Knowledge that Transforms

We examine whether the presence of female directors and female audit committee members affect audit quality in terms of audit effort and auditor choice by using observations from a sample of U.S. firms, spanning the years 2001–2011. We find, after controlling for endogeneity and other board, firm, and industry characteristics, that firms with gender‐diverse boards (audit committees) pay 6 percent (8 percent) higher audit fees and are 6 percent (7 percent) more likely to choose specialist auditors compared to all‐male boards (audit committees). Our findings suggest that boards (audit committees) with female directors (members) are likely to demand higher audit quality, ceteris paribus.

Prior studies find that audit fees are higher for cross‐listed firms, and these studies primarily attribute the incremental fees to added litigation costs. In this study, we investigate whether the higher audit fees that foreign firms cross‐listed in the United States pay are also attributable to incremental audit effort associated with U.S. disclosure requirements and a more stringent U.S. auditing environment. By comparing audit fees of foreign cross‐listed firms to U.S. domiciled firms and to non‐cross‐listed foreign firms, we are able to decompose incremental audit fees into portions attributable to added audit effort and to added litigation costs. We find that, on average, foreign firms cross‐listed in the United States pay significantly higher fees than domestic U.S. firms and foreign firms that do not cross‐list. Furthermore, we find that audit effort is almost as important as litigation costs in explaining the higher fees associated with foreign cross‐listed firms; our estimates suggest that between 29 percent and 48 percent of the incremental fees are attributable to incremental audit effort. In addition, the total cross‐listing premium is increasing in the difference between the U.S. auditing regulatory environment and that of the home country of the cross‐listed firm. Our study improves our understanding of the role of audit effort in explaining the added fees charged by auditors when foreign firms cross‐list in the United States.

We examine whether, in the aggregate, margin debt is associated with the divergence of price from accounting fundamentals. We find that investors increase their margin debt following upward price movements away from accounting fundamentals, consistent with these investors being extrapolative in aggregate. We also find evidence that margin debt appears to be linked to temporary overpricing in recent periods, as the aggregate ratio of margin debt to price is reliably associated with negative future returns since at least 1992. Our results are consistent with the theoretical literature that predicts extrapolative traders have a destabilizing effect on market prices, and helps explain why prices diverge from accounting fundamentals.

This study investigates the role of tax avoidance in the credit‐rating process and whether differences exist in how rating agencies account for the risk relevance of tax avoidance. Using a sample of initial credit ratings assigned to public debt issuances during 1994–2013, our evidence is consistent with Moody's Investors Service and Standard & Poor's assessing the costs and benefits associated with tax avoidance differently from one another, resulting in more frequent and pronounced rating agency disagreement. Rating agency disagreement over tax avoidance is most evident when it is accompanied by relatively high levels of uncertain tax positions, foreign activities, research and development activities, or tax footnote opacity. We also find evidence that decreases (increases) in tax avoidance or tax footnote disclosure opacity are positively (negatively) associated with the convergence of split ratings. This suggests that firms can exacerbate or mitigate rating agency disagreement subsequent to bond issuance. Our study complements prior research by examining why sophisticated information intermediaries disagree about the risk relevance of tax avoidance. It also sheds light on how firms can influence rating agencies’ understanding of tax avoidance.

The accounting literature includes numerous examples of discontinuities at prominent benchmarks that are widely interpreted as evidence that earnings are managed to meet those benchmarks. However, there are a few examples where discontinuities do not exist, which are sometimes interpreted as inconsistent with earnings management. Alternative explanations for discontinuities have also been suggested. This paper reviews, evaluates, and integrates the available evidence and concludes that the theory that earnings are managed to meet benchmarks provides the simplest and most complete explanation for the body of discontinuity‐related evidence.

Using 1990 through 2013 data of U.S. firms with foreign operations, we show that (i) the serial correlation of analyst forecast errors increases in the extent of international diversification, (ii) post‐earnings‐announcement drift ( PEAD ) based on analyst forecast errors increases in the extent of international diversification, and (iii) the impact of international diversification on the serial correlation of analyst forecast errors and its associated drift is significantly reduced after the implementation of SFAS 131 on segment disclosures. When we replicate our tests using seasonally differenced earnings, we fail to observe similar patterns. Overall, our results suggest that investors’ underreaction to announced earnings is a likely explanation for PEAD . Our findings also indicate that disclosures required under SFAS 131 are useful to analysts in forming efficient earnings expectations, thereby helping capital market participants in the pricing of internationally diversified firms’ earnings.

We investigate the economic effects of capitalizing development costs during a race between two firms to discover and develop a new technology. Winning the race requires success in the research stage and success in the development stage. Development costs are expensed in some settings, but capitalized in others. Capitalization of development costs provides a credible signal regarding progress in the race, allowing the rival to make a more informed decision regarding whether to proceed with development. We study the effects of this signal on the firms’ investment decisions and social welfare. We show that if both firms capitalize instead of expense development costs, aggregate investment in research weakly increases but aggregate investment in development weakly decreases. We also characterize the accounting policies that the two rival firms would adopt if they could freely choose either an expensing policy or a capitalization policy.

This paper derives the impacts of legal system characteristics and auditing standards on auditor behavior (audit quality), and analyzes the determination of optimal auditing standards under different legal regimes. Legal regimes are characterized by differences in the uncertainty concerning the outcome of legal proceedings (termed vagueness of legal systems) and differences in the average size of damage awards. Auditing standards as determined by standard setters can vary in both toughness and vagueness. Our analysis provides implications for the adoption of International Standards on Auditing ( ISA ). Countries, such as the United States, where auditor legal liability is significantly more onerous than the global norm are not likely to adopt ISA , since these standards may not induce auditors to provide the optimal level of audit quality. Conversely, the adoption of ISA by countries, such as China, where the legal system makes the recovery of damages from auditors quite difficult, is not by itself likely to result in a high level of audit quality. Furthermore, our model suggests that auditor rotation can help improve audit quality, but only in certain circumstances.

Trust is often posited to substitute for management control in interfirm transactions. However, this raises questions of how trust arises in new relationships, and whether trust that is not based on prior experience transacting together is sufficient to persuade managers to forgo investments in management controls. We use an experiment to test whether two features of the early stage of an interfirm relationship influence a buyer's initial trust in a supplier and have consequences for subsequent investments in management controls and in the collaboration. These two features are the autonomy of the buyer's manager to choose a supplier (i.e., delegation of decision‐making authority) and the supplier's willingness to share information with the buyer. We find that the buyer manager's initial trust in the supplier is associated positively with both the autonomy to choose the supplier and the supplier's willingness to share information. Information content and supplier characteristics are held constant, so these results are novel and distinct from prior studies of the antecedents of trust. We find that higher initial trust is associated with reduced expenditures for management controls and increased investments in the collaboration. Thus, we conclude that delegation of decision‐making authority and supplier information‐sharing behavior in the early stages of a relationship influence the formation of initial trust, which has real consequences for investments in management control and in the collaboration.

Our study reports evidence on the dynamic effects of client switches on auditor reputations and fee premia. Offices of large accounting firms that lose (gain) major industry clients experience a reputation shock leading to more same‐industry client losses (gains) over the next two years. There is also a shift in audit fees charged to other same‐industry clients when a major client loss (gain) results in an audit office losing (gaining) city‐level industry leadership. A major client loss or gain also creates a short‐term capacity shock to an audit office's ability to supply high‐quality audits. However, there is no evidence of reputation spillovers to other‐industry clients in the audit office, or to clients in other offices of the accounting firm.