We study the value impact of environmental shareholder proposals (ESPs) for Russell 3000 firms from 2006 to 2021. We distinguish between climate-dedicated ESPs and non-climate ESPs covering other environmental topics. We use two approaches to evaluate management's ability and willingness to select value-enhancing ESPs and reject value-destroying ESPs: (i) cumulative abnormal returns around the final proxy filing date and (ii) a regression discontinuity design around the voting threshold at the annual general meeting. Our results suggest that management has screening ability for ESPs, especially for climate proposals, and that investors and managers share common objectives in environmental activism.

Using a sample of 30,270 forecasts by 2,280 analysts under a stacked difference‐in‐differences framework involving 22 major climatic disasters in the United States, we examine the effect of climatic disasters on information production by security analysts, who play a crucial role in the financial market as information intermediaries. We find that earnings forecasts by analysts who experienced a major climatic disaster become less accurate than those by unaffected analysts within 3 months after the disaster, due to distracted attention. Disaster‐zone analysts are more likely to allocate their attention to firms of greater importance or salience, and they tend to reiterate their previous forecasts to maintain the quantity and timeliness of their forecasts. Overall, we document the real impact of cognitive bias on financial professionals' performance.

We analyze how capital requirements from environmental risk exposure affect bank lending to the corporate sector, and how these effects transmit to real economic activity and to greenhouse gas emissions. To do so, we exploit the introduction of a policy in Brazil that required banks to incorporate environmental risks in their capital assessments. Using comprehensive credit data, we find that the policy induces large banks to reallocate their lending away from exposed sectors. The credit contraction has no substantial impact on the real activity and greenhouse gas emissions of these sectors, as smaller banks expand their lending afterwards. However, the policy triggers a moderate labor reallocation from small firms (i.e., those with higher costs of switching lenders) and into large firms within environmentally exposed sectors.

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We predict and confirm that long-term institutional investors (LTIOs) play an important role in mitigating the negative market perceptions of US stocks following mainstream print media coverage of climate change. We observe a stronger effect of LTIOs for companies that lack corporate social responsibility and have less diverse and more co-opted boards. Overall, these findings indicate that the US equity market views LTIOs as effective monitors who can help guide companies facing climate risks toward a more sustainable trajectory.

Utilising climate-related narratives in conference call transcripts to measure firm-level exposure to climate risks, we examine the association between such exposure and the corporate cost of debt financing. Using a sample of 21 European countries from 2001 to 2020, we find that firms exposed to greater climate change experience higher debt costs. The impact is even more extreme when using climate-related opportunity and regulatory exposure measures. We further find critical economic channels through which the higher debt costs occur: financial development and credit supplies. Specifically, our findings hold only for firms in weakly developed financial markets and institutions as measured by the new broad-based multi-dimensional financial development indices. We also find some other conditioning factors. Firstly, the higher the carbon intensity level, the greater the debt cost a firm with more climate change exposure must pay. Secondly, debtholders appear to punish firms with high environmental and social disclosure that are exposed to more climate change. Thirdly, the findings are more pronounced in financially constrained firms.

We analyze how the materialization of physical climate risk in the institutional investors’ portfolios spurs a propagation effect on the information content of stock prices. Institutional investors with a relatively high portfolio exposure to natural disasters divest from disaster-hit stocks, decrease the trading intensity in non-hit stocks, and their trading decisions predict low medium-term returns. At the firm-level, institutional investors propagate the effects of disasters to non-hit stocks through reduced incorporation of firm-specific information, especially when the stocks represent a low portfolio weight. Combined, these results suggest that natural disasters trigger a rational reallocation of information-processing resources by institutional investors.

This paper examines how physical climate exposure affects firm performance and global supply chains. We document that heat at supplier locations reduces the operating income of suppliers and their customers. Further, customers respond to perceived changes in suppliers’ exposure: when suppliers’ realized exposure exceeds ex ante expectations, customers are 7% more likely to terminate supplier relationships. Consistent with experience-based learning, this effect increases with signal strength and repetition and decreases with country-level climate adaptation. Subsequent replacement suppliers show a lower expected and realized but similar projected heat exposure. We find similar results for suppliers’ exposure to floods.

I develop a directed technical change model of economic growth and energy efficiency in order to study the impact of climate change mitigation policies on energy use. I show that the standard Cobb–Douglas production function used in the environmental macroeconomics literature overstates the reduction in cumulative energy use that can be achieved with a given path of energy taxes. I also show that, in the model, the government combines energy taxes with research and development (R&D) policy that favors output-increasing technology—rather than energy efficiency technology—to maximize welfare subject to a constraint on cumulative energy use. In addition, I study energy use dynamics following sudden improvements in energy efficiency. Exogenous shocks that increase energy efficiency also decrease the incentive for subsequent energy efficiency R&D and increase long-run energy use relative to a world without the original shock. Subsidies for energy efficiency R&D, however, permanently alter R&D incentives and decrease long-run energy use.

Economists have widely endorsed pricing CO2 emissions to internalize climate change-related externalities. Doing so would significantly affect coal, the most carbon-intensive energy source. However, U.S. coal markets exhibit an additional distortion: the railroads that transport coal to power plants can exert market power. This article estimates how coal-by-rail markups respond to changes in coal demand. I identify markups in a major intermediate goods market using both reduced-form and structural methods. I find that rail carriers reduce coal markups when downstream power plant demand changes due to a drop in the price of natural gas (a competing fuel). My results imply that decreases in coal markups have increased recent U.S. climate damages by $11.9 billion, compared to a counterfactual where markups did not change. Incomplete pass-through would likely erode the environmental benefits of an incremental carbon tax, shifting the tax burden towards upstream railroads. Still, a non-trivial tax would likely increase welfare.