EBITDA is a commonly used performance measure for (i) valuation, (ii) debt contracting, and (iii) executive compensation. The widespread use of EBITDA by stakeholders may induce managers to focus their attention on EBITDA . Since EBITDA excludes various expenses, managers who fixate on EBITDA may underweight the excluded expenses when determining their firms' investments in capital and leverage levels. I find that managers who fixate on EBITDA overinvest in capital and overlever their firm relative to their industry peers. These results are robust to alternative proxies for managers' focus on EBITDA and alternative specifications. I also find that firms whose managers focus on EBITDA have weaker operating performance, which is attributed to higher depreciation expense. My primary proxy for managers' focus on EBITDA is whether they choose to disclose EBITDA in annual earnings announcements. I find that the use of EBITDA in setting executive compensation, the prevalence of EBITDA estimates by analysts, and the use of EBITDA ‐based covenants in firms' debt contracts are all positively associated with the propensity to disclose EBITDA in earnings announcements. I find weaker evidence of opportunistic motives explaining EBITDA disclosure. These results are consistent with managers disclosing EBITDA to portray to investors that it is a metric they seek to maximize. Overall, this study suggests that while EBITDA is a widely used metric, there is a systematic cost to using this measure—it provides managers with incentives to overinvest in capital and to acquire excessive debt.

Sell‐side equity analysts serve as external monitors, yet evidence on how they fulfill this monitoring role remains limited. We examine whether analysts utilize earnings conference calls to monitor firms suspected of real earnings management and assess the implications of such monitoring. Our findings reveal that analysts are more likely to ask about discretionary expenses during conference calls of firms suspected of lowering these expenses to meet or narrowly beat analysts' expectations. These questions are associated with lower subsequent EPS forecast revisions, indicating a potential cost to managers. Moreover, analysts' questions on discretionary expenses to suspect firms are linked to subsequent increases in discretionary expenses and a lower likelihood of meeting or narrowly beating analysts' earnings expectations in the following 2 years. Overall, our results suggest that analysts' active participation in earnings conference calls potentially discourages managers from engaging in real earnings management.