This paper examines the shareholders’ perceptions of the costs and benefits associated with the use of pooling-of-interests. The paper focuses on the market's reaction to the SEC's adoption of SAB 96. This regulation-forced firms to chose between using pooling-of-interests and maintaining their share repurchase programs. Overall, the results suggest shareholders perceive there to be a net cost when managers choose to use pooling-of-interests. These findings should be of particular interest to regulators, practitioners and researchers.

Recent papers have proposed a link between underpricing of an initial public offering (IPO) and the resulting ownership structure of the firm. Brennan and Franks [J. Financ. Econ. 45 (1997) 391] hypothesize that IPO managers want to discourage new blockholdings to reduce the likelihood of being monitored. They show that underpricing encourages oversubscription, allowing discrimination against large blockholders. Conversely, Stoughton and Zechner [J. Financ. Econ. 49 (1998) 45] hypothesize that managers underprice to encourage investment by blockholders who provide monitoring services. We find that the link between underpricing and ownership structure is weak. Most firms have outside blocks in place at the IPO and retain them afterwards. In terms of acquiring new blockholders, there is no difference between firms that underprice and those that do not.

This paper analyzes the relation between bidder gains and the source of financing funds available. We document that after controlling for the form of payment, financing decisions during the year before a takeover play an important role in explaining the cross section of bidder gains. Bidder announcement period abnormal returns are positively and significantly related to the amount of ex ante equity financing. This relation is particularly strong for high q firms. We further report a negative and significant relation between bidder gains and free cash flow. This relation is particularly strong for firms classified as having poor investment opportunities. The amount of debt financing before a takeover announcement is not significantly related to bidder gains. Together, we take these findings as supportive of the pecking-order theory of financing and the free cash flow hypothesis.

The re-entry of banking organizations into securities underwriting raises concerns over the possibility of banks using their lending-generated private information to benefit themselves and the issuing firm at the expense of investors. This paper illustrates the use of syndicate structure by lending banks to credibly commit against such opportunistic behavior and to exploit their proprietary information to lower issuance cost for borrowing firm issuers. We show that lending banks predominantly comanage with a high reputation nonlending underwriter. We present evidence that, relative to investment banks, comanaging issues allows lending banks to lower issuance costs for borrowing firms.

The purpose of our work is to explore contagious financial crises. To this end, we use simplified, thus numerically solvable, versions of our general model [C.A.E. Goodhart, P. Sunirand, D.P. Tsomocos, A Model to Analyse Financial Fragility, Oxford Financial Research Centre Working Paper No. 2003fe13, 2003]. The model incorporates heterogeneous agents, banks and endogenous default, thus allowing various feedback and contagion channels to operate in equilibrium. Such a model leads to different results from those obtained when using a standard representative agent model. For example, there may be a trade-off between efficiency and financial stability, not only for regulatory policies, but also for monetary policy. Moreover, agents who have more investment opportunities can deal with negative shocks more effectively by transferring ‘negative externalities’ onto others.

We develop a model that clarifies how to measure CEO incentive strength and how to reconcile the enormous differences in pay sensitivities between executives in large and small firms. The crucial parameter is shown to be the elasticity of CEO productivity with respect to firm size. We find that CEO marginal products rise significantly with firm size (confirming Rosen's conjecture that CEOs of large firms have a "chain letter" effect on firm performance), and overall CEO incentives are roughly constant, or decline slightly, with firm size. We employ a multitask model to discuss implications for the design of control systems.