Does armed conflict reduce trade, even in noncombat areas, through the destruction of intergroup social capital? We analyze Ukrainian trade transactions before and after the 2014 Russia-Ukraine conflict. In a difference-in-differences framework, we find that Ukrainian firms from districts with fewer ethnic Russians experienced a deeper decline in trade with Russia. This decline is economically signifi-cant, persistent, and can be explained by erosion of intergroup trust. Affected Ukrainian firms suffered a decrease in performance and diverted trade to other countries. Our results suggest that, through social effects, conflict can be economically damaging even away from combat areas.

A large body of evidence finds that relative mobility in the US has declined over the past 150 years. However, long-run mobility estimates are usually based on White samples and therefore do not account for the limited opportunities available for nonwhite families. Moreover, historical data measure the father’s status with error, which biases estimates toward greater mobility. Using linked census data from 1850 to 1940, I show that accounting for race and measurement error can double estimates of intergenerational persistence. Updated estimates imply that there is greater equality of opportunity today than in the past, mostly because opportunity was never that equal.

We measure how a network of heroes can legitimize and diffuse extreme political behaviors. We exploit newly declassified intelligence files, novel voting data, and regimental histories to show that home municipalities of French line regiments arbitrarily rotated under Philippe Pétain’s generalship through the heroic World War I battlefield of Verdun diverge politically thereafter, particularly following Pétain’s own overt espousal of authoritarian views. Further, under Pétain’s collaborationist Vichy regime (1940–1944), they raise 7 percent more active Nazi collaborators per capita. These effects extend across all forms of Nazi collaboration and diffuse beyond the veterans themselves.

We examine the role of technological change in explaining the large and persistent decline in earnings following job loss. Using detailed skill requirements from the near universe of online vacancies, we estimate technological change by occupation and find that technological change accounts for 45 percent of the decline in earnings after job loss. Technological change lowers earnings after job loss by requiring workers to have new skills to perform newly created jobs in their prior occupation. When workers lack the required skills, they move to occupations where their skills are still employable but are paid a lower wage.

We develop a trade model with correlation in productivity across countries. The model spans the full class of generalized extreme value import demand systems and implies that countries with relatively dissimilar technology gain more from trade. In the context of a multisector trade model, we provide a tractable and flexible estimation procedure for correlation based on compressing highly disaggregate sectoral data into a few latent factors related to technology classes. We estimate significant heterogeneity in correlation across sectors and countries, which leads to quantitative predictions that are significantly different from estimates of models assuming independent productivity across sectors or countries.

Greece experienced a boom until 2007, followed by a collapse of unprecedented magnitude and persistence. We assess the sources of the boom and the bust, using a rich estimated dynamic general equilibrium model. External demand and government consumption fueled the boom in production, whereas transfers fueled the boom in consumption. Different from the standard narrative, wages and prices declined substantially during the bust. Tax policy accounts for the largest fraction of the bust in production, whereas uninsurable risk accounts for the bust in consumption and wages. We assess how the composition of fiscal adjustment and bailouts affected the crisis.

We propose a method to estimate the effect of firm policies (e.g., bankruptcy laws) on allocative efficiency using (quasi-)experimental evidence. Our approach takes general equilibrium effects into account and requires neither a structural estimation nor a precise assumption on how the experiment affects firms. Our aggregation formula relies on treatment effects of the policy on the distribution of output-to-capital ratios, which are easily estimated. We show this method is valid for a large class of commonly used models in macrofinance. We apply it to the French banking deregulation episode of the mid- 1980s and find an increase in aggregate TFP of 5 percent.

Growing reliance on student loans and repayment difficulties have raised concerns of a student debt crisis in the United States, but little is known about the effects of student borrowing on human capital and long-run financial well-being. We use variation induced by recent expansions in federal loan limits combined with administrative data-sets to identify the effects of increased access to student loans on credit-constrained students’ educational attainment, earnings, debt, and loan repayment. Increased student loan availability raises student debt and improves degree completion, later-life earnings, and student loan repayment, while having no effect on homeownership or other types of debt.

Adverse selection in procurement arises when low-cost bidders are also low-quality suppliers. We propose a mechanism called LoLA (lowball lottery auction) which, under some conditions, maximizes any combination of buyer’s and social surplus, subject to incentive compatibility, in the presence of adverse selection. The LoLA features a floor price, and a reserve price. The LoLA has a dominant strategy equilibrium that, under mild conditions, is unique. In a counterfactual analysis of Italian government auctions, we compute the gain that the government could have made, had it used the optimal procurement mechanism (a LoLA), relative to a first-price auction (the adopted format).