Knowledge that Transforms

A micro-founded model that allows for changes in the monetary/fiscal policy mix and in the volatility of structural shocks is fit to US post-WWII data. Agents are aware of the possibility of regime changes and their beliefs have an impact on the law of motion of the macroeconomy. The results show that the '60s and the '70s were characterized by a prolonged period of active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy. The appointment of Volcker marked a change in the conduct of monetary policy, but it took almost ten years for the fiscal authority to start accommodating this regime change.

We study the evolution of both characteristics of reciprocity: the willingness to reward and the willingness to punish. First, both preferences for rewarding and preferences for punishing can survive provided that individuals interact within separate groups. Second, rewarders survive only in coexistence with self-interested preferences, but punishers either vanish or dominate the population entirely. Third, the evolution of preferences for rewarding and the evolution of preferences for punishing influence each other decisively. Rewarders can invade a population of self-interested players. The existence of rewarders enhances the evolutionary success of punishers, who then crowd out all other preferences.

Employment verification systems covered about one out of four people hired in the United States in 2010. In this paper, we evaluate the impact of state-level employment verification mandates on the employment and wages of likely unauthorized workers across the entire United States between 2004 and 2010. We find that E-Verify mandates, particularly those covering all employers, significantly curtail the employment likelihood of likely unauthorized male and female workers. However, they appear to have mixed effects on wages and may redistribute likely unauthorized labor towards industries often benefiting from specific exclusions, such as agriculture or food services.

Average living standards are converging among developing countries and faster growing economies see more progress against poverty. Yet we do not find poverty convergence; countries starting with higher poverty rates do not see higher proportionate rates of poverty reduction. The paper tries to explain why. Analysis of a new dataset suggests that, at given mean consumption, high initial poverty has an adverse effect on consumption growth and also makes growth less poverty-reducing. Thus, for many poor countries, the growth advantage of starting out with a low mean is lost due to a high incidence of poverty. JEL: D63, I31, I32, O15

Using matched data on product-level prices and the producing firm's unit labor cost, we find a moderate pass-through of current idiosyncratic marginal-cost changes. Also, the response does not vary across firms facing very different idiosyncratic shock variances, but identical aggregate conditions. These results do not fit the predictions of Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009). Neither do firms react strongly to predictable marginal-cost changes, as expected from Mankiw and Reis (2002). We find that firms consider both current and expected future marginal cost when setting prices. This points toward impediments to continuous price adjustments as a key driver of monetary non-neutrality.

We study experimentally a new two-player game: each player requests an amount between 11 and 20 shekels. He receives the requested amount and if he requests exactly one shekel less than the other player, he receives an additional 20 shekels. Level-k reasoning is appealing due to the natural starting point (requesting 20) and the straightforward best-response operation. Nevertheless, almost all subjects exhibit at most three levels of reasoning. Two variants of the game demonstrate that the depth of reasoning is not increased by enhancing the attractiveness of the level-0 strategy or by reducing the cost of undercutting the other player.

This comment highlights different ways of coding crisis episodes in Cerra and Saxena (2008) (CS). The comment shows that the coding used for civil war implies a misrepresentation of its impact. A correct coding of civil war reveals that the average civil war leads to a loss in output of 18 percent. This makes civil wars more devastating than all other crisis studied by CS.

A salient feature of globalization in recent decades is the emergence of “global supply chains” in which different countries specialize in different stages of a sequential production process. In Costinot, Vogel and Wang (2011) (CVW hereafter), we have developed a simple theory of trade with sequential production to shed light on how global supply chains affect the interdependence of nations. In this paper we develop a multi-factor extension of CVW to explore how the emergence of global supply chains may affect wage inequality within countries.

We study a market with rationally inattentive consumers who are unsure of the terms of the offers made by firms, but can acquire information about the terms at a cost. In a symmetric equilibrium, the price set by firms is continuously increasing in the cost of information for consumers and decreasing in the number of firms operating. In addition, favorable a priori information about a firm leads it to set a higher price, and a new entrant can increase demand for incumbents. When consumers have heterogeneous costs of information, firms selling low-quality products may choose to set the highest prices.

School choice systems designed to help disadvantaged groups might be hindered by information asymmetries. Kenyan elite secondary schools admit students from the entire country based on a national test score, district quotas, and stated school choices. We find even the highest ability students make school choice errors. Girls, students with lower test scores, and students from public and low quality schools are more likely to make such errors. Net of observable demographic characteristics, these errors are associated with a decrease in the probability that a student is admitted to an elite secondary school, relegating them to schools of lower quality.