This paper examines the measurement of non-financial assets in imperfectly competitive markets and considers the effect of alternative measurements on firms' investing and operating activities. We analyze a duopoly where each firm manufactures, reports, and thereafter sells its inventory. We initially characterize the informativeness of a firm's accounting report when it is prepared using historical cost and find a firm's report does not always reveal its level of inventory. We then characterize the informativeness of a report when it is prepared using fair value and find it completely reveals a firm's inventory holding. We highlight the difficulty of implementing fair value measurements that arise because fair value is an endogenous consequence of the strategic interaction between firms.

The lock-in effect proposes that capital gains taxes represent transaction costs that increase the reservation price for security owners and, ceteris paribus, reduce trading volume. Consistent with the lock-in effect, previous empirical research documents price and reactions to enacted changes in the capital gains tax rate. We investigate whether the volume hypothesis predicted by the lock-in effect extends to corporate acquisition activity. In particular, we analyze whether aggregate corporate acquisition activity is inversely associated with shareholder capital gains tax rates. We measure quarterly corporate acquisition activity from 1973 through 2001 using (1) the percentage of traded firms acquired in a calendar quarter and (2) the percentage of market value of traded firms acquired in a calendar quarter. In supplemental analysis, we measure acquisition activity at the industry level (i.e., as the percentage of firms and percentage of market value acquired by industry annually). In each analysis we model acquisition activity as a function of the maximum long-term capital gains tax rate for individuals and other macroeconomic factors previously hypothesized to be associated with acquisition activity. Consistent with a lock-in effect for corporate acquisitions, we find a significant negative association between corporate acquisition activity and the capital gains tax rate whether we measure acquisition activity in the aggregate or at the industry level. In addition, we find that this negative association is attributable to increased (decreased) taxable acquisition activity during periods of low (high) capital gains tax rates. These results suggest that, ceteris paribus, capital gains taxes represent significant transaction costs that influence the level of corporate acquisition activity.

In this paper, we embed the double entry accounting structure in a simple belief revision (estimation) problem. We ask the following question: Presented with a set of financial statements (and priors), what is the reader's “best guess” of the underlying transactions that generated these statements? Two properties of accounting information facilitate a particularly simple closed form solution to this estimation problem. First, accounting information is the outcome of a linear aggregation process. Second, the aggregation rule is double entry.

ABSTRACT The management control information used in decision‐making comports with one of the two generally accepted roles—to monitor and evaluate employees to conform their behavior to achieving organizational goals (decision‐influencing role), or to reduce decision uncertainty (decision‐facilitating role). However, the ways in which these two roles may combine concurrently has received limited empirical attention. Thus, in this case study, archival data and evidence from 30 interviews with space sector experts are employed to evaluate how the two roles assumed by management control contributed—both individually and jointly—to the achievements of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Apollo program. The analysis leads to a proposed 2×2 matrix that better characterizes the roles that could be assumed by management control in decision settings. This study extends the management control literature by presenting an additionally nuanced picture of these roles, as well as the subsequent consequences that arise from their combinations. Its findings provide insight for management control development and application.

ABSTRACT The literature on the usefulness of analysts’ cash flow forecasts is unsettled, with Call et al. ( ), Mohanram ( ), and Radhakrishnan and Wu ( ) providing evidence in favor of their usefulness, and Givoly et al. ( ), Bilinski ( ), and Ecker and Schipper ( ) questioning this. Target prices provide a good setting to test the usefulness of cash flow forecasts because they are an ultimate output of an analyst's valuation process to which cash flow forecasts are an input. Moreover, studying the effect of cash flow forecasts on target prices is more relevant for assessing their usefulness than is studying their effect on earnings‐forecast accuracy, as the accuracy of target prices requires a comparison with market prices, which are less subject to management influence than reported earnings. By improving an analyst's understanding of unexpected accruals and permanent earnings, a cash flow forecast can increase an analyst's target price accuracy and signal an analyst's superior forecasting ability. We examine whether, conditional on their earnings forecasts, analysts’ cash flow forecasts improve their target price accuracy. We find that when analysts issue cash flow forecasts, their target price accuracy increases. We also find that this accuracy increases with the accuracy of their cash flow forecasts. Finally, we find that this increased target price accuracy is greater for more challenging‐to‐value firms. Our study provides confirmatory evidence of the usefulness of analysts’ cash flow forecasts.

Abstract We investigate the economic effects of capitalizing development costs during a race between two firms to discover and develop a new technology. Winning the race requires success in the research stage and success in the development stage. Development costs are expensed in some settings, but capitalized in others. Capitalization of development costs provides a credible signal regarding progress in the race, allowing the rival to make a more informed decision regarding whether to proceed with development. We study the effects of this signal on the firms’ investment decisions and social welfare. We show that if both firms capitalize instead of expense development costs, aggregate investment in research weakly increases but aggregate investment in development weakly decreases. We also characterize the accounting policies that the two rival firms would adopt if they could freely choose either an expensing policy or a capitalization policy.

Extant research suggests that book-tax differences are useful measures in evaluating firm performance. There is little evidence, however, regarding taxable income as an alternative performance measure to book income. We examine firm characteristics that mitigate or enhance the ability of taxable income to inform investors regarding firm performance. We find that the relative and incremental information content of estimated taxable income to book income is lower for high tax planning firms and higher for low earnings quality firms. Our results suggest that tax planning and low earnings quality have contrasting effects on the information content of estimated taxable income. These findings are pertinent to recent research examining book-tax differences as a measure of earnings quality and taxable income as an alternative performance measure.

Abstract This paper uses a strategic tax compliance model to examine taxpayer reporting and tax authority audit strategies in an international setting with two tax authorities. The setting features both information asymmetry between the taxpayer and the tax authorities and inconsistent tax transfer‐pricing rules. The latter creates the possibility of each country trying to tax the same income. We study the effect of the probability of transfer‐price rule inconsistency on the strategies and payoffs of the taxpayer and the tax authorities. We find that an increase in the probability of transfer‐price rule inconsistency induces more aggressive auditing by governments. It therefore deters taxpayers from shifting income to the country with the lower tax rate in situations in which the transfer‐pricing rules are consistent, and can either increase or decrease the income reported to the low‐tax‐rate country in cases in which the transfer‐pricing rules are inconsistent. We find that an increase in transfer‐price rule inconsistency could either increase or decrease the taxpayer's expected tax liability and could either increase or decrease the deadweight loss from auditing. Our results call into question the conventional wisdom that the prospect of double taxation due to transfer‐price rule inconsistency increases a firm's expected tax liability and governments' expected audit costs.