Knowledge that Transforms

Researchers have studied the entry of professionals into the public accounting field, their careers at an organization, and their exit from the field. However, they have largely overlooked the mobility of these professionals, whose careers involve firm transfers. Drawing on Bourdieu's sociology and interviews with 31 transferees and 7 non–Big 4 legacy partners, we examine the move of Big 4 professionals to non–Big 4 firms. Our findings show that transferees have an ingrained belief that a Big 4 career is the ideal professional trajectory. But they experience points of disjuncture at these firms, prompting them to reevaluate this organizational illusio and their career aspirations and ultimately reinforcing their transfer decision. After moving, transferees learn by trial and error how to valorize and layer their habitus and different forms of capital in order to adjust to the non–Big 4 firms. Our findings challenge prior assumptions about the superiority of Big 4 professionals and the distinctive forms of their capital by showing that the capital needed to obtain powerful positions at Big 4 and non–Big 4 firms are similar, but that its nature and relative value varies. Our findings reveal a paradoxical dynamic in which transferees' Big 4 habitus and capital undergo a complex, iterative process of valorization and layering when these professionals move within the public accounting field. This contrasts with a materialization of professional domination that occurs when former Big 4 employees move outside the public accounting field. For most of our transferees, dissonance also develops between the Big 4 and non–Big 4 layers of their habitus, and they never completely deconstruct their organizational illusio. These findings reveal that the reflexivity of transferees is both shaped and limited by their Big 4 habitus and illusio. Overall, our results contribute to the understanding of professional mobility within the public accounting field.

Short interest is currently required to be disclosed twice per month, but regulators have sought to increase this frequency. Meanwhile, short interest information from private third‐party vendors has emerged to meet investor demand on a daily basis. We find that daily private‐sector data strongly predict bimonthly regulatory disclosure. Furthermore, private‐sector data help price discovery, albeit with modest economic magnitude. Investors tend to underreact to the information content of private‐sector data mainly due to limits to arbitrage rather than market inattention. Despite the costly access to private‐sector data, we find no evidence that retail investors are harmed in their trades. Overall, our findings highlight the interplay between private‐sector and regulatory solutions in enhancing financial market transparency.

The Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 158 mandates the recognition of previously disclosed off–balance sheet liabilities (OBLs) for sponsors of defined benefit (DB) retirement plans. This recognition significantly increases reported liabilities, with notable variation across DB plan sponsors. We find that unrated DB plan sponsors reduce financial leverage following OBLs recognition, driven by net debt retirements and net equity issuances. These adjustments appear optimal because they bring firms closer to their estimated leverage targets. In contrast, DB plan sponsors with tight, floating‐GAAP covenants also reduce financial leverage, primarily through net debt retirements. The evidence suggests that on–balance sheet reporting requirements impact capital structure decisions through a rating or a covenant channel.

This study investigates the joint effects of investor status and locus of attribution on investors' judgments of management credibility. We study these effects in the context of an adverse event disclosure. Building on social identity and ultimate attribution error theory, we predict and find that under external attribution, current investors perceive management as more credible than prospective investors do. In contrast, we predict and find that investor status does not affect perceived management credibility under internal attribution. We provide evidence supporting our theory that company identification explains these findings. In addition, we document that the differences in credibility are mainly driven by perceptions of management's trustworthiness, rather than competence. Moreover, our results indicate that these differences in credibility judgments affect earnings expectations, thus inducing disagreement among investors. Our findings have important practical implications, including that company identification can be an asset to companies and that communicating adverse events with an external attribution reduces perceived management credibility for prospective investors.

We examine changes in bank loan contracts after borrowers experience a nearby local newspaper closure. Compared to a sample of control firms, we find that the closure of a local newspaper leads to higher interest spreads for borrowers. This effect is more pronounced when there are fewer related lenders in the syndicate, when lenders have less prior lending experience in the local area, when the closed local newspapers are associated with increases in misconduct cases, and for institutional lenders who rely more heavily on others for monitoring. In addition, we observe that loan contract amendments become less frequent, while covenant strictness increases following newspaper closures. Our main findings are robust to various research design specifications and are not driven by deteriorating local economic conditions. Our findings suggest that local media still plays a significant role in the debt markets, even as society moves deeper into the internet era.

In 2008, the IRS added several schedules to Form 990, including Schedule R, related party transactions. Utilizing Schedule R, we investigate and descriptively document the existence of related parties and the types of transactions engaged in with those related parties. Then, to provide evidence of the usefulness of these disclosures, we tie into the literature on financial reporting quality. Prior research into financial reporting quality shows that donors discount program ratios when a nonprofit organization reports zero fundraising expenses, implying that they find reporting zero fundraising expenses to be a proxy for poor financial reporting quality. A plausible reason for organizations reporting zero fundraising expenses is that a related party conducts fundraising on the organization's behalf. Consistent with this interpretation, we find that when nonprofits disclose that fundraising services are provided by a related entity, they are more likely to report zero fundraising expenses. We also find that disclosure of related party fundraising mitigates donor discounting of the program ratio when zero fundraising expenses are reported. However, we only find that this mitigation occurs in nonprofits with sophisticated donors. In sum, we find evidence consistent with donors—in particular, sophisticated donors—using disclosures provided in Form 990 to supplement the amounts recognized. Our findings demonstrate the importance of, and are consistent with the use of, these related party disclosures. On a broader level, these findings provide insight into how thoroughly donors are willing to review Form 990 to get information relevant to their donation decision.

We examine the association between target firms' public non‐GAAP earnings disclosures and merger and acquisition (M&A) efficiency. This research question is important, given the widespread use of non‐GAAP metrics in M&A valuation and lack of evidence regarding the real effects of non‐GAAP disclosure. Public non‐GAAP disclosure can enhance bidders' ability to assess a target's core earnings and potential synergy, especially in the earlier stages of due diligence, and enable bidders to make better M&A decisions. We find that target firms' non‐GAAP disclosures are associated with greater M&A efficiency, greater synergies, and lower likelihood of post‐acquisition goodwill impairment. We also find some evidence that target firms' non‐GAAP disclosures are positively related to post‐acquisition operating performance. Further, we find modest evidence that the positive relation between non‐GAAP disclosures and M&A efficiency is stronger (1) for targets that are more difficult to value, (2) for targets with weaker information environments, and (3) when targets' non‐GAAP numbers are of higher quality. Overall, our evidence suggests that non‐GAAP disclosures help facilitate efficient resource allocation in M&As and are associated with real effects on corporate investment. Our evidence is potentially relevant to regulators' concerns about the usefulness of non‐GAAP metrics.

This paper examines how a change in disclosure regulation influences investors' information acquisition and trading across multiple markets. We leverage the 2007 elimination of the Form 20‐F reconciliation requirement for cross‐listed firms that prepare financial statements under IFRS. Using a difference‐in‐differences research design, we show that investors acquire fewer Form 20‐Fs of IFRS‐reporting cross‐listed firms when these forms are not filed in a timely manner relative to the home‐country earnings announcement. We also find an increased acquisition of earnings‐specific 6‐Ks, indicating a shift in investor attention from delayed and unreconciled 20‐Fs to more timely earnings releases in the home country. Furthermore, we find that American Depositary Receipt (ADR) market reactions to local earnings announcements increase after the deregulation, especially for firms with strong home‐country institutions. In addition, we find that the deregulation increases return co‐movement between the US ADR market and the home‐country stock market for IFRS filers' shares. Our results bring novel insights regarding the cross‐market impact of the disclosure regulation change.

How do global firms manage conflicting constituencies in complex markets? The Big 4 accounting firms have expanded their size and scope to the extent that they need to relate to different constituencies simultaneously, sometimes on controversial issues. This is particularly relevant given their engagement in aggressive tax planning services alongside their traditional professional obligations, as this generates a conflict between discretion offered to “offshore” clients and accountability offered to other stakeholders. This requires strategic duplicity—sending differentiated signals to different stakeholders. We suggest that firms use organizational partitioning across legal structures and geographies to enable strategic duplicity. We test this by collecting a unique data set on the Big 4's ownership structures and staff numbers across all locations, showing that their organizations are heavily segmented. We show that the Big 4 use this geographical and legal differentiation to send contrasting signals to constituents about their organizations, engaging in a type of strategic duplicity that we term transparency arbitrage, in which “onshore” stakeholders receive a signal of transparency and “offshore” stakeholders receive a signal of discretion. This duality enables them to engage in controversial issues with conflicting stakeholders.

This study provides empirical evidence that key audit matters (KAMs) are informative for future negative accounting outcomes. We employ FinBERT—a deep learning model designed for natural language processing that allows human‐like text comprehension—to demonstrate that goodwill‐related KAMs are predictive of firms' future impairments. Our findings reveal that utilizing KAMs as a stand‐alone predictor for future impairments provides meaningful predictive power. By exploring the semantic content of reported KAMs, we find that their predictive power is primarily driven by text passages covering how both the firm and the auditor exercise judgment in the accounting and auditing of goodwill. Furthermore, we show that KAMs are incrementally predictive beyond several firm‐level determinants and disclosures in annual reports. Finally, our additional analyses indicate that (1) KAM‐predicted impairment probabilities are relevant to capital markets, (2) KAMs are useful for predicting the magnitude of goodwill impairments, and (3) the predictive power extends to other KAM topics. Collectively, our findings enhance the understanding of the informational content of KAMs, which is a key rationale for their introduction.