Knowledge that Transforms

Enterprise systems ( ES s) are widely used to support business processes along the enterprise value chain. It has been shown that ES s, by integrating business functions and making information about day‐to‐day activities available, enhance operational transparency and improve the internal information environment. However, while ES ‐based business infrastructures can offer many benefits, their prevalence and increased complexity have also brought new challenges to external auditors. Motivated by the prominence of this issue for auditors and regulators and by the scarcity of research jointly examining ES s and auditors’ work, we investigate whether the presence and extent of client firms’ ES implementations are related to the quality and efficiency of auditors’ work. Using proprietary archival data on ES implementations and controlling for self‐selection, we find that ES implementation improves the quality and efficiency of current and future years’ audit work. Specifically, there are fewer restatements, a greater likelihood of auditors issuing going‐concern opinions to firms that do not survive, higher accruals‐based auditing quality, a lower likelihood of Form 10‐K filing delays, and generally lower audit fees. We further show that the benefits of ES s generally increase with the scope of implementation and are generally greater when the ES includes accounting and finance systems. Inconsistent with improvement in the quality of auditors’ work, we find no evidence that ES s help auditors identify material weaknesses in advance of restatement announcements and we find that, even in the presence of ES s, auditors issue an excessive number of going‐concern opinions to clients that survive.

This study examines the extent to which parsimonious and general cross‐sectional valuation models, restricted to include only publicly available historical accounting information, explain share prices in the cross section, identify periods when market mispricing may be more pervasive, and also identify which shares within those cross sections are more likely to be mispriced. Our model simply includes historical book value, earnings, dividends, and growth, but it explains on average over 60 percent of the cross‐sectional variation in share prices in annual estimations across 1975–2011. We also examine the extent to which the residuals indicate mispricing. The quintile of stocks picked by our model as most likely underpriced outperform the quintile of stocks picked as most likely overpriced by an average of 9.9 percent over the following 12 months, after controlling for size. We also predict and find that value residuals are better predictors of future abnormal returns: (i) among firms that are not covered by analysts; (ii) among firms that face fewer accounting measurement challenges; and (iii) when we estimate value model parameters by industry/year. We also predict and find our approach works better in periods when the mapping of fundamentals into prices is weaker. This study contributes a novel and straightforward approach to map accounting fundamentals into share prices in order to identify mispricing in time‐series and in the cross section.

This study investigates whether or not related party transactions serve as “red flags” that warn of potential financial misstatement. We hand‐collect related party transactions for S&P 1500 firms in 2001, 2004, and 2007 and find a positive correlation between these transactions and future restatements, suggesting restatements are more likely when a firm engages in related party transactions. The association is concentrated among transactions that appear to reflect “tone at the top” rather than arguably more necessary business transactions. We also find RPT firms pay lower audit fees. However, “tone RPT ” firms that subsequently restate pay higher audit fees, providing evidence that auditors recognize the individual restatement risks of these firms. Our results suggest that tone‐based RPT s serve as signals of higher risk of material misstatement.

Managers have a variety of tools at their disposal to influence stakeholder perceptions. Earnings management and the strategic reporting of non‐ GAAP earnings are just two of the available menu choices. We explore how real earnings management and accruals management influence the probability that a company will disclose a non‐ GAAP adjusted earnings metric in its earnings press release and the likelihood that it will do so aggressively. We first investigate situations where managers already meet analysts’ expectations either based on strong operating performance or after employing real and accruals management. We find that when solid operating performance alone allows firms to meet expectations, managers do not employ earnings management or non‐ GAAP reporting. However, when managers meet expectations using real and accruals management, they are significantly less likely to report a non‐ GAAP earnings metric. Next, we explore scenarios where companies fall short of expectations. We find that when they just miss expectations after managing GAAP earnings, they are significantly more likely to employ non‐ GAAP reporting, suggesting that the timing and relatively costless nature of non‐ GAAP reporting allows managers to appear to meet expectations on a non‐ GAAP basis when managed GAAP earnings fall short. Moreover, we find that companies are more likely to report non‐ GAAP earnings (and to do so aggressively) when (i) they are unable to use real or accruals earnings management, (ii) are constrained by prior‐period accruals management, and (iii) their operating performance is poor. Taken together, our results are consistent with a substitute relation between non‐ GAAP reporting and both real and accruals management.

This study examines the impact of auditor quality on financial covenants in debt contracts. We conjecture that high‐quality auditors have two related effects on these debt covenants: (i) they encourage fewer and less restrictive covenants by providing assurance to lenders at contract inception and, consequently, (ii) they ensure a lower probability of eventual covenant violations. Consistent with the conjectures, we find that auditor quality is negatively associated with the intensity and tightness of financial covenants. Specifically, high‐quality auditors are associated with fewer covenants (especially performance covenants) and less binding covenants. Additionally, we find that auditor quality is negatively associated with the likelihood of covenant violations. In an ancillary test, we provide evidence that high‐quality auditors mitigate the detrimental effect of covenant violations on the cost of borrowing. Together, these findings highlight the important role of auditors in debt contracting.

This study examines the associations between four economic outcomes of the 2005 mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards ( IFRS ) and concurrent changes in two important accounting constructs, accounting comparability and reporting quality. My primary purpose is to evaluate the relative importance of cross‐country accounting comparability and firm‐specific reporting quality in explaining previously documented increases in Tobin's Q, stock liquidity, analyst forecast accuracy, and analyst forecast agreement following IFRS adoption. Given that improvements in both comparability and reporting quality are primary stated objectives of the International Accounting Standards Board ( IASB ), it is important to understand their relative roles in shaping the information environment of financial statement users following IFRS adoption. Using 1,861 first‐time adopters in 23 countries, I find that firms with a larger improvement in comparability have larger increases in Q, liquidity, forecast accuracy, and forecast agreement following adoption, relative to other adopters. In contrast, improvements in reporting quality around adoption appear to have only a second‐order effect that is generally limited to Q effects among those adopters with concurrent improvements in comparability. These results are robust to alternative design and variable specifications. Finally, I continue to find these results for samples restricted to countries with weaker pre‐adoption institutional environments and countries that did not initiate proactive financial statement reviews, indicating that strong institutions and regulatory improvements are not driving the results. Overall, my results suggest that improvements in cross‐country accounting comparability played an important role in the previously documented economic benefits that accrued to 2005 mandatory IFRS adopters.

Recent microstructure research finds that liquidity risk, in particular its information component, plays an important role in explaining the post‐earnings‐announcement drift ( PEAD ). We decompose liquidity risk into an accounting‐associated component and a nonaccounting‐associated component and examine their relative importance in explaining PEAD . Our research is motivated by recent findings that liquidity risk is a systematic risk and earnings quality is negatively associated with liquidity risk. We find that the accounting‐associated component is more strongly related to PEAD returns than is its nonaccounting‐associated counterpart. Further analyses reveal that the relation between accounting‐associated liquidity risk and PEAD returns is weaker for firms with greater analyst following. We also find that in a significant market downturn, the relation between accounting‐associated liquidity risk and PEAD returns becomes more pronounced. Our study is the first to document a liquidity risk‐based role of accounting quality in explaining the PEAD phenomenon. It parses out the PEAD risk premia associated with accounting versus nonaccounting sources and, by so doing, sheds light on the role of accounting quality in shaping the liquidity risk‐ PEAD returns relation.

While accounting research has demonstrated the role of a decision maker's own emotions during judgments, psychology research proposes that others’ emotions provide an informational signal to assess an opponent's limits, cooperativeness, and toughness during bargaining. We examine how a bargaining opponent's emotions provide information signals that can be used by a selling division manager during transfer pricing decisions and whether informal control system choices by corporate management to foster cooperation can create a context that influences how managers react to these signals. In an experiment, when informal controls to encourage cooperation were absent (less collaborative environment), managers’ selling price estimates were more conciliatory when the opponent was described as displaying negative emotions than when described as displaying positive emotions. However, when informal controls to cooperate were present (more collaborative environment), managers’ selling price estimates were more conciliatory when the opponent displayed positive rather than negative emotions. Path analyses suggest that managers’ perception of their opponents’ signals is the mechanism by which opponents’ emotions influence transfer‐price decisions. This study highlights the role of others’ emotions as information signals during accounting bargaining and provides insight into the context dependency of opponents’ emotions under various control system structures.

This study finds that investors price firms' greenhouse gas ( GHG ) emissions as a negative component of equity value, and this valuation discount does not differ between firms that voluntarily disclose to the Carbon Disclosure Project ( CDP ) and nondisclosing firms. We derive the GHG emissions for nondisclosers from an estimation model that incorporates firm characteristics and industry. The finding that investors view CDP amounts and estimates of emissions as equally value‐relevant suggests that equity values reflect GHG information from channels other than the CDP . An event study of investors' response to emission‐related information in firms' 8‐K filings further supports this finding. Economically, our results suggest that, for the median S&P 500 firm, GHG emissions impose a market‐implied equity discount of $79 per ton, representing about one‐half of 1 percent of market capitalization.

Prior research finds that investors respond more favorably to a disaggregated earnings forecast than to an aggregated one. The present study examines whether this initial favorable effect on investors’ decisions leads to investors giving management the benefit of the doubt, or backfires in the event of a subsequent earnings surprise announcement. The results of our experiment indicate a “backfire effect” consistent with Expectation Violation Theory. We find that investors’ negative reactions to an earnings surprise are stronger if they first observed a disaggregated forecast than if they first saw an aggregated forecast. The largest downward adjustment in investment interest occurs when the disaggregated forecast is later found to be overstated. This study provides evidence of the complexity of the effect of disaggregated earnings forecast and adds to the literature concerning the costs and benefits of accounting information disaggregation.