Abstract The causes and consequences of the 2008 mortgage meltdown and 2020 COVID-19 crisis are quite different: the 2008 mortgage meltdown reflected infection of the financial system due to excess leverage and poor-quality mortgage loans, and the recent crisis reflects a substantial global economic shock to contain the viral outbreak of the coronavirus. Yet the financial and medical systems share many elements, such as opacity and interconnectedness as well as adequate buffers and reserves. We examine these themes as well as asset pricing, moral hazard (though it was at the root of the crisis only in the Great Recession), the consequences for government as a systemic actor, economic concentration, and capital market regulation in the two crises. In both crises, interventions in financial markets and disruptions in the housing market played important, but differing, roles. The recent crisis elucidates open questions about the foundation of financial economics and risk sharing.

Abstract Proxy advisory firms developed due to market failures underlying voting and corporate governance more broadly. However, these firms, which have not been subject to mandatory regulation, reflect their own market failures, emphasizing challenges underlying corporate governance. We highlight underlying frictions, such as economies of scale and public goods aspects to information production, the import of incentive conflicts faced by the advisory firms, their power, and the implications of their recommendations and votes by different types of investors. Asset managers emphasizing stewardship are more supportive of management than are proxy advisors. We highlight the evolving regulatory environment and limitations of one-size-fits-all recommendations. (JEL G34, G38, G24, H4) Received October 31, 2019; editorial decision October 17, 2020 by Editor Andrew Ellul.

Abstract We investigate intraday return dynamics in currency markets around FOMC announcements. Using comprehensive high-frequency exchange rate data, we reveal that post-FOMC announcement returns are significantly low, cancelling out approximately 65% of positive pre-FOMC announcement drifts. These post-announcement reversals mainly result from uncertainty resolution and are mostly realized between 12 and 24 hours after FOMC announcements. This return behavior is significantly related to the negative jump volatilities driven by FOMC announcements. Our findings suggest that our signed jump volatility measures capture informational shocks and uncertainty resolutions and tend to be high under illiquid market conditions. (JEL G14, G15)

We examine the stock market reaction to announcements of formal supervisory actions. We find that the variation in the quality and timeliness of disclosure by U.S. banks explains much of the variation in the market's reactions. We also find that these announcements can cause spillover effects. However, rather than representing contagion, these spillover effects are consistent with enhanced transparency. Only banks in the same region as the announcing bank, with similar exposures, are affected. Thus, enhanced disclosure can improve the allocation of resources in the banking system. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21, G28.

What are the causes and consequences of commonality in liquidity? We examine this issue using a model of liquidity trading in which liquidity shocks are decomposed into common (systematic) and idiosyncratic components. We show that common liquidity shocks do not give rise to commonality in trading volume. Indeed, trading volume is independent of systematic liquidity risk, and this risk is always priced irrespective of market liquidity. In contrast, idiosyncratic liquidity shocks create liquidity demand and volume, and investors can diversify their risk by trading. Hence, pricing of the risk of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks depends on market liquidity, with idiosyncratic liquidity risk being fully priced only in perfectly illiquid markets. While trading volume increases with the variance of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, price volatility increases with the variance of both idiosyncratic and systematic liquidity shocks. Surprisingly, our results are largely independent of the number of different securities traded in the market. When asset returns are uncorrelated, there is no transmission of liquidity across assets even when investors experience common liquidity shocks, suggesting that such liquidity shocks may not be the source of commonality in liquidity across assets detected in the literature. However, under limited conditions, more liquid securities can act as substitutes for less liquid securities. Overall, our findings suggest that common factors in liquidity may be the outcome of covariation in investor heterogeneity (e.g., as measured by co-movements in the volatility of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks) rather than of common liquidity shocks. Moreover, we find that different liquidity proxies measure different things, which has implications for future empirical analysis.

Abstract What distribution best characterizes the time series and cross-section of individual stock returns? To answer this question, we estimate the degree of cross-sectional return skewness relative to a benchmark that nests many models considered in the literature. We find that cross-sectional skewness in monthly returns far exceeds what this benchmark model predicts. However, cross-sectional skewness in long-run returns in the data is substantially below what the model predicts. We show that fat-tailed idiosyncratic events appear to be necessary to explain skewness in the data. (JEL, G10, G11, G12, G13, G14).

Abstract We use data from aggregate stock and dividend futures markets to quantify how investors’ expectations about economic growth evolved across horizons following the outbreak of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) and subsequent policy responses until July 2020. Dividend futures, which are claims to dividends on the aggregate stock market in a particular year, can be used to directly compute a lower bound on growth expectations across maturities or to estimate expected growth using a forecasting model. We show how the actual forecast and the bound evolve over time. As of July 20th, our forecast of annual growth in dividends points to a decline of 8% in both the United States and Japan and a 14% decline in the European Union compared to January 1. Our forecast of GDP growth points to a decline of 2% in the United States and Japan and 3% in the European Union. The lower bound on the change in expected dividends is -17% in the United States and Japan and -28% in the European Union at the 2-year horizon. News about U.S. monetary policy and the fiscal stimulus bill around March 24 boosted the stock market and long-term growth but did little to increase short-term growth expectations. Expected dividend growth has improved since April 1 in all geographies.

We provide a model in which a single psychological constraint, limited attention, explains both under- and overreaction to different earnings components. Investor neglect of earn-ings induces post-earnings announcement drift and the profit anomaly. Neglect of earnings components causes accrual and cash flow anomalies. The model offers empirical implica-tions relating the strength of earnings-related anomalies to the forecasting power of current earnings-related information for future earnings, investor attentiveness, and the volatilities of and correlation between accruals and cash flows. We also show that, owing to atten-tion costs, in equilibrium not all investors choose to attend to earnings or its components. (JEL G12, G14, M41, M43) Market reactions to earnings and earnings components present a striking puzzle. Stock prices on average underreact to earnings surprises (post-earnings an-nouncement drift), but overreact to the operating accruals component of earn-ings.1 Earnings- and accruals-related patterns of return predictability are often referred to as “anomalies, ” “under- ” and “overreaction, ” or reflecting investor “optimism, ” “pessimism, ” or “naı̈veté. ” Such labels offer little guidance as to

Abstract This paper examines whether a one-time, extensive, but temporary shock to cash supply can affect the adoption of digital payments. We exploit the 2016 demonetization episode in India, which overnight discontinued 86% of cash in circulation. Using novel administrative data from retail debit card transactions, we identify a 12% increase in digital payments in areas adversely affected by the cash shortage, which persisted well after the restoration of cash supply. Examining mechanisms, we find a limited role for social networks and stronger support for learning by doing. Further, information frictions hinder the immediate adoption of digital payments. (JEL E5, 023) Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Possible explanations are provided for two basic results in Kräussl's paper. First, rating effect may be stronger in emerging markets because they are less transparent. Transparency is interpreted in the context of Knightian uncertainty and institutional quality. Emerging markets have lower institutional quality ratings and present greater uncertainty than mature markets, therefore, they are more susceptible to rating agencies’ evaluations. Some empirical evidence on the correlations between institutional quality rankings and portfolio investment is presented. Second, sovereign credit downgrades generate a stronger market reaction than upgrades because decision makers value losses more than gains, as posited by cumulative prospect theory.