Knowledge that Transforms

Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer by P.-A. Chiappori, S. Levitt and T. Groseclose. Published in volume 92, issue 4, pages 1138-1151 of American Economic Review, September 2002

In this paper, we propose a new measure of horizontal equity that overcomes many of the shortcomings of previous proposed measures. Our starting point is the observation that a well-behaved social welfare function need not evaluate global' (vertical equity) differences in after-tax income using the same weights it applies to local' (horizontal equity) differences, even though this constraint has been applied in the past. Following work on the structure of individual preferences, we show that a social welfare function can imply different preferences toward horizontal and vertical equity. Adopting the general approach to the measurement of inequality developed by Atkinson (1970), we use such a social welfare function to derive measures of inequality that are decomposable into components naturally interpreted as indices of horizontal and vertical equity. In particular, the former index measures deviations from the fundamental principle that equals be treated equally. Finally, we apply our new measure to two tax-return data sets, evaluating the degree to which the horizontal equity of the US personal income tax has changed over time, and how horizontal equity would be altered by one version of recent proposals to do away with the so-called marriage penalty.'

This paper investigates a class of matching problems—the assignment of indivisible items to agents where some agents have prior claims to some of the items. As a running example, we will refer to the indivisible items as houses. House allocation problems are not only of theoretical interest, but also of practical importance. A house allocation mechanism assigns a set of houses (or offices, tasks, etc.) to prospective tenants, allotting at most one house to each tenant. Rents are exogenously given and there is no medium of exchange, such as money. In general some houses will have existing tenants, some houses will be empty, and some applicants for housing will be new (e.g., freshmen). The canonical examples are assignment of college students to dormitory rooms and public housing units. Other examples are assignment of offices and tasks to individuals. Many universities in the United States employ some variant of a mechanism called the random serial dictatorship with squatting rights (RSD) to allocate dormitory rooms. Each existing tenant can either keep her house or enter the applicant pool. Each applicant is randomly

In many important high-technology markets, including software development, data processing, communications, aeronautics, and defense, suppliers learn through experience how to provide better service at lower cost. This paper examines how a buyer designs dynamic competition among rival suppliers to exploit learning economies while minimizing the costs of becoming locked in to one producer. Strategies for controlling dynamic competition include the handicapping of more efficient suppliers in procurement competitions, the protection and allocation of intellectual property, and the sharing of information among rival suppliers.

Income convergence across countries turns on whether technological knowledge spillovers are global or local. I estimate the amount of spillovers from R&D expenditures on a geographic basis, using a new data set which encompasses most of the world's innovative activity between 1970 and 1995. I find that technology is to a substantial degree local, not global, as the benefits from spillovers are declining with distance. The distance at which the amount of spillovers is halved is about 1,200 kilometers. I also find that over time, technological knowledge has become considerably more global. Moreover, language skills are important for spillover diffusion.

Exchange traded funds (ETFs) are a new variety of mutual fund that first became available in 1993. ETFs have grown rapidly and now hold nearly $80 billion in assets. ETFs are sometimes described as more 'tax efficient' than traditional equity mutual funds, since in recent years, some large ETFs have made smaller distributions of realized and taxable capital gains than most mutual funds. This paper provides an introduction to the operation of exchange traded funds. It also compares the pre-tax and post-tax returns on the largest ETF, the SPDR trust that invests in the S&P500, with the returns on the largest equity index fund, the Vanguard Index 500. The results suggest that between 1994 and 2000, the before- and after-tax returns on the SPDR trust and this mutual fund were very similar. Both the after-tax and the pre-tax returns on the fund were slightly greater than those on the ETF. These findings suggest that ETFs offer taxable investors a method of holding broad baskets of stocks that deliver returns comparable to those of low-cost index funds.

This paper analyzes how markets for old-age care respond to the aging of populations. We consider how the biological forces which govern the stocks of frail and healthy persons in a population interact with economic forces which govern the demand and supply for labor-intensive care.... We test our predictions empirically using state- and county-level evidence on the U.S. market for long-term care in nursing homes over the last three decades. (EXCERPT)

The Q-theory of investment says that a firm's investment rate should rise with its Q. We argue here that this theory also explains why some firms buy other firms. We find that 1. A firm's merger and acquisition (M&A) investment responds to its Q more -- by a factor of 2.6 -- than its direct investment does, probably because M&A investment is a high fixed cost and a low marginal adjustment cost activity, 2. The typical firm wastes some cash on M&As, but not on internal investment, i.e., the 'Free-Cash Flow' story works, but explains a small fraction of mergers only, and 3. The merger waves of 1900 and the 1920's, `80s, and `90s were a response to profitable reallocation opportunities, but the `60s wave was probably caused by something else.

We examine the impact of the coal boom of the 1970's and the coal bust of the 1980's on disability program participation. These shocks provide clear evidence that as the value of labor-market participation increases, disability program participation falls. For the Disability Insurance program, the elasticity of payments with respect to local earnings is between -0.3 and -0.4 and for Supplemental Security Income the elasticity is between -0.4 and -0.7. Consistent with a model where qualifying for disability programs is costly, the relationship between economic conditions and program participation is much stronger for permanent than for transitory economic shocks.