We use public finance sufficient statistic approaches to characterize the welfare effects of “nudges,” such as simplified information and warning labels, in markets with taxes and endogenous prices. While many studies focus on average effects, we show that welfare also depends on how the nudge affects the variance of choice distortions, and average effects become irrelevant with zero pass-through or optimal taxes. We implement the framework with experiments evaluating automotive fuel economy labels and sugary drink health labels. Labels decrease purchases of low-fuel economy cars and sugary drinks but may decrease welfare because they increase the variance of choice distortions.

Public recognition is frequently used to motivate desirable behavior, yet its welfare effects—such as costs of shame or gains from pride— are rarely measured. We develop a portable empirical methodology for measuring and monetizing social image utility, and we deploy it in experiments on exercise and charitable behavior. In all experiments, public recognition motivates desirable behavior but creates highly unequal image payoffs. High-performing individuals enjoy significant utility gains, while low-performing individuals incur significant utility losses. We estimate structural models of social signaling, and we use the models to explore the social efficiency of public recognition policies.