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CEO Pay and Appointments: A Market-Based Explanation for Recent Trends

American Economic Review 2004 94(2), 192-196
Very few business topics attract as much public attention as the paychecks of top executive officers in the largest U.S. companies. Undoubtedly, part of this interest has been fueled by the large and continuous increases in chief executive officers ’ (CEOs) compensation over the past three decades. Even ignoring the more recent escalation in the use of executive stock options (Brian Hall and Kevin J. Murphy, 2000, 2003), the base salaries and bonuses of Forbes 800 CEOs increased from an average of $700,000 in 1970 (in 2002-constant dollars) to over $2.2 million in 2000. 1 During the same period, the ratio of CEO cash compensation to average pay for production workers increased from about 25 in 1970 to nearly 90 in 2000. 2 The most prevalent explanation in popular press for this trend is the “fat cat ” theory, a variant of which has been espoused among academics by Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried, and

Sunk Costs and Antitrust Barriers to Entry

American Economic Review 2004 94(2), 471-475
US antitrust policy takes as its objective consumer welfare, not total economic welfare. With that objective, Joe Bain's definition of entry barriers is more useful than George Stigler's or definitions based on economic welfare. It follows that economies of scale that involve sunk costs may create antitrust barriers to entry. A simple model shows that sunk costs without scale economies may discourage entry without creating an antitrust entry barrier.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Does Competition Destroy Ethical Behavior?

American Economic Review 2004 94(2), 414-418 open access
Explanations of unethical behavior often neglect the role of competition, as opposed to greed, in assuring its spread. Using the examples of child labor, corruption, "excessive" executive pay, corporate earnings manipulation, and commercial activities by universities, this paper clarifies the role of competition in promoting censured conduct. When unethical behavior cuts costs, competition drives down prices and entrepreneurs' incomes, and thereby reduces their willingness to pay for ethical conduct. Nonetheless, I suggest that competition might be good for ethical behavior in the long run, because it promotes growth and raises incomes. Higher incomes raise the willingness to pay for ethical behavior, but may also change what people believe to be ethical for the better.

Rationalizing the Penn World Table: True Multilateral Indices for International Comparisons of Real Income

American Economic Review 2004 94(5), 1411-1428 open access
Real incomes are routinely compared internationally using methods that “correct” for deviations from purchasing power parity. The most widely used of these is the Geary method which, though theoretically suspect, underlies the Penn World Table. This paper provides a theoretical foundation for the Geary method which I call the GAIA (“Geary-Allen International Accounts”) system. I show that the Geary method is exact when preferences are non-homothetic Leontief and, more generally, gives a (possibly poor) approximation to the GAIA benchmark. An empirical application suggests that both it and other widely used methods underestimate the degree of international inequality.

Toward a Consumption Tax, and Beyond

American Economic Review 2004 94(2), 161-165
Amid the academic debate about whether a tax based on consumption or income is superior, it has long been recognized that the U.S. federal tax system is in reality a hybrid of an income and consumption tax, with some elements that do not fit naturally into either system. In recent decades, tax-law changes that altered the nature of the hybrid were generally not discussed as part of a plan to establish either a pure income tax or a pure consumption tax, but as attempts to establish a “level playing field” or to improve “incentives to save.” As of 2003, the outline of an explicit plan to move toward a consumption tax is emerging. Under the original Bush administration proposals in 2003, dividends would become taxexempt if corporate tax had been paid on the earnings supporting the dividends, and a new tax-exempt Lifetime Savings Account, with no restrictions on use, would be created. The proposed expansion of tax-exempt savings accounts was not passed, although it will likely be reintroduced in some form. What did become law were two provisions to expand expensing of qualified property: (i) an increase in the fraction of equipment investment that can be immediately written off from 30 percent (which became law in 2002) to 50 percent, and (ii) an increase through 2005 of the limit on the expensing of new depreciable assets by small businesses allowed under IRC Section 179. The 2003 tax law also reduced the rate of tax on dividends and realized capital gains received by an individual shareholder to be no more than 15 percent, compared to a top rate on “ordinary” income of 35 percent. The acceleration of depreciation, the reduction of personal tax on dividends, and an expansion of tax-favored savings accounts can be seen as part of a strategy to shift the tax base from income to consumption. If the ultimate destination of this set of tax reforms is a consumption tax base, then the most glaring omission from the discussion to date concerns interest deductibility. The continuation of interest deductibility, in spite of other moves toward a consumption tax base, raises two issues. The first is that interest deductibility plus expensing for businesses, plus exemption of financial returns of individuals produces not a zero tax on capital income, as under a consumption tax, but rather a subsidy. The second is that this tax structure allows a range of tax arbitrage opportunities among individuals and across corporations and individuals. For example, even under pre-2002 tax law, when high-tax-bracket investors borrowed from those in low (or zero) tax brackets they generated an arbitrage gain equal to the difference between the tax rates. Reducing the tax rate on interest income, but not interest deductions, to zero vastly expands this opportunity. These tax arbitrage opportunities reduce tax revenue without necessarily providing * Gordon: Department of Economics, University of California–San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093 (e-mail: [email protected]); Kalambokidis: Department of Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, 217f Classroom-Office Building, 1994 Buford Avenue, St. Paul, MN 55108-6040 (e-mail: [email protected]); Rohaly: Urban Institute, 2100 M Street N.W., Washington, DC 20037 (e-mail: [email protected]); Slemrod: Office of Tax Policy Research, University of Michigan, 701 Tappan Street, Rm. A2120, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234 (e-mail: [email protected]). 1 The Tax Reform Act of 1986, which in many ways moved the definition of taxable income closer to economic income, may be an exception (see Charles E. McLure, Jr., 1988). 2 Jonathan Weisman (2003) reported that the Bush administration was debating whether to push “a plan for stealth tax reform in ‘five easy pieces’—lower marginal income tax rates, including capital gains tax rates; eliminate taxes on dividends; accelerate the speed with which businesses can write investment expenses off their tax bills [ultimately to the point of 100 percent first-year expensing of business capital investment]; expand the Roth individual retirement account to all personal saving; and exclude export and other foreign trade income of American companies from taxation.”

What Do Aggregate Consumption Euler Equations Say About the Capital-Income Tax Burden?

American Economic Review 2004 94(2), 166-170
Aggregate consumption Euler equations fit financial asset return data poorly. But they fit the return on the capital stock well, which leads us to three empirical findings relating to the capital income tax burden. First, capital taxation drives a wedge between consumption growth and the expected pre-tax capital return. Second, capital taxation is the major distortion in the capital market, in the sense that most of the medium and long run deviations between expected consumption growth and the expected pre-tax capital return are associated with capital taxation. Third, consumption growth appears to be pretty elastic to the after-tax capital return (i.e., capital is elastically supplied), even while it appears inelastic to returns on various financial assets. Capital income taxes are passed on through reduced capital accumulation, or higher markups, or some combination.

Balance Sheets and Exchange Rate Policy

American Economic Review 2004 94(4), 1183-1193 open access
В статье анализируется связь между обменным курсом и балансом активов и пассивов и влияние этой связи на макроэкономические показатели в малой открытой экономике. Из-за высокой степени долларизации обязательств, обесценение национальной валюты, с одной стороны, снижает чистую стоимость компаний (net worth), что порождает финансовую хрупкость частного сектора. Это ведет к ограничению инвестиций. С другой стороны, девальвация приводит к расширению выпуска и росту отдачи от инвестиций, что также является компонентом чистой стоимости компании. В работе показывается, что негативный внешний шок может быть усилен эффектом баланса (balance sheet effect). В результате выпуск и инвестиции снижаются. При фиксированном курсе это падение сильнее, чем при плавающем. Таким образом, гибкий курс является лучим амортизатором внешних реальных шоков, даже несмотря на значительный эффект баланса.