Knowledge that Transforms

We investigate the origins and implications of zero-sum thinking: the belief that gains for one individual or group tend to come at the cost of others. Using a new survey of 20,400 US residents, we measure zero-sum thinking, political preferences, policy views, and a rich array of ancestral information spanning four generations. We find that a more zero-sum mindset is strongly associated with more support for government redistribution, race- and gender-based affirmative action, and more restrictive immigration policies. Zero-sum thinking can be traced back to the experiences of both the individual and their ancestors, encompassing factors such as the degree of intergenerational upward mobility they experienced, whether they immigrated to the United States or lived in a location with more immigrants, and whether they were enslaved or lived in a location with more enslavement. (JEL C83, D72, D91, H23, J15, J16, Z13)

We assemble a new dataset spanning 150 years and 60 countries to study the economic toll of war. A war of average intensity is associated with an output drop of close to 10 percent in the war-site economy, while consumer prices rise by approximately 20 percent. The capital stock, total factor productivity, and equity returns all decline sharply. The economic ramifications of war are not confined to the war site. The evidence points to adverse economic outcomes in other belligerent and third-party countries if they are exposed to the war site through trade linkages or share a common border. (JEL D74, E23, E32, F43, F51, N40)

This paper estimates the effects of improving public transit infrastructure on city structure and welfare. It develops a quantitative urban model with multiple worker groups and transit modes, and derives a special case yielding sufficient statistics for aggregate welfare in a broad class of models. The paper estimates reduced-form elasticities to implement the approach using data spanning construction of the world’s largest Bus Rapid Transit system in Bogotá, Colombia. This class of models explains observed adjustments in economic activity. Standard value-of-time calculations capture only 52 percent of welfare gains. Accounting for reallocation and general equilibrium effects, distributional impacts are modest. (JEL H76, L92, L98, O18, R42, R53)

We show remote work led to large drops in lease revenues, occupancy, and market rents in the commercial office sector. We revalue New York City office buildings, taking into account both the cash flow and discount rate implications of these shocks, and find a 46 percent decline in long-run value. For all US office markets combined, we find a $556.8 billion value destruction. Higher-quality buildings were buffered against these trends due to a flight to quality, while lower-quality offices are at risk of becoming a stranded asset. These valuation changes have repercussions for financial stability and local public finances. (JEL E31, E32, G12, J22, M51, R33)

We show that subjective assessments of employee “potential” contribute to gender gaps in promotion and pay. Using data on 29,809 management-track employees from a large retail chain, we find that women receive substantially lower potential ratings despite receiving higher performance ratings. Differences in potential ratings account for approximately half of the gender promotion gap. Women’s lower potential ratings do not reflect accurate forecasts of future performance: Women subsequently outperform male colleagues, both on average and on the margin of promotion. We highlight two mechanisms driving the gender potential gap: strategic retention and stereotyping. (JEL J16, J31, J71, L81, M12, M51)

This paper examines how workforce composition, labor demand, and minimum wage jointly determine wages through their effects on worker-task assignments, firm wage premiums, and firm-worker sorting. Using an estimated model of monopsonistic local labor markets, it finds that minimum wage hikes and labor demand shocks drove the decline in Brazilian wage inequality from 1998 to 2012. While rising educational attainment compressed skill premiums within firms, it also reallocated skilled workers to high-wage firms, limiting that shock’s effect on inequality. The analysis highlights interactions among exogenous factors, showing that concurrent supply and demand changes attenuated minimum wage impacts. (JEL J22, J23, J24, J31, J38, J42, R23)

For whom has earnings risk changed, and why? We answer these questions by combining the Kalman filter and EM algorithm to estimate persistent and temporary earnings for every individual at every point in time. We apply our method to administrative earnings linked with survey data. We show that since the 1980s, persistent earnings risk rose by 12.5 percent for both employed and unemployed workers and the scarring effects of unemployment doubled. At the same time, temporary earnings risk declined. Using education and occupation codes, we show that rising persistent earnings risk is concentrated among high-skill workers and related to technology adoption. (JEL J22, J24, J31, J64)

Consider an economy with equal amounts of N types of goods, to be allocated to agents with strict quasi-convex preferences over lotteries. We show that ex ante, all Pareto-efficient allocations give almost all agents lotteries over at most two outcomes. Our results provide a simple criterion showing that many popular allocation mechanisms are ex ante inefficient. For the case of identical preferences, we establish existence of an efficient solution where all lotteries used are equally attractive. Assuming the reduction axiom, social welfare deteriorates by first randomizing over these binary lotteries. Efficient ex ante equality is achieved if agents satisfy the compound-independence axiom. (JEL D44, D61, D82)

I study multidistrict legislative elections with two parties and two binary dimensions of policy. Strategic voters focus on the dimension where their district is most likely to be pivotal in the legislature. Anticipating this, candidates select different policies than they would in single-district elections. The final policy is (i) uniquely pinned down by voter preferences, (ii) preferred by a majority of districts on each dimension, and (iii) a Condorcet winner if one exists. These properties are not guaranteed in single-district elections. (JEL D71, D72, D81, D91)