Knowledge that Transforms

The purpose of this paper is to examine certain received theories of the firm, trade union behavior, and bargaining in order to derive testable implications concerning the conditions under which labor disputes are more likely to occur. There are at least three reasons why an investigation of industrial strike activity seems fruitful. First, it might be argued that, because of their relatively frequent disruption of key sectors of the economy, work stoppages are the most important public policy issue raised by the existence of trade unions. It would therefore be useful to know whether, as Hicks thought, the majority of actual strikes are doubtless the result of faulty negotiation [18, p. 146] or whether they are an inevitable part of the functioning of an institutionalized market economy. Although it has long been known that the level of strike activity follows the business cycle [23] [20] [29], this leaves open the questions of the behavioral relations involved and their stability over time. Second, data on industrial disputes provide a potentially rich source of material for testing the implications of bargaining theories which purport to explain the outcome of labor-management negotiations.' Yet little work seems to have been done to date on the application of bargaining theoretic models to nonexperimeiltal data. A third reason for undertaking a study of this problem stems from the continuing interest in the effect of unions upon both the relative wage structure and the rate of change of aggregate money wages. Most union power is derived from the threat of the strike, and, accordingly, we agree with Charles Holt's recent suggestion that . the theory and analysis of industrial disputes may belp to clarify the role that unions play in the determination of wages [19, p. 50].

A simple model of a hospital is developed, and its implications are considered. An attempt is made to justify the realism of the model, although it cannot be entirely realistic. To develop the model the assumption is made that hospital expenses are financed by the patient and not by a third party. Thus the model may prove applicable to other non-profit institutions where third party payments are not important, such as colleges and universities, the performing arts, and museums.

The memorandum is about the segregation that can result from discriminatory individual behavior. It examines some of the individual incentives, and perceptions of difference, that can lead collectively to segregation. It also examines the extent to which inferences can be drawn, from the phenomenon of collective segregation, about the preferences of individuals, the strengths of those preferences, and the facilities for exercising them.

Investment in transit facilities necessarily begins by being largely investment in the provision of new routes or new services under conditions of substantial indivisibilities and increasing returns to scale. Under these conditions the usual profitability tests for determining the desirability of specific investments lead generally to under- rather than to over-investment in transit facilities. As investment proceeds, however, larger and larger proportions of transportation investment are made primarily to relieve congestion on existing routes and to expand overall capacity. This paper discusses the investment designed to relieve congestion. For purposes of economic analysis it is useful to distinguish at least six types of congested situations, which are: simple interaction, multiple interaction, bottleneck, triggerneck, network and control, and general density.