Knowledge that Transforms

Previous studies of macroeconomic accounting have focused on the conceptual and political development of national accounts and how such theoretical concepts generate economic reality. By turning focus to the calculative practices of macroeconomic accounting, studying the Norwegian Quarterly National Accounts (QNA), the present work underlines that the national economy is not only constituted in the political discourse of growth and within international classifications, but also within the everyday processes of calculating the numbers. It shows how the QNA team struggles to adhere to the formal classifications and find reliable empirical accounts that matches them. In such situations, epistemic strategies are employed to handle the “gaps” and misalignments between the formal classifications and the everyday calculative practice. By theorizing the validation and support of weak numbers within a calculative culture shaped by the handling of second-order measurements and interrupted representations, the present study contributes to an emerging accounting literature on interrupted and hyperreal representations.

This study investigates, via two experiments, the effects of target transparency, which reflects employees' knowledge about each other's targets in an organization, on managers' target setting decisions. We also investigate whether this effect depends on the need for help among employees. We predict and find that target transparency and need for help interact to influence managers' target setting decisions. Target transparency increases target levels when the need for help is low, but not when it is high. Further, target transparency leads managers to differentiate less between individual employee targets. This reduction is greater when the need for help is high than when it is low. Additional analyses support our theory by revealing that managers strategically set targets in a way that is consistent with an intention to motivate both effort at the individual level and help among employees when such are needed. Our results help explain anecdotal evidence of why companies that value help among employees often make targets transparent throughout the entire organization.

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