Knowledge that Transforms

By committing to terminate funding if a firm's performance is poor, investors can mitigate managerial incentive problems. These optimal financial constraints, however, encourage rivals to ensure that a firm's performance is poor; this raises the chance that the financial constraints become binding and induce exit. The authors analyze the optimal financial contract in light of this predatory threat. The optimal contract balances the benefits of deterring predation by relaxing financial constraints against the cost of exacerbating incentive problems.

This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of North-South trade in which research and development races between firms determine the rate of product innovation in the North. Tariffs designed to protect dying industries in the North from Southern competition reduce the steady-state number of dominant firms in the North, reduce the rate of product innovation, and increase the relative wage of Northern workers.

The value of the dollar appears to move in one direction for long periods of time. The authors develop a new statistical model of exchange rate dynamics as a sequence of stochastic, segmented time trends. They reject the null hypothesis that exchange rates follow a random walk in favor of their model of long swings. The authors' model also generates better forecasts than a random walk. The specification is a natural framework for assessing the importance of the "peso problem" for the dollar. The authors nonetheless reject uncovered interest parity.

The Dynamo and the Computer: An Historical Perspective on the Modern Productivity Paradox Author(s): Paul A. David Source: The American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Second Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1990), pp. 355-361 Published by: American Economic Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2006600 Accessed: 08/12/2010 01:40

This paper studies four classic fiscal-policy experiments within a quantitatively restricted neoclassical model. The authors' main findings are as follows: (1) permanent changes in government purchases can lead to short-run and long-run output multipliers that exceed one; (2) permanent changes in government purchases induce larger effects than temporary changes; (3) the financing decision is quantitatively more important than the resource cost of changes in government purchases; and (4) public investment has dramatic effects on private output and investment. These findings stem from important dynamic interactions of capital and labor absent in earlier equilibrium analyses of fiscal policy.

Manufacturing is undergoing a revolution. The mass production model is being replaced by a vision of a flexible multiproduct firm that emphasizes quality and speedy response to market conditions while utilizing technologically advanced equipment and new forms of organization. The authors' optimizing model of the firm generates many of the observed patterns that mark modern manufacturing. Central to the authors' results is a method of handling optimization and comparative statics problems that requires neither differentiability nor convexity.