimes affect the frequency and amounts of settlements in a three person setting (one plaintiff and two defendants). The four legal regimes investigated differ along two dimensions: (1) allocation of liability, either ‘joint and several’ or proportionate liability, and (2) liability mappings, either unconditional or conditional mappings. We find that the lowest settlement frequencies occur in regimes with joint and several allocation rules. In addition, joint and several rules have the most adverse effects on the defendants' wealth.

A Competitive Theory of Employment Dynamics

Review of Economic Studies 1997 64(1), 1
We develop a model of search and unemployment in an economy consisting of a large number of spatially separated local competitive labour markets and aggregate uncertainty. If aggregate shocks are positively autocorrelated, the implied cyclical behaviour of the aggregate variables match those of empirical studies: worker movement and job creation are procyclical while total unemployment, job destruction and job reallocation are countercyclical.