Self-regulation is the private provision of public goods and private redistribution. This paper examines the scope of self-regulation motivated by altruistic moral preferences that are reciprocal and stronger the closer are citizens in a socioeconomic distance. The focus is on the role of organizations in increasing self-regulation by mitigating free-rider problems. Social label and certification organizations can expand the scope of self-regulation but not beyond that with unconditional altruism. Enforcement organizations expand the scope of self-regulation farther, and for-profit enforcement is more aggressive than non-profit enforcement. Enforcement through social pressure imposed by NGOs also expands the scope of self-regulation.

We document that delivery lags and transaction-level economics of scale matter for international trade, leading importers to import infrequently and hold additional inventory. In a model with these frictions calibrated to empirical measures of inventory and trade lumpiness, these frictions have a large (20 percent) tariff equivalent, mostly due to inventory carrying costs. These frictions also alter the dynamics of imports and prices. Consistent with evidence from large devaluation episodes in six developing economies, following terms-of-trade and interest rate shocks, the model generates a short-term implosion of imports and a gradual increase in the retail price of imports.

The Efficacy of Collaborative Learning Recitation Sessions on Student Outcomes by Kim P. Huynh, David T. Jacho-Chávez and James K. Self. Published in volume 100, issue 2, pages 287-91 of American Economic Review, May 2010

The Effect of Migration on Wages: Evidence from a Natural Experiment by Dakshina G. De Silva, Robert P. McComb, Young-Kyu Moh, Anita R. Schiller and Andres J. Vargas. Published in volume 100, issue 2, pages 321-26 of American Economic Review, May 2010