Many Sub-Saharan African countries are extremely poor. It has been argued that the marriage system -- in particular polygyny -- is one contributing factor to the lack of development in this region. Polygyny leads to low incentives to save, depressing the capital stock and output. Enforcing monogamy might seem like an obvious solution. However, such a law will have winners and losers. In this paper, we investigate the transition from a polygynous to a monogamous steady state.

South Koreans appear to be preoccupied with their offspring's education and also have the lowest total fertility rate in the world. We propose a novel theory with status externalities and endogenous fertility connecting these facts, motivated by novel empirical evidence on private education spillovers. Using a quantitative model calibrated to Korea, we find that fertility would be 28 percent higher without the externality. We explore the effects of government policy: a pro-natal transfer or an education tax can increase fertility and reduce education spending. An education tax of 22 percent together with moderate pro-natal transfers maximizes the current generation's welfare.

Consumer bankruptcy provides partial insurance against bad luck, but, by driving up interest rates, makes life-cycle smoothing more difficult. We argue that to assess this trade-off one needs a quantitative model of consumer bankruptcy with three key features: life-cycle component, idiosyncratic earnings uncertainty, and expense uncertainty (exogenous negative shocks to household balance sheets). We find that transitory and persistent earnings shocks have very different implications for evaluating bankruptcy rules. More persistent shocks make the bankruptcy option more desirable. Larger transitory shocks have the opposite effect. Our findings suggest the current US bankruptcy system may be desirable for reasonable parameter values.

How might policies that promote marriage and/or dissuade divorce help in the fight against HIV/AIDS? This question is addressed employing a choice-theoretic general equilibrium search model, using Malawi as a case study. In the framework developed, individuals can choose between married and single life. A single person can select among abstinence and sex with or without a condom. The results suggest that marriage-friendly policies can help to abate HIV/AIDS. The policy predictions that obtain from general equilibrium analysis are compared with those that arise from simulated synthetic field experiments and epidemiological studies.