Productivity reflects not only how efficiently inputs are transformed into outputs, but also how well information is applied to resource allocation decisions. This paper examines how information technology has affected capacity utilization in the trucking industry. Estimates for 1997 indicate that advanced on-board computers (OBCs) have increased capacity utilization among adopting trucks by 13 percent. These increases are higher than for 1992, suggesting lags in the returns to adoption, and are highly skewed across hauls. The 1997 estimates imply that OBCs have enabled 3-percent higher capacity utilization in the industry, which translates to billions of dollars of annual benefits.
This paper introduces a new technique for testing the Heckscher-Ohlin model that allows for the possibility that countries with sufficiently disparate endowments specialize in unique subsets of goods. Results based upon industry-level data reject one-size-fits-all homogeneity in favor of Heckscher-Ohlin specialization. Results also reveal that industry-level data hide substantial intra-industry heterogeneity, violating the assumptions of the model and complicating the interpretation of results from earlier research. A methodology for adjusting industry output to reflect underlying product variation is introduced. Reestimation of the model using adjusted aggregates in place of standard industry classifications provides strong support for Heckscher-Ohlin specialization.
A new and easily implementable framework for the empirical analysis of the relationship between aggregate and individual wages is developed. Aggregate real wages are shown to contain three important bias terms: one associated with the dispersion of individual wages, a second deriving from compositional changes in the (selected) sample of workers, and a third reflecting the distribution of working hours. Their importance for interpreting the path of aggregate wages and of the returns to education for recent experience in Britain is highlighted. A close correspondence between the estimated biases and the patterns of differences shown by aggregate wages is established.
We study nearly 7,000 retirement accounts during the April 1994–August 1998 period. Several interesting patterns emerge. Most asset allocations are extreme (either 100 percent or zero percent in equities) and there is inertia in asset allocations. Equity allocations are higher for males, married investors, and for investors with higher earnings and more seniority on the job; equity allocations are lower for older investors. There is very limited portfolio reshuffling, in sharp contrast to discount brokerage accounts. Daily changes in equity allocations correlate only weakly with same-day equity returns and do not correlate with future equity returns.
Strong and widely accepted evidence shows that the natural rate of unemployment varies over time with substantial amplitude. The frictions in the labor market that account for positive normal levels of unemployment are not simple and mechanical. Instead, as a rich modern body of theory demonstrates, the natural rate of unemployment is an equilibrium in which the volumes of job-seeking by workers and worker-seeking by employers reach a balance controlled by fundamental determinants of the relative prices of the two activities. In recessions, unemployment rises, and job vacancies fall. The natural explanation is an economywide fall in labor demand. But a compelling model that generates a fall in labor demand without a counterfactual fall in productivity has eluded theorists to date. Nonetheless, policymakers have appropriately adopted the view that the natural rate varies over time and is not a simple benchmark for setting monetary instruments.
This paper argues that long-run trends in geographic segregation are inconsistent with models where residential choice depends solely on local public goods (the Tiebout hypothesis). We develop an extension of the Tiebout model that predicts as mobility costs fall, the heterogeneity across communities of individual public good preferences and of public good provision must (weakly) increase. Given the secular decline in mobility costs, these predictions can be evaluated using historical data. We find decreasing heterogeneity in policies and proxies for preferences across (i) a sample of U.S. municipalities (1870–1990); (ii) all Boston-area municipalities (1870–1990); and (iii) all U.S. counties (1850–1990).
Employee stock options (ESO’s) are a ubiquitous form of compensation in corporate America. By the late 1990’s, ESO’s outstanding at large corporations averaged 7 percent of total outstanding shares, with top executives holding approximately one-third of total ESO’s (John Core and Guay, 2001). Empirical evidence suggests that firms use ESO’s to align employees’ and shareholders’ interests, attract and retain employees, and compensate employees for their labor while simultaneously raising capital from employees (Core and Guay, 1999, 2001; Kevin J. Murphy, 1999). There is currently an intense debate nationally and internationally among standard-setters, politicians, investors, corporate executives, and academics about whether to require corporations to deduct the estimated value of ESO grants as a business expense in reported income. Existing accounting standards require firms to expense most forms of pay, such as salaries, cash bonuses, and the value of stock grants, but allow firms to choose whether to expense the value of ESO grants. Until very recently, nearly all firms chose not to expense ESO’s. However, firms that do not expense ESO’s must publicly disclose in the financial statement footnotes what reported income would have been if the ESO’s were expensed. In a recent sample of large growth firms, Christine Botosan and Marlene Plumlee (2001) find that mandatory expensing of ESO’s would have resulted in a 14-percent median reduction in firms’ earnings per share. Firms are also required to disclose details of top-executive ESO compensation in the annual proxy statement. Underlying the ESO debate is the concern that the choice among alternative financialaccounting treatments have real economic consequences. A large literature beginning with Ross Watts and Jerold Zimmerman (1978) provides evidence that accounting choice can impose economic costs on firms when contracts (e.g., debt and executive compensation contracts) or influential external parties (e.g., tax authorities) rely on reported accounting numbers (see Thomas Fields et al. [2001] for a survey of this literature). Accounting choice can also have economic consequences if investors fixate on particular numbers, such as reported earnings, resulting in security mispricing and misallocation of capital. Proponents of mandatory expensing argue that ESO’s reflect a cost of acquiring employee labor, and that expensing ESO’s conveys this information to outsiders consistently with other labor costs. Some argue that the absence of ESO expense results in stock mispricings, because investors fixate on reported earnings and fail to understand or utilize supplemental footnote disclosures about the true economic cost of ESO grants. Others argue that, when investors and boards of directors fixate on accounting earnings, the absence of ESO expense exacerbates ineffective corporate governance and allows management to use ESO’s to extract excessive compensation. Proponents of this view argue that expensing ESO’s will reign in management compensation by putting it under a brighter light. Opponents of expensing ESO’s argue that deducting the cost of ESO’s from earnings conveys an impression of weaker financial results to investors and, under the assumption that investors fixate on reported earnings, could raise the firms’ cost of financing and stifle corporate investment and innovation. There is also a concern that external parties, such as taxing authorities, might use changes in financial-accounting treatment as a cue to alter regulatory and tax policy.
Daniel Kahneman received the Nobel Prize in economics sciences in 2002, December 8, Stockholm, Sweden. This article is the edited version of his Nobel Prize lecture. The author comes back to the problems he has studied with the late Amos Tversky and to debates conducting for several decades already. The statement is based on worked out together with Shane Federik the quirkiness of human judgment. Language: ru
My first exposure to the psychological assumptions of economics was in a report that Bruno Frey wrote on that subject in the early 1970's. Its first or second sentence stated that the agent of economic theory is rational and selfish, and that his tastes do not change. I found this list quite startling, because I had been professionally trained as a psychologist not to believe a word of it. The gap between the assumptions of our disciplines appeared very large indeed. Has the gap been narrowed in the intervening 30 years? A search through some introductory textbooks in economics indicates that if there has been any change, it has not yet filtered down to that level: the same assumptions are still in place as the cornerstones of economic analysis. However, a behavioral approach to economics has emerged in which the assumptions are not held sacrosanct. In the following I comment selectively on the developments with regard to the three assumptions, on both sides of the disciplinary divide.