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Tracing the Economic Impact of Cumulative Discrimination

American Economic Review 2005 95(2), 99-103
economic outcomes. This literature typically focuses on investigating whether there are racespecific effects present for a particular outcome (years of school, hiring, loan applications) within a particular domain (education, labor markets, housing markets) at a particular point in time. In this paper, I discuss the need to model and measure the cumulative effects of discrimination. For simplicity, I talk about black/white racial differences, but the discussion can be applied to other group comparisons. The paper builds on the discussion of cumulative discrimination found in Blank et al. (2004). Cumulative discrimination is the measure-

An Empirical Assessment of the Comparative Advantage Gains from Trade: Evidence from Japan

American Economic Review 2005 95(1), 208-225
We provide an empirical assessment of the comparative advantage gains from trade argument. We use Japan’s nineteenth-century opening up to world commerce as a natural experiment to answer the following counterfactual: “By how much would real income have had to increase in Japan during its final autarky years of 1851–1853 to afford the consumption bundle the economy could have obtained if it were engaged in international trade during that period?” Using detailed historical data on trade flows, autarky prices, and Japan’s real GDP, we obtain upper bounds on the gains from trade of about 8 to 9 percent of Japan’s GDP.

Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design

American Economic Review 2005 95(4), 936-959
We study security-bid auctions in which bidders compete for an asset by bidding with securities whose payments are contingent on the asset's realized value. In formal security-bid auctions, the seller restricts the security design to an ordered set and uses a standard auction format (e.g., first- or second-price). In informal settings, bidders offer arbitrary securities and the seller chooses the most attractive bid, based on his beliefs, ex post. We characterize equilibrium and show that steeper securities yield higher revenues, that auction formats can be ranked based on the security design, and that informal auctions lead to the lowest possible revenues.

On the Irrelevance of Input Prices for Make-or-Buy Decisions

American Economic Review 2005 95(5), 1631-1638
This paper demonstrates that input prices need not reflect the costs of an efficient incumbent supplier in order to induce entrants to implement efficient make-or-buy decisions. Because of strategic downstream considerations, entrants may always undertake efficient make-or-buy decisions, regardless of the prices at which they are authorized to buy key inputs from incumbent suppliers.

Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting

American Economic Review 2005 95(4), 981-1004 open access
Organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model. Unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory, we find that each voter's expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight. An exception occurs when many high-weight voters exist, as low-weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power. The model also predicts that, ex post, the coalition formateur (the party chosen to form a coalition) will receive a disproportionately high payoff. Using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001, we find strong evidence of such formateur effects.

Regulation and the High Cost of Housing in California

American Economic Review 2005 95(2), 323-328
This paper analyzes the effect of regulations governing land use and residential construction upon the course of housing prices in California. We explore the linkage between regulation and housing prices using measures of housing prices estimated from the Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the 1990 and 2000 Census of Population and Housing, together with a detailed cross-sectional land use regulation and growth controls in California cities. We explore mechanisms by which regulatory stringency may affect housing outcomes for consumers. First, we assess whether housing is more expensive in more regulated cities. Second, we assess whether growth in the city-level housing stock over the period of a decade depends on the degree of land-use regulation at the start of the decade. Finally, we estimate the price elasticity of housing supply for regulated and relatively unregulated cities. Our results suggest that current regulations have powerful effects on housing outcomes.

A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England

American Economic Review 2005 95(2), 376-380
In 2003 there were 8,665 transplants of deceased donor kidneys for the approximately 60,000 patients waiting for such transplants in the United States. While waiting, 3,436 patients died. There were also 6,464 kidney transplants from living donors (Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients web site). Live donation is an option for kidneys, since healthy people have two and can remain healthy with one. While it is illegal to buy or sell organs, there have started to be kidney exchanges involving two donor–patient pairs such that each (living) donor cannot give a kidney to the intended recipient because of blood type or immunological incompatibility, but each patient can receive a kidney from the other donor. So far these have been rare: as of December 2004, only five exchanges had been performed in the 14 transplant centers in New England. One reason there have been so few kidney exchanges is that there have not been databases of incompatible patient–donor pairs. Incompatible donors were simply sent home. (Databases are now being assembled not only in New England, but also in Ohio and Baltimore.) Lainie Friedman Ross et al. (1997) discussed the possibility of exchange between incompatible patient–donor pairs. Not only have a few such two-way exchanges been performed, but two three-way exchanges (in which the donor kidney from one pair is transplanted into the patient in a second pair, whose donor kidney goes to a third pair, whose donor kidney goes to the first pair) have been performed at Johns Hopkins. There have also been a number of “list exchanges” in which an incompatible patient– donor pair makes a donation to someone on the waiting list for a cadaver kidney, in return for the patient in the pair receiving high priority for a cadaver kidney when one becomes available.