In this paper, I examine the effect of corporate greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) on profitability. I use the gender composition of the CEOs' children as an identification strategy to investigate the impact of GHG emissions on profits. CEOs who father a daughter are associated with a 10% reduction in GHG emissions. The reduction in emissions, in turn, improves profitability. A one standard deviation decrease in GHG emissions leads to a 0.14 standard deviations increase in profitability. Examining the channels, I show that CEOs with daughters are more likely to adopt a climate-integrated business strategy and set emission-reduction targets. Emission reduction affects profitability through both information advantage (protection from negative industry shocks, and lower cost of capital), and operational efficiency (lower operating costs and energy consumption) channels.

In this article, we show that statements of U.S. CEOs on contentious social issues are not necessarily an expression of their political views. Republican-donor CEOs are three times more likely to make social statements with a liberal slant. CEO activism is more likely if firms’ operating environment is politically polarized and employees are Democrat-leaning. Such statements are associated with a 3% increase in consumer visits to a firm’s Democrat County stores without significantly reducing them in Republican counties. CEO activism is associated with a 0.12% gain in firm value, increased quarterly sales, and a reduced likelihood of shareholder activism on social issues.

This paper examines the role of information and regulatory interventions in mitigating the executive gender pay gap. We find female executives receive about 34% less compared to equivalent males from the same cohort, which falls by half over tenure within the company, but remains systematically significant throughout. The gender pay gap is the highest for young female executives and in the financial sector. Both demand-side (board gender quotas) and supply-side (family policies) regulatory interventions are associated with a lower gender gap in executive pay. Board gender quotas are associated with lower gender pay gap for experienced female executives in the highest age bracket. In contrast, supply-side interventions are associated with lower gender pay gap for the youngest female executives. Our results have important implications for the relative effectiveness of public policies that aim to reduce gender imbalance in corporate leadership and pay.

We examine how ownership structure affects managerial incentive alignment mechanisms and strategic objectives. We compare large Indian firms with dispersed equity ownership with business-group affiliates operating within the same institutional frameworks. We find that the performance sensitivity of CEO pay and turnover differ significantly across group affiliates and stand-alone firms. The strategic choices of firms also differ in response to managerial incentives. However, we find that, regardless of those differences, firm performance is similar for both types of firms. Overall, this paper suggests that ownership structure and managerial incentives can adjust to optimize strategic choices and firm performance.

Executive compensation is increasingly being linked to ESG outcomes. This paper examines whether ESG targets are consistent with shareholder welfare. Using granular information on compensation contracts of Swedish CEOs, we show that ESG and financial targets are competing. ESG-linked compensation is 5 percentage points more common in well-governed firms and 6.3 percentage points more likely for CEOs with broader skill sets (generalist CEOs). ESG scores of well-governed firms improve when generalist CEOs have ESG-linked pay, but there is no effect on profitability. These results suggest that boards set ESG contracts because shareholders derive utility from ESG in addition to wealth, and ESG may not be produced without these incentives. (JEL M14, G14, D21, L21) Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

This paper investigates the role of stakeholder preference on corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies. Using a staggered difference-in-difference approach, we show that Indian firms increase CSR expenses when trade restrictions (Antidumping) are initiated against competing Chinese exports from countries with a high stakeholder preference for CSR. However, when these shocks emanate from countries with a lower stakeholder preference, CSR expenses remain unchanged. Capital expenditure and R&D of Indian firms increase following AD shocks, irrespective of their country of origin. Finally, CSR increases firm value only when the demand shocks originate from countries with a higher CSR preference. Collectively, we provide evidence for consumer-driven CSR strategies.