We examine how financial statement informativeness, analyst following, and news relate to the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Corporations’ timely disclosures of value relevant information and information collection by outsiders reduce information asymmetry, limiting insiders’ ability to trade profitably on private information. We use the profitability and intensity of insider trades to proxy for information asymmetry. We find that increased analyst following is associated with reduced profitability of insider trades and reduced insider purchases. Financial statement informativeness is negatively associated with the frequency of insider purchases. However, company news, good or bad, is positively associated with insider purchase frequency.

Little evidence exists on whether boards help managers make better decisions. We provide evidence that strong and independent boards help overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) avoid honest mistakes when they seek to acquire other companies. In addition, we find that once-overconfident CEOs make better acquisition decisions after they experience personal stock trading losses, providing evidence that a manager’s recent personal experience, and not just educational and early career experience, influences firm investment policy. Finally, we develop and validate a new CEO overconfidence measure that is easily constructed from machine-readable insider trading data, unlike previously used measures.

This paper examines the Reaching-for-Coupon (RFC) phenomenon in U.S. corporate bond mutual funds. We define RFC as a portfolio tilt toward higher-coupon bonds relative to peers with similar yields. Using detailed bond-level holdings data from 2002–2018, we construct a novel fund-level RFC measure and show that high-RFC funds attract larger inflows, particularly in low-interest-rate environments. Crucially, investor flows into RFC funds are less sensitive to poor performance, leading to a less concave flow–performance relationship and mitigating redemption-driven fragility. These altered flow dynamics strengthen managerial incentives to take risk. Moreover, compared to Reaching-for-Yield (RFY) funds, RFC funds provide more stable income streams and are less exposed to credit downgrades. Our results demonstrate that RFC captures a distinct channel through which income-driven investor demand shapes risk-taking and fragility in bond markets.

This paper proposes “implied stochastic volatility models” designed to fit option-implied volatility data and implements a new estimation method for such models. The method is based on explicitly linking observed shape characteristics of the implied volatility surface to the coefficient functions that define the stochastic volatility model. The method can be applied to estimate a fully flexible nonparametric model, or to estimate by the generalized method of moments any arbitrary parametric stochastic volatility model, affine or not. Empirical evidence based on S&P 500 index options data show that the method is stable and performs well out of sample.

We document systematic evidence of risk effects of disclosures culled from a virtually exhaustive set of sources from the print medium. We content analyze more than 100,000 disclosure reports by management, analysts, and news reporters (i.e., business press) in constructing firm-specific disclosure measures that are quantitative and amenable to replication. We expect credibility and timeliness differences in the disclosures by source, which would translate into differential cost of capital effects. We find that when content analysis indicates favorable disclosures, the firm's risk, as proxied by the cost of capital, stock return volatility, and analyst forecast dispersion, declines significantly. In contrast, unfavorable disclosures are accompanied by significant increases in risk measures. Analysis of disclosures by source—corporations, analysts, and the business press—reveals that negative disclosures from business press sources result in increased cost of capital and return volatility, and favorable reports from business press reduce the cost of capital and return volatility.

Using a sample of Chinese firms from 2000 to 2018, we document that hometown firms (firms with hometown chairpersons) engage in less green innovation than non-hometown firms. Evidence suggests that local stakeholders offer hometown chairpersons more protection from environmental consequences than non-hometown chairpersons. We identify two possible mechanisms: government patronage and accommodation by local supply chain partners. Furthermore, we find that the double standards are alleviated with insignificant difference in corporate green innovation when non-hometown chairpersons marry hometown spouses or build local political relationships. Additional analyses suggest that (1) the double standards drive hometown firms to emit more pollutants than non-hometown firms, (2) when a firm is under government scrutiny for environmental issues, located in the city with severe air pollution, or in heavily polluting industries, the adverse effect of a chairperson's hometown on green innovation is minimal, and (3) our findings on green innovation also extend to a decrease in the number of pollutant treatment facilities and treatment capacity in a firm.

We investigate the impact of excess perk consumption on crash risk in state-owned enterprises in China. To enjoy excess perks, executives in state-owned enterprises have an incentive to withhold bad news for extended periods, leading to higher future stock price crash risk. Consistent with this assertion, we find a positive correlation between excess perks and crash risk. The findings are robust to the inclusion of other determinants of crash risk identified in the literature, such as earnings management, conditional conservatism, and firm-level corporate governance mechanisms. The results still hold after accounting for possible endogeneity issues using a two-stage least squares estimation. Earnings management (conditional conservatism) helps amplify (lessen) this impact. Moreover, better external monitoring mitigates the impact of excess perks on firm crash risk. We further find that the impact of excess perks on crash risk is more pronounced in firms whose executives are approaching retirement and persists for at least two years.