The existing literature typically does not differentiate between security returns and the returns of investors in these securities. This study clarifies that investor and security returns differ because of the timing and magnitude of investor capital flows into and out of these securities. The empirical results indicate that actual investor returns are systematically lower than buy-and-hold returns for nearly all major international stock markets. These results imply that the historical equity premium and the cost of equity capital are likely lower than previously thought.

We study the effects of antitrust policy in industries with continual innovation. Antitrust policies that restrict incumbent behavior toward new entrants may have conflicting effects on innovation incentives, raising the profits of new entrants, but lowering those of continuing incumbents. We show that the direction of the net effect can be determined by analyzing shifts in innovation benefit and supply, holding the innovation rate fixed. We apply this framework to analyze several specific antitrust policies. We also show that, in some cases, the tension does not arise, and policies that protect entrants necessarily raise the rate of innovation.

A long-run link between money and prices is evident for the United States since the Korean War if the M2 measure of money is used and the velocity of M2 (V2) is modeled as a mean-reverting series. This link between M2 and prices is the basis for a dynamic model of inflation that compares favorably in forecasting exercises with Phillips-curve and more typical monetarist approaches. The behavior of V2 is examined from 1870 to the present, providing a basis for reconsidering previous findings that V2 follows a random walk.

While neoclassical models assume static cost-minimization by firms, agency models suggest that firms may not minimize costs in less-competitive or regulated environments. We test this using a transition from cost-of-service regulation to market-oriented environments for many US electric generating plants. Our estimates of input demand suggest that publicly owned plants, whose owners were largely insulated from these reforms, experienced the smallest efficiency gains, while investor-owned plants in states that restructured their wholesale electricity markets improved the most. The results suggest modest medium-term efficiency benefits from replacing regulated monopoly with a market-based industry structure.