Knowledge that Transforms

Author(s): Granger, Clive W.J. | Abstract: This is the speech that Professor Granger gave at Nobel Prize Awards 2004

After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies by Karla Hoff and Joseph E. Stiglitz. Published in volume 94, issue 3, pages 753-763 of American Economic Review, June 2004

This paper reports an experimental test of how individuals learn from the behavior of others. By using techniques only available in the laboratory, we elicit subjects' beliefs. This allows us to distinguish informational cascades from herd behavior. By adding a setup with continuous signal and discrete action, we enrich the ball-andurn observational learning experiments paradigm of Lisa R. Anderson and Charles Holt (1997). We attempt to understand subjects' behavior by estimating a model that allows for the possibility of errors in earlier decisions.

Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity: Comment by Leslie M. Marx and Greg Shaffer. Published in volume 94, issue 3, pages 796-801 of American Economic Review, June 2004

The paper builds a tractable model of patent pools, agreements among patent owners to license sets of their patents. It provides a necessary and sufficient condition for patent pools to enhance welfare and shows that requiring pool members to be able to independently license patents matters if and only if the pool is otherwise welfare reducing. The paper allows patents to differ in importance, asymmetric blocking patterns, and licensors to also be licensees. We undertake some initial exploration of the impact of pools on innovation. The analysis has broader applicability than pools, being relevant to a number of co-marketing arrangements.

This paper investigates whether the housing market responds to the information incorporated in state-administered school grades. We study whether school grades affect families' residential locations and house prices. Using detailed data on repeated sales of individual residential properties in the state of Florida, we find evidence that there is an independent effect of these grades on house prices and residential location, above and beyond the estimated effects of test scores and the other components of the school grades. Because these grades have a large stochastic component, however, we find that over time the estimated effects of the grades has diminished.

The advantage of knowing about risks is that we can change our behavior to avoid them. Of course, it is easily observed that to avoid all risks would be impossible; it might entail no flying, no driving, no walking, eating and drinking only healthy foods and never being touched by sunshine. Even a bath could be dangerous. I could not receive this prize if I sought to avoid all risks. There are some risks we choose to take because the benefits from taking them exceed the possible costs. Optimal behavior takes risks that are worthwhile. This is the central paradigm of finance; we must take risks to achieve rewards but not all risks are equally rewarded. Both the risks and the rewards are in the future, so it is the expectation of loss that is balanced against the expectation of reward. Thus we optimize our behavior, and in particular our portfolio, to maximize rewards and minimize risks.

Money Does Matter! Evidence from Increasing Real Income and Life Satisfaction in East Germany Following Reunification by Paul Frijters, John P. Haisken-DeNew and Michael A. Shields. Published in volume 94, issue 3, pages 730-740 of American Economic Review, June 2004

In an extraordinarily influential paper, Craig Burnside and David Dollar (2000, p. 847) find that “... aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary, and trade policies but has little effect in the presence of poor policies.” This finding has enormous policy implications. The Burnside and Dollar (2000, henceforth BD) result provides a role and strategy for foreign aid. If aid stimulates growth only in countries with good policies, this suggests that (1) aid can promote economic growth, and (2) it is crucial that foreign aid be distributed selectively to countries that have adopted sound policies. International aid agencies, public policy makers, and the press quickly recognized the importance of the BD findings. This paper reassesses the links between aid, policy, and growth using more data. The BD data end in 1993. We reconstruct the BD database from original sources and thus (1) add additional countries and observations to the BD data set because new information has become available since they conducted their analyses, and (2) extend the data through 1997. Thus, using the BD methodology, we reexamine whether aid influences growth in the presence of good policies. Given our focus on retesting BD, we do not summarize the vast pre-BD literature on aid and growth. We just note that there was a long and inconclusive literature that was hampered by limited data availability, debates about the mechanisms through which aid would affect growth, and disagreements over econometric specification (see Gustav F. Papanek, 1972; Robert Cassen, 1986; Paul Mosley et al., 1987; Peter Boone, 1994, 1996; and Henrik Hansen and Finn Tarp’s 2000 review). Since BD found that aid boosts growth in good policy environments, there have been a number of other papers reacting to their results, including Paul Collier and Jan Dehn (2001), CarlJohan Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Patrick Guillaumont and Lisa Chauvet (2001), Hansen and Tarp (2001), Robert Lensink and Howard White (2001), and Collier and Dollar (2002). These papers conduct useful variations and extensions (some of which had already figured in the pre-BD literature), such as introducing additional control variables, using nonlinear specifications, etc. Some of these papers confirm the message that aid only works in a good policy environment, while others drive out the aid policy interaction term with other variables. This literature has the usual limitations of choosing a specification without clear guidance from theory, which often means there are more plausible specifications than there are data points in the sample. We differentiate our paper from these others by NOT deviating from the BD specification. Thus, we do not test the robustness of the results to an unlimited number of variations, but instead maintain the BD methodology. This paper conducts a very simple robustness check by adding new data that were unavailable to BD. Thus, we expand the sample used over their time period and extend the data from 1993 to 1997. * Easterly: Department of Economics, New York University, 269 Mercer Street, New York, NY 10003, Center for Global Development, and National Bureau of Economic Research (e-mail: [email protected]); Levine: Department of Finance, Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota, 321 19th Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55455, and National Bureau of Economic Research (e-mail: [email protected]); Roodman: Center for Global Development, 1776 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036 (e-mail: [email protected]). We are grateful to Craig Burnside for supplying data and assisting in the reconstruction of previous results, without holding him responsible in any way for the work in this paper. Thanks also to Francis Ng and Prarthna Dayal for generous assistance with updating the Sachs-Warner openness variable, and to three anonymous referees, Craig Burnside, and Henrik Hansen for helpful comments. 1 See, for instance, the World Bank (1994, 2001, 2002), the U.K. Department for International Development (2000), President George W. Bush’s speech (March 16, 2002), the announcement by the White House on creating the Millennium Challenge Corporation (White House, 2002), as well as a Washington Post editorial (February 9, 2002), a Financial Times column by Alan Beattie (March 11, 2002), and The Economist (March 16, 2002).

It is typically less profitable for an opportunistic borrower to divert inputs than to divert cash. Therefore, suppliers may lend more liberally than banks. This simple argument is at the core of our contract theoretic model of trade credit in competitive markets. The model implies that trade credit and bank credit can be either complements or substitutes. Among other things, the model explains why trade credit has short maturity, why trade credit is more prevalent in less developed credit markets, and why accounts payable of large unrated firms are more countercyclical than those of small firms.