The frequency of foreign conflict initiations in the United States is found to be significantly greater following the onset of recessions during a president's first term than in other periods. We develop an economic theory of the political use of wars which links the election cycle, war decisions, and economic performance consistent with the observed relationships among these events. An incumbent leader with an unfavorable economic performance record may initiate a war to force the learning of his war leadership abilities and thus salvage, with some probability, his reelection. This obtains despite voter rationality and informational symmetry.

Manufacturers can stimulate sales by a temporary wholesale price reduction for the retailer, a rebate directed toward consumers, or a combination of both. The trade-offs between these price promotions are analyzed, providing insights about their roles, profitability, and welfare properties. Retailers' rebates are also studied. While price discrimination is a common explanation for rebates to consumers, when a product is sold through a distribution channel, the manufacturer may also use rebates to motivate retail participation in the promotion. This explains why rebates may be offered even when all consumers use them and price discrimination does not occur.

The value of the dollar appears to move in one direction for long periods of time. We develop a new statistical model of exchange rate dynamics as a sequence of stochastic, segmented time trends. We reject the null hypothesis that exchange rates follow a random walk in favor of our model of long swings. Our model also generates better forecasts than a random walk. The specification is a natural framework for assessing the importance of the "peso problem" for the dollar. We nonetheless reject uncovered interest parity.