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More Evidence on the Performance of Merger Simulations

American Economic Review 2011 101(3), 51-55
Merger simulations are commonly used to simulate the effects of potential mergers. Despite the large resources devoted to merger review, little evidence exists on the accuracy of these methods. This paper uses the acquisition of Tambrands by Proctor and Gamble to provide evidence on the efficacy of merger simulation. Two simple demand systems are estimated under several identification assumptions and combined with a static model of price competition. Simulations predict small price effects of about 1 percent for the merging firms' brands, while direct estimates indicate the merger raised prices by 5–8 percent.

Land and Racial Wealth Inequality

American Economic Review 2011 101(3), 371-376
Could racial wealth inequality have been reduced if freed slaves had been granted land following the Civil War? This paper exploits a plausibly exogenous variation in policies of the Cherokee Nation and southern United States to identify the impact of free land on the size of the racial wealth gap. Using data on land, livestock, and home ownership, I find evidence that former slaves who had access to free land were absolutely wealthier and experienced lower levels of racial wealth inequality in 1880 than former slaves who did not. Furthermore, their children continued to experience these advantages in 1900.

Estimating the Willingness to Pay to Avoid Violent Crime: A Dynamic Approach

American Economic Review 2011 101(3), 625-629
The hedonic model, which has been used extensively in the Environmental, Urban, and Real Estate literatures, allows for the estimation of the implicit prices of housing and neighborhood attributes, as well as households' demand for these non-marketed amenities. A recognized drawback of the existing hedonic literature is that the models assume a myopic decision-maker. In this paper, we estimate a dynamic hedonic model and find that the average household is willing to pay $472 per year for a ten percent reduction in violent crime. In addition, we find that the traditional, myopic model suffers from a 21 percent negative bias.

Recessions, Retirement, and Social Security

American Economic Review 2011 101(3), 23-28
This paper examines how labor market fluctuations around the time of retirement affect the labor force status and Social Security receipt of individuals ages 55 to 69 and the income of retirees in their 70s, using data from the March Current Population Survey, Census, and American Community Surveys. We find that workers are more likely to leave the labor force, to collect Social Security earlier, and to have lower Social Security income when they face a recession near retirement. The impact is greatest for the less-educated, who are more susceptible to job loss and rely more heavily on Social Security.

Face Value

American Economic Review 2011 101(4), 1497-1513
People pay attention to the appearance of others, and personal characteristics can affect many types of decisions. We ask, is there informational value in a face in a situation where trust and reciprocity can increase earnings? We use a laboratory trust game experiment where subjects are unable to observe a counterpart, must observe a counterpart, or can pay to reveal a counterpart's photograph. Both senders and responders are willing to pay to observe the photos, and we show that behavior, earnings, and efficiency are affected. When subjects are “face to face,” efficiency is enhanced, and senders have higher earnings. (JEL D12, D83, Z13)

Global Financial Crisis and Africa: Is the Impact Permanent or Transitory? Time Series Evidence from North Africa

American Economic Review 2011 101(3), 577-581 open access
We utilize time series tests with structural breaks to test for an adverse impact on economic growth rates in North Africa associated with the recent US financial crisis and global recession. One or two breaks are identified for each country, except for Morocco where no break is found, while breaks coincide with the 2008 financial crisis in only two of the six countries (Libya and Mauritania). These findings suggest that, in general, shocks from the recent financial crisis have only temporary effects on economic growth in these countries. Impulse response functions with breaks confirm these results. We conclude by suggesting explanations for these findings.

Vertical Linkages and the Collapse of Global Trade

American Economic Review 2011 101(3), 308-312
A common view is that cross-border vertical linkages played a key role in the 2008–2009 collapse of global trade. This paper presents two accounting results from a global input-output framework that shed light on this channel. We feed in observed changes in final demand and find that trade in final goods fell by twice as much as trade in intermediate goods. Nevertheless, intermediate goods account for more than two-fifths of the trade collapse. We also find that vertical specialization trade fell 13 percent, while value-added trade fell by 10 percent, because declines in demand were largest in highly vertically-specialized sectors.

Are Risk Preferences Stable across Contexts? Evidence from Insurance Data

American Economic Review 2011 101(2), 591-631 open access
Using a unique dataset, we test whether households' deductible choices in auto and home insurance reflect stable risk preferences. Our test relies on a structural model that assumes households are objective expected utility maximizers and claims are generated by household-coverage specific Poisson processes. We find that the hypothesis of stable risk preferences is rejected by the data. Our analysis suggests that many households exhibit greater risk aversion in their home deductible choices than their auto deductible choices. Our results are robust to several alternative modeling assumptions. (JEL D11, D83)

Strike Three: Discrimination, Incentives, and Evaluation

American Economic Review 2011 101(4), 1410-1435
Major League Baseball umpires express their racial/ethnic prefer ences when they evaluate pitchers. Strikes are called less often if the umpire and pitcher do not match race/ethnicity, but mainly where there is little scrutiny of umpires. Pitchers understand the incentives and throw pitches that allow umpires less subjective judgment (e.g., fastballs over home plate) when they anticipate bias. These direct and indirect effects bias performance measures of minorities downward. The results suggest how discrimination alters discriminated groups' behavior generally. They imply that biases in measured productivity must be accounted for in generating measures of wage discrimination. (JEL J15, J31, J44, J71, L83)