Knowledge that Transforms

The front matter of the June 2000 issue contains the Table of Contents.

Many open-access resources, such as elephants, are used to produce storable goods. Anticipated future scarcity of these resources will increase current prices and poaching. This implies that, for given initial conditions, there may be rational expectations equilibria leading to both extinction and survival. The cheapest way for governments to eliminate extinction equilibria may be to commit to tough antipoaching measures if the population falls below a threshold. For governments without credibility, the cheapest way to eliminate extinction equilibria may be to accumulate a sufficient stockpile of the storable good and threaten to sell it should the population fall. (JEL Q20)

How Much Should Americans Be Saving for Retirement? by B. Douglas Bernheim, Lorenzo Forni, Jagadeesh Gokhale and Laurence J. Koltikoff. Published in volume 90, issue 2, pages 288-292 of American Economic Review, May 2000

In a dynamic model of moral hazard, competition can undermine prudent bank behavior. While capital-requirement regulation can induce prudent behavior, the policy yields Pareto-inefficient outcomes. Capital requirements reduce gambling incentives by putting bank equity at risk. However, they also have a perverse effect of harming banks' franchise values, thus encouraging gambling. Pareto-efficient outcomes can be achieved by adding deposit-rate controls as a regulatory instrument, since they facilitate prudent investment by increasing franchise values. Even if deposit-rate ceilings are not binding on the equilibrium path, they may be useful in deterring gambling off the equilibrium path. (JEL G2, E4, L5)

This paper provides a consistent international comparison of the patterns of growth in Canadian and U.S. industries. While much previous work has been done comparing sectoral (total factor) productivity in these two countries, the methods are not entirely comparable. Our approach here is to use methods and definitions that are almost identical for the two countries and therefore to provide a better sense of the relative productivity performance of the two countries. Our methodology for international comparisons of growth in output, inputs, and productivity is based on the economic theory of production. We use measures of labor and capital that take into account the changing composition of the labor force and capital stocks (relatively more educated and older workers, and relatively more equipment compared to structures). We find that, during the 1961–1973 period, Canadian industries were able to bring their productivity levels closer to U.S. levels, and they also had a higher rate of output growth. However, the growth in output and productivity slowed down after 1973 in both countries. As a result, the gap in the level of productivity between the Canadian and U.S. industries has remained virtually unchanged since 1973. Looking closely at the sources of industrial output growth, we find that input growth is the predominant source of the growth for almost all industries in the two countries over the 1961– 1995 period. Productivity growth contributes, on average, only about 20 percent of the growth of industrial output in the two countries over this period.

Abstract Exchange-rate regimes in transition economies over the last decade have spanned the entire spectrum of possibilities, going from freely floating to permanently fixed (currency boards, DM-ization) through managed floats, preannounced crawling rates, and bands with or without intermittent adjustments. Such extreme diversity is due to differences in available foreign reserves and in initial macroeconomic imbalances (especially the presence of a monetary overhang in some transition economies) and to differences in government preferences between inflation and unemployment. Performance of alternative exchange-rate regimes is difficult to assess, (i) because performance can be mixed, (ii) because all exchange regimes if sustained have a tendency to validate themselves via their impact on inflation, and above all, (iii) because performance depends on the entire package of public policy instruments (fiscal, monetary, and structural) and on exogenous factors, as well as the exchange-rate regime itself.