Autocratic regimes, democratic majorities, private platforms, and religious or professional organizations can achieve social control by managing the flow of information about individuals’ behavior. Bundling the agents’ political, organizational, or religious attitudes with information about their prosocial conduct makes them care about behaviors that they otherwise would not. The incorporation of the individuals’ social graph in their social score further promotes soft control but destroys the social fabric. Both bundling and guilt by association are most effective in a society that has weak ties and is politically docile.

When will solidarity, which emerges spontaneously from the fear of spillovers, be reinforced through contracting? The optimal pact between countries that differ substantially in their probability of distress is a simple debt contract with market financing, a borrowing cap, but no joint liability. While joint liability augments total surplus, the borrowing country cannot compensate the deep-pocket guarantor. By contrast, the optimal pact between two countries symmetrically exposed to shocks with an arbitrary correlation is a simple debt contract with joint liability, provided that shocks are sufficiently independent, spillovers sufficiently large, liquidity needs moderate, and available sanctions sufficiently tough.

Industrial organization studies the exercise and control of market power. To this purpose, it builds models that capture the essence of the situation. The predictions of the model can then be tested econometrically and possibly in the lab or the field. In the end, the reasonableness of, and robustness to modeling assumptions and the quality of empirical fit determine how confident economists are in making recommendations to public decision-makers for intervention, and to companies for the design of their business model. Industrial organization has a long tradition: first theoretical, with the work of French “engineer-economists” Antoine Augustin Cournot (1838) and Jules Dupuit (1844); then policy-oriented with the enactment of the Sherman Act (1890) and subsequent legislation; then descriptive with the studies of the Harvard school (“Structure-Conduct-Performance”) comforting and refining the antitrust drive; and finally skeptical with the Chicago school. The Chicago school correctly pointed out the lack of underlying theoretical doctrine and went on to cast doubt on the whole edifice. It however did not develop an alternative antitrust doctrine, perhaps because

The paper provides a first analysis of market jump starting and its two-way interaction between mechanism design and participation constraints. The government optimally overpays for the legacy assets and cleans up the market of its weakest assets, through a mixture of buybacks and equity injections, and leaves the firms with the strongest legacy assets to the market. The government reduces adverse selection enough to let the market rebound, but not too much, so as to limit the cost of intervention. The existence of a market imposes no welfare cost.

Thinking about contingencies, designing covenants, and seeing through their implications is costly. Parties to a contract accordingly use heuristics and leave it incomplete. The paper develops a model of limited cognition and examines its consequences for contractual design.

Studying the implications of uncoordinated borrowing, the paper first looks at whether and when countries borrow too much in the aggregate. It then revisits the “original sin” debate, analyzing whether and when equity portfolio investment, international portfolio diversification, domestic currency denomination and longer maturities enhance borrowing countries’ access to international lending. The paper thereby relates a country’s level and quality of access to international capital markets to a variety of institutional features such as the level of domestic savings, their location, the extent of control rights held by political authorities, and the interests of dominant domestic political forces.

Building on the idea that accounting matters for corporate governance, this paper studies the equilibrium interaction between the measurement rules that firms find privately optimal, firms’ governance, and the liquidity in the secondary market for their assets. This equilibrium approach reveals an excessive use of market-value accounting: corporate performance measures rely excessively on the information generated by other firms’ asset sales and insufficiently on the realization of a firm’s own capital gains. This dries up market liquidity and reduces the informativeness of price signals, thereby making it more costly for firms to overcome their agency problems.

Concerns of pride, dignity, and the desire to keep hope about future options often lead individuals and groups to walk away from rea sonable offers, try to shift blame for failure onto others or take refuge in political utopias. Costly impasses and conflicts result, such as trials, divorces, strikes, the scapegoating of minorities for economic hardships, and wars. A key and puzzling aspect of these processes is the role played by wishful rationalizations and delusions, as attested by field observers (e.g., Truman F. Bewley (1999) in the context of labor relations; Kevin Woods, James Lacey, and Williamson Murray (2006) in that of war), as well as controlled experiments. Leigh Thompson and George Loewenstein (1992) and Linda C. Babcock et al. (1995) thus demonstrate how subjects in bargaining situations with common knowledge spontaneously generate, through self-serving processing and recall of the same evidence, divergent beliefs about the fairness of their cause and wishful predictions of outcomes, and how these are associated to costly delays and disagreements.

The paper explores strategies that the sponsor of a proposal may employ to convince a qualified majority of members in a group to approve the proposal. Adopting a mechanism design approach to communication, it emphasizes the need to distill information selectively to key group members and to engineer persuasion cascades in which members who are brought on board sway the opinion of others. The paper shows that higher congruence among group members benefits the sponsor. The extent of congruence between the group and the sponsor, and the size and the governance of the group, are also shown to condition the sponsor's ability to get his project approved.

We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or image-related) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed, and this “overjustification effect” can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify the settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and, more generally, those that make individual actions complements or substitutes, which we show depends on whether stigma or honor is (endogenously) the dominant reputational concern. Finally, we analyze the socially optimal level of incentives and how monopolistic or competitive sponsors depart from it. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.