I combine newly digitized personnel and public finance data from the British colonial administration for the period 1854–1966 to study how patronage affects the promotion and incentives of governors. Governors are more likely to be promoted to higher salaried colonies when connected to their superior during the period of patronage. Once allocated, they provide more tax exemptions, raise less revenue, and invest less. The promotion and performance gaps disappear after the abolition of patronage appointments. Patronage therefore distorts the allocation of public sector positions and reduces the incentives of favored bureaucrats to perform.

We use newly digitized records from the post office to study the effects of strengthened state capacity between 1875 and 1901. Exploiting the implementation of the Pendleton Act—a landmark statute that shielded bureaucrats from political interference—across US cities over two waves, we find that civil service reform reduced postal delivery errors and increased productivity. These improvements were most pronounced during election years when the reform dampened bureaucratic turnover. We provide suggestive evidence that reformed cities witnessed declining local partisan newspapers. Separating politics from administration, therefore, not only improved state effectiveness but also weakened the role of local politics.

We use producer-level data to evaluate the role of financial frictions in determining total factor productivity (TFP). We study a model of establishment dynamics in which financial frictions reduce TFP through two channels. First, finance frictions distort entry and technology adoption decisions. Second, finance frictions generate dispersion in the returns to capital across existing producers and thus productivity losses from misallocation. Parameterizations of our model consistent with the data imply fairly small losses from misallocation, but potentially sizable losses from inefficiently low levels of entry and technology adoption.

The fundamental importance of economic institutions for economic growth through their impact on technological change has long been argued by Joseph Schumpter and others. Recent empirical studies have reconfirmed such arguments. Robert Barro (1997) finds that economic and political institutions are the most important factors in explaining differences in growth across economies. New growth theory has made major breakthroughs in endogenizing technological changes. However, although some insightful and inspiring discussions of institutional impacts of innovation are provided, there is little attempt in these models to explain what, aside from capital, labor inputs, and knowledge accumulation, determines innovation. An attempt is made to fill the gap in literature by examining how financial institutions affect technological innovation and thus affect growth.

This paper estimates a dynamic structural model of a producer's decision to invest in R&D and export, allowing both choices to endogenously affect the future path of productivity. Using plant-level data for the Taiwanese electronics industry, both activities are found to have a positive effect on the plant's future productivity. This in turn drives more plants to self-select into both activities, contributing to further productivity gains. Simulations of an expansion of the export market are shown to increase both exporting and R&D investment and generate a gradual within-plant productivity improvement.

A large empirical literature has documented that firm-level differences in productivity, size, ownership status, and other characteristics are crucial to understanding differences in firms’ decisions to export. The evidence strongly supports the self-selection of more productive firms into export markets, but there has been more mixed evidence on the subsequent feedback effects of exporting on the future path of firm productivity. Several recent papers have introduced a new dimension into this export-productivity relationship: firm-level investments in productivity-enhancing activities such as R&D. James A. Costantini and Marc J. Melitz (2007), Alla Lileeva and Daniel Trefler (2007), and Paula Bustos (2006) explore the linkages between investments in innovation, productivity, and the decision to export in the context of the liberalization of trade regimes. Aw, Roberts, and Tor Winston (2007) have also found a significant role for firm R&D investments in explaining Taiwanese firm export patterns, as well as interaction effects between firm R&D and export choices in explaining productivity change. In this paper we summarize some empirical results from our research project to develop an estimable structural model of the joint exportinvestment decision. In the theoretical model, firms invest in R&D and physical capital, which can affect the path of future productivity for the firm. R&D investment, through its effect on future productivity, increases the profits from exporting, and participation in the export market raises the return to R&D investments. The theoretical model yields equations for the policy functions for R&D investment, physical investment, and the exporting decision, as well as the evolution of firm-level profitability, that can be estimated with micro datasets containing R&D Investments, Exporting, and the Evolution of Firm Productivity

We study the procompetitive gains from international trade in a quantitative model with endogenously variable markups. We find that trade can significantly reduce markup distortions if two conditions are satisfied: (i) there is extensive misallocation, and (ii) opening to trade exposes hitherto dominant producers to greater competitive pressure. We measure the extent to which these two conditions are satisfied in Taiwanese producer-level data. Versions of our model consistent with the Taiwanese data predict that opening up to trade strongly increases competition and reduces markup distortions by up to one-half, thus significantly reducing productivity losses due to misallocation.

Policy-relevant treatment effect estimation in a marketplace setting requires assessing both the direct treatment benefit and spillovers induced by changes to the market equilibrium. We show how to identify and estimate policy-relevant treatment effects using a unit-randomized trial run within a single large market. A Bernoulli-randomized trial allows consistent estimation of direct effects and of treatment-heterogeneity measures that enable welfare-improving targeting. Estimating spillovers—and providing confidence intervals for the direct effect—requires estimates of price elasticities, which we provide using an augmented experimental design. We illustrate our results using a simulation calibrated to a conditional cash-transfer experiment in the Philippines.

We study a Chinese policy that awards substantial tax cuts to firms with R&D investment over a threshold or “notch.” Quasi-experimental variation and administrative tax data show a significant increase in reported R&D that is partly driven by firms relabeling expenses as R&D. Structural estimates show relabeling accounts for 24.2 percent of reported R&D and that doubling R&D would increase productivity by 9 percent. Policy simulations show that firm selection and relabeling determine the cost-effectiveness of stimulating R&D, that notch-based policies are more effective than tax credits when relabeling is prevalent, and that modest spillovers justify the program from a welfare perspective.

Many price indices must be constructed without quantity data at the elementary level. The paper shows that for some consumer goods in the United States and other countries, one can approximate expenditure shares using weights derived from the retail distribution of sellers. These weights are based on the share of outlets selling an item, or the share of outlets adjusted by the total number of items sold in each. Relative to using no weights, the paper finds that using such imputed weights substantially reduces bias in the frequency of price changes, in annual inflation, and in price comparisons across countries.