Knowledge that Transforms

We examine characteristics of the 400 wealthiest individuals in the United States over the past three decades as tabulated by Forbes Magazine, and analyze which theories of increasing inequality are most consistent with these data. The people of the Forbes 400 in recent years did not grow up as advantaged as in decades past. They are more likely to have started their businesses and to have grown up upper-middle class, not wealthy. Today's Forbes 400 were able to access education while young, and apply their skills to the most scalable industries: technology, finance, and mass retail. Most of the change occurred by 2001.

We consider two happiness puzzles. First, many studies show that only relative income matters for well-being. Yet the Gallup data for the United States and from the rest of the world show no such result, at least for life evaluation. There may be relative income effects in hedonic well-being though other interpretations are available. Second, more religious people typically report higher experiential well-being but more religious places have worse well-being on average, both across US states and across countries. More religious states and counties in the US also have worse murder rates, deaths from cardiovascular disease and from cancer.

This paper evaluates the effect of estate taxes on labor supply. The analysis decomposes the effect of estate taxation into the substitution effect of relative price changes and the two income effects for which the estate tax is responsible. These two income effects arise from tax burdens on those who leave estates plus tax burdens on those who receive them. Despite the double income burden of the estate tax, existing empirical evidence suggests that the net effect of estate taxation on aggregate labor supply is uncertain.

An agent advises a principal on selecting one of multiple projects or an outside option. The agent is privately informed about the projects' benefits and shares the principal's preferences except for not internalizing her value from the outside option. We show that for moderate outside option values, strategic communication is characterized by pandering: the agent biases his recommendation toward “conditionally better-looking” projects, even when both parties would be better off with some other project. A project that has lower expected value can be conditionally better-looking. We develop comparative statics and implications of pandering. Pandering is also induced by an optimal mechanism without transfers.

Do laboratory subjects correctly perceive the dynamics of a mean-reverting time series? In our experiment, subjects receive historical data and make forecasts at different horizons. The time series process that we use features short-run momentum and long-run partial mean reversion. Half of the subjects see a version of this process in which the momentum and partial mean reversion unfold over 10 periods ('fast'), while the other subjects see a version with dynamics that unfold over 50 periods ('slow'). Typical subjects recognize most of the mean reversion of the fast process and none of the mean reversion of the slow process.

This paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a political agency model with career concerns and endogenous entry of candidates. The data refer to Brazil, where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously at given population thresholds, allowing us to implement a regression discontinuity design. The empirical evidence shows that larger transfers increase observed corruption and reduce the average education of candidates for mayor. These and other more specific empirical results are in line with the predictions of the theory.

We explore empirically models of aggregate fluctuations in which consumers form anticipations about the future based on noisy sources of information and these anticipations affect output in the short run. Our objective is to separate fluctuations due to changes in fundamentals (news) from those due to temporary errors in agents' estimates (noise). We show that structural VARs cannot be used to identify news and noise shocks, but identification is possible via a method of moments or maximum likelihood. Next, we estimate our model on US data. Our results suggest that noise shocks explain a sizable fraction of short-run consumption fluctuations.

We compare nonparametric instrumental variables (IV) models with linear models and 2SLS methods when dependent variables are discrete. A 2SLS method can deliver a consistent estimator of a Local Average Treatment Effect but is not informative about other treatment effect parameters. The IV models set identify a range of interesting structural and treatment effect parameters. We give set identification results for a counterfactual probability and an Average Treatment Effect in a IV binary threshold crossing model. We illustrate using data on female employment and family size (employed by Joshua Angrist and William Evans (1998)) and compare with their LATE estimates.

The strong dislike evidenced by the American public towards the estate tax suggests that the wealthy wish to transfer resources to their heirs tax-free and would thus exploit mechanisms allowing them to reduce the tax burden whenever possible. However, I find strong evidence that the wealthy fail to utilize what is perhaps the simplest method of tax avoidance--that of making transfers to eventual heirs up to the annual exclusion. Instead they transfer far less than the amount permitted by the tax code, whether measured in cross-section or over time. In failing to give more, they forgo significant tax savings.

A bidding process can be organized so that offers are submitted simultaneously or sequentially. In the latter case, potential buyers can condition their behavior on previous entrants' decisions. The relative performance of these mechanisms is investigated when entry is costly and selective, meaning that potential buyers with higher values are more likely to participate. A simple sequential mechanism can give both buyers and sellers significantly higher payoffs than the commonly used simultaneous bid auction. The findings are illustrated with parameters estimated from simultaneous entry USFS timber auctions where our estimates predict that the sequential mechanism would increase revenue and efficiency.