In this study we conduct an experiment to examine how qualifying an income‐decreasing accounting change in years of strong financial performance affects financial report users' assessments of strategic reporting, current financial performance, and future financial performance (performance over the next three years). We find that without the qualification, users viewed the income‐decreasing accounting change as relatively nonstrategic and that user assessments of current and future performance were not different. In the presence of the qualification, users believed that the accounting change was relatively strategic, and they discounted the income effect of the accounting change. We find further that their assessments of future performance were below their assessments of current performance but no different from the assessments of future performance in the absence of the qualification. Although our findings suggest that audit qualifications encourage users to be skeptical of income‐decreasing accounting changes, we find no evidence that they impose negative consequences on management in terms of lower assessments of financial performance.

Auditors are expected to plan and adapt audit programs in response to changes in risk associated with each client. Results in the existing research have been mixed regarding whether auditors respond to changes in risk. Two possible explanations for the lack of responsiveness to changes in risk found in the existing research are that auditors succumb to profit pressure, and that researchers only analyze responses in the risky accounts without considering related accounts. This paper experimentally tests how auditors respond to changes in risk of material misstatement identified by means of interim audit testing results. The response to changes in risk of material misstatement is analyzed using planned audit hours across related financial statement accounts and at varying levels of profit pressure. Results indicate the following primary findings: (a) auditors respond to changes in risk of material misstatement by increasing planned audit hours in accounts related to the risky account, and (b) profit pressure does not affect the auditor's response to changes in risk. These results indicate that the relations between accounts must be considered in order to identify the auditors' response to changes in risk of material misstatement. In addition, the results are consistent with audit firms decreasing the emphasis on profit pressure due to the current importance that the market places on audit quality.

Two standard‐setting approaches have emerged globally to guide the choice of accounting for securitizations: the control and components approach ( SFAS No. 125 and SFAS No. 140 ) and the risks and rewards transfer approach ( IAS No. 39 ). A lack of consensus about derecognition accounting is a major impediment to achieving convergence in global standards that must be resolved. Thus, both SFAS No. 140 and IAS No. 39 will be reexamined, and evidence pertinent to the debate is timely and important. In this study, we present evidence consistent with the view of credit‐rating analysts, who view many securitizations as, in substance, secured borrowings. Specifically, for a sample of originators applying sale accounting guidance in SFAS No. 125 / 140 during the period 1997‐2003, we show that off‐balance‐sheet debt related to securitizations has, on average, the same risk‐relevance for explaining market measures of risk (that is, CAPM beta) as on‐balance‐sheet debt. We also find that, in a returns and earnings association framework, the pricing multiple on securitization gains declines as the amount of off‐balance‐sheet debt increases, implying that investors take off‐balance‐sheet debt into account when assessing the valuation‐relevance of such gains. For those who advocate the control and components approach to securitization accounting, our results suggest that, at least for frequent securitizers, the put option arising from implicit recourse is a “missing piece” that is not currently accounted for when calculating securitization gains. Our results challenge the extant measurement standards in SFAS No. 140 .

This study investigates security analysts' reactions to public management guidance and assesses whether managers successfully guide analysts toward beatable earnings targets. We use a panel data set between 1995 and 2001 to examine the fiscal‐quarter‐specific determinants of management guidance and the timing, extent, and outcomes of analysts' reactions to this guidance. We find that management guidance is more likely when analysts' initial forecasts are optimistic, and, after controlling for the level of this optimism, when analysts' forecast dispersion is low. Analysts quickly react to management guidance and are more likely to issue final meetable or beatable earnings targets when management provides public guidance. Our evidence suggests that public management guidance plays an important role in leading analysts toward achievable earnings targets.

We examine the determinants of managers' use of discretion over employee stock option (ESO) valuation‐model inputs that determine ESO fair values. We also explore the consequences of such discretion. Firms exercise considerable discretion over all model inputs, and this discretion results in material differences in ESO fair‐value estimates. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that a large proportion of firms exercise value‐increasing discretion. Importantly, we find that using discretion improves predictive accuracy for about half of our sample firms. Moreover, we find that both opportunistic and informational managerial incentives together explain the accuracy of firms' ESO fair‐value estimates. Partitioning on the direction of discretion improves our understanding of managerial incentives. Our analysis confirms that financial statement readers can use mandated contextual disclosures to construct powerful ex ante predictions of ex post accuracy.