This paper reports results of committee voting experiments in which a fixed agenda specifies a sequence of binary decisions. The outcome depends on whether voting is myopic or strategic. Subjects initially voted in accordance with myopic-voting rules; strategic-voting behavior was more prevalent with experience. The use of the same induced preferences in successive meetings was more likely to induce strategic voting than the provision of public information concerning the numbers of voters of each preference type.

People pay attention to the appearance of others, and personal characteristics can affect many types of decisions. We ask, is there informational value in a face in a situation where trust and reciprocity can increase earnings? We use a laboratory trust game experiment where subjects are unable to observe a counterpart, must observe a counterpart, or can pay to reveal a counterpart's photograph. Both senders and responders are willing to pay to observe the photos, and we show that behavior, earnings, and efficiency are affected. When subjects are “face to face,” efficiency is enhanced, and senders have higher earnings.

Do women and men behave differently in financial asset markets? Our results from an asset market experiment show a marked gender difference in producing speculative price bubbles. Mixed markets show intermediate values, and a meta-analysis of 35 markets from different studies confirms the inverse relationship between the magnitude of price bubbles and the frequency of female traders in the market. Women's price forecasts also are significantly lower, even in the first period. Implications for financial markets and experimental methodology are discussed.

Technology Improves Learning in Large Principles of Economics Classes: Using Our WITS by Sheryl B. Ball, Catherine Eckel and Christian Rojas. Published in volume 96, issue 2, pages 442-446 of American Economic Review, May 2006