This study investigates experimentally how mutual monitoring affects effort when employees are compensated via rank‐order tournaments. Theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that mutual monitoring may either decrease effort by facilitating collusion or increase effort by stimulating competition. In our first experiment, we find that mutual monitoring increases effort, because participants do not attempt to collude but rather behave competitively. This result leads us to expand our theory and develop hypotheses to predict that the effect of mutual monitoring depends on whether employees have the inclination to collude or compete. Specifically, we predict that mutual monitoring decreases effort when employees are inclined to collude and increases effort when employees are inclined to compete; that is, mutual monitoring will not change the basic inclination created by the workplace setting, but will “turn up the volume” on the effect that such inclination has on effort. Consistent with our predictions, our second experiment finds that mutual monitoring leads to lower effort when participants have a collusive inclination and (eventually) higher effort when they have a competitive inclination. Overall, the results from these two experiments suggest that allowing employees to observe each other's productive effort in tournament incentive settings may have positive or negative consequences for the firm, depending on whether environmental factors predispose employees to collude or compete.

We examine the relation between auditor tenure and a firm's ability to use discretionary accruals to meet or beat analysts' earnings forecasts. We find evidence over the period 1988-2006 that firms with both short and long tenure are more likely to report levels of discretionary accruals that allow them to meet or beat earnings forecasts. These results suggest that while regulatory mandates for periodic auditor turnover have negative effects, sustained long-term auditor-client relationships may also be detrimental to audit quality. Further, although we observe a positive relation between tenure and the use of discretionary accruals to meet or beat earnings in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) period, we do not observe such a relation in the post-SOX period. This latter finding is consistent with regulatory reforms and heightened scrutiny of financial reporting in the post-SOX period resulting in less aggressive efforts at managing earnings by client firms and/or increased diligence on the part of auditors. These findings may not generalize to firms that are not covered by analysts, because these firms do not face the same public pressure to manage earnings in order to meet or beat expectations. © CAAA.

This study investigates whether incentive-based compensation for audit committee members is associated with accounting restatements. We use an agency framework to predict that short-term (long-term) incentive compensation for audit committee members will increase (decrease) the likelihood of accounting restatements due to error or fraud. Using a matched-sample logistic regression with 153 restatement and 153 nonrestatement companies, we find the predicted positive relation between short-term incentive compensation (short-term stock option grants) for audit committee members and likelihood of restatement. However, the long-term incentive compensation results contradict prediction and indicate a significant positive relation between audit committee member long-term incentive compensation {long-term stock option grants) and restatement likelihood. Supplemental testing provides evidence that the findings generally are robust to numerous alternative measures and models. The results raise questions about stock option grants for audit committee members and suggest the need for additional theoretical and empirical research to clarify the audit committee's role and incentives in agency frameworks.

This study examines the behavioral impact of an information system, and how that impact varies with the information system's precision, in an internal reporting environment. We propose that a manager's reporting decisions are affected by his or her trade‐off of the benefits of appearing honest against the benefits of misrepresentation. The information system affects the manager's trade‐off by improving the owner's ability to make an inference regarding the manager's level of honesty. Thus, to the extent that the manager perceives benefits to appearing honest, the presence of an information system can increase managerial honesty. As the information system becomes more precise, however, the manager must forgo greater benefits of misrepresentation in order to achieve the same appearance of honesty. For managers under a precise system, this will shift the trade‐off decision toward the benefits of misrepresentation and away from the benefits of appearing honest. Notably, in our experiment, the only benefit of appearing honest is an intrinsically motivated desire for social approval. We find that, although the existence of an information system increases managerial honesty, honesty is lower under a precise than under a coarse information system. We also compare profit earned by the owners in our experiment, which relies on a behavioral role of an information system, with the maximum profit theoretically possible given a contractual use of the information system. This comparison suggests that, unless the available information system is sufficiently precise, the owner will obtain greater profits by not contracting on its output, even if that output is fully contractible.

We investigate whether the financial riskiness of large U.S. audit firm clienteles varied with the changing audit litigation liability environment during the period 1975‐99. Partitioning the period of study into four distinct periods (a benchmark period (1975‐84), a period of increasing concerns about litigation liability (1985‐89), a period of lobbying for reform (1990‐94), and a post‐relief period (1995‐99)), we find some evidence of risk decreases during 1985‐89, strong evidence of risk decreases during 1990‐94, and strong evidence of risk increases during 1995‐99. However, we also find that over the period of our study, a time during which Big 6 market shares grew appreciably, the proportion of litigious‐industry clients in Big 6 client portfolios grew at about the same rate as the proportion of such clients in the population. Moreover, the Big 6 share of the financially riskiest clients in the economy did not grow as fast as the overall Big 6 market share. In sum, although our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the riskiness of Big 6 client portfolios responded to changes in the audit litigation liability environment, we find no systematic evidence of a "race to the bottom" or "bottom fishing" by these firms in a bid to increase their market shares.

The nominating committee (NC) of the board identifies and nominates individuals for board service, thus establishing the board's composition. Despite this important role, relatively little is known about the NC process, including NC members' actions and thought processes. Based on interviews of 20 U.S. public company NC members, including 16 chairs, we focus on two primary questions: (1) what is the extent of influence that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) has over committee processes, and (2) to what extent are committee processes formalized (i.e., framed and acted upon in a mechanistic way)? We find that there is continuing recognition of CEO influence in the director nomination process, the level of which varies widely by company. Also, there is considerable variability in the formalization of the director nomination process (e.g., some NCs use search firms and a matrix/grid approach to assessing director skill sets across the board, while others do not). Finally, we find that many interviewees have professional or personal ties to the CEO and that nearly all of the NCs focus on “chemistry” and comfort in the director nomination process, where the often‐stated goal is to enhance the board's ability to function effectively and to reduce risk in the director nomination process. The overall message of the interviews perhaps is best captured by one interviewee, who described a “strange little dance.” Throughout the interviews, we find evidence that the NC must “dance” through a complex decision landscape.

This study examines the relation between audit quality and earnings management. Consistent with prior research, we treat audit quality as a dichotomous variable and assume that Big Six auditors are of higher quality than non‐Big Six auditors. Earnings management is captured by discretionary accruals that are estimated using a cross‐sectional version of the Jones 1991 model. Prior literature suggests that auditors are more likely to object to management's accounting choices that increase earnings (as opposed to decrease earnings) and that auditors are more likely to be sued when they are associated with financial statements that overstate earnings (as compared to understate earnings). Therefore, we hypothesize that clients of non‐Big Six auditors report discretionary accruals that increase income relatively more than the discretionary accruals reported by clients of Big Six auditors. This hypothesis is supported by evidence from a sample of 10,379 Big Six and 2,179 non‐Big Six firm years. Specifically, clients of non‐Big Six auditors report discretionary accruals that are, on average, 1.5‐2.1 percent of total assets higher than the discretionary accruals reported by clients of Big Six auditors. Also, consistent with earnings management, we find that the mean and median of the absolute value of discretionary accruals are greater for firms with non‐Big Six auditors. This result also indicates that lower audit quality is associated with more “accounting flexibility”.

Prior studies find that delayed earnings announcements tend to communicate unfavorable news, and investors react negatively when firms delay earnings announcements. However, these findings do not explain why investors discount delayed earnings, even after controlling for the earnings news, and why firms sometimes announce good news late. Motivated by theory from Trueman (1990) that attempts to explain these phenomena, we examine whether announcement delays indicate earnings management. We predict and find that good news firms with higher discretionary accruals are more likely to announce earnings late. Consistent with post fiscal year‐end activities driving announcement delays, we fail to find a relation between measures of real earnings management and late announcements. Using a last‐chance earnings management measure based on tax expense manipulation, we also predict and find strong evidence that good news firms engaging in last‐chance earnings management are more likely to delay earnings announcements. Consistent with Trueman's (1990) theory that earnings management explains why investors discount delayed earnings announcements, we find that, on average, earnings announcement returns are 1.4% lower for late announcers relying on last‐chance earnings management to report good news. Overall, our findings suggest that announcement delays provide information about not only the sign of the earnings news but also the potential for earnings management.

Differentiating real earnings management (REM) from normal business decisions poses a unique challenge for auditors, researchers, and investors. The ambiguity associated with REM, and the fact that REM does not violate GAAP, may explain why its use is on the rise. While some assert that auditors are not, and should not be, concerned with REM, recent research suggests that REM may influence some auditor judgments. Using Correspondent Inference Theory (CIT) as our theoretical framework, we extend REM research by investigating the ways in which auditors respond to REM and how auditors deal with the intrinsic ambiguity associated with REM. We administer a 3×2 between‐subjects experiment to 113 highly‐experienced auditors, manipulating the level of ambiguity surrounding the observed REM (Explicit REM, Potential REM, or No REM) and the earnings context in which the client engages in REM (the client beat or missed the consensus earnings forecast). We find that auditors respond to REM by lowering assessments of management tone (i.e., management's commitment to a culture of high ethical standards), being more likely to discuss the issue with the audit committee, and being less likely to retain the client. Auditors respond to Explicit REM regardless of the earnings context, but respond to Potential (i.e., ambiguous) REM only when the client beats the forecast. Finally, we find that management tone mediates the relation between REM and auditor responses, even after controlling for various audit‐related risks. Thus, for auditors, REM appears to be primarily a “people” issue, as REM provides a negative signal about management.