This paper presents an interpersonal model of audit file review centered on the audit manager. A manager's conduct of the review is affected by four components: the manager's expectations about the client, expectations about the preparer, expectations about the partner, and the manager's own approach and circumstances. The paper then presents a comprehensive field-based analysis of how a working paper review is conducted. It supplements the mostly experimental research on working paper review by reporting the results of a retrospective field questionnaire that asked audit managers to report on their behavior and their relationships with preparers and partners on actual audit engagements. The extent of review was sensitive to specific features of the client and the file (including risk factors), to features of the preparer, and particularly to the style of the reviewer, which was quite stable across cases. Although the evidence of managers' awareness of preparers' “stylizing” the file to suit the manager was weak, the evidence of managers' stylizing for the partners was pervasive, affecting both work done and documentation. Managers believed that good reviews emphasized key issues and risks rather than detail. Other new descriptive evidence on the nature of the review process is provided, including the purpose of the review process, how frequently surprises are found in the review process, and the qualities of good reviewers compared with poor reviewers. The implications of our model and our results for future research are outlined.

This paper presents an interpersonal model of audit file review centered on the audit manager. A manager's conduct of the review is affected by four components: the manager's expectations about the client, expectations about the preparer, expectations about the partner, and the manager's own approach and circumstances. The paper then presents a comprehensive field‐based analysis of how a working paper review is conducted. It supplements the mostly experimental research on working paper review by reporting the results of a retrospective field questionnaire that asked audit managers to report on their behavior and their relationships with preparers and partners on actual audit engagements. The extent of review was sensitive to specific features of the client and the file (including risk factors), to features of the preparer, and particularly to the style of the reviewer, which was quite stable across cases. Although the evidence of managers' awareness of preparers' “stylizing” the file to suit the manager was weak, the evidence of managers' stylizing for the partners was pervasive, affecting both work done and documentation. Managers believed that good reviews emphasized key issues and risks rather than detail. Other new descriptive evidence on the nature of the review process is provided, including the purpose of the review process, how frequently surprises are found in the review process, and the qualities of good reviewers compared with poor reviewers. The implications of our model and our results for future research are outlined.

This paper describes an experiment in which subjects, acting as division managers, exchanged privately held information before making intrafirm investment decisions. Social efficiency required that managers honestly disclose their private information, but managers had individual incentives to send biased messages. These features of the model created an important role for ex post verification, the main manipulation in the experiment. The matching protocol was also manipulated, using both random and continuous matching of subjects. This second manipulation was intended to examine whether an important institutional attribute — the frequency of interaction — would affect the usefulness of verification. The results of the experiment indicate that verification significantly increased the relative frequency of honest messages and the level of social efficiency. However, the improvements from verification were greater in settings where subjects did not interact repeatedly. The data also indicate that, in the continuous matching treatments, responses depended on the history of behavior of the message sender. However, this behavior was not observed in the random matching treatments. Thus, both the efficacy of verification and the extent of reputation formation depended on the institutional setting.

This paper describes an experiment in which subjects, acting as division managers, exchanged privately held information before making intrafirm investment decisions. Social efficiency required that managers honestly disclose their private information, but managers had individual incentives to send biased messages. These features of the model created an important role for ex post verification, the main manipulation in the experiment. The matching protocol was also manipulated, using both random and continuous matching of subjects. This second manipulation was intended to examine whether an important institutional attribute — the frequency of interaction — would affect the usefulness of verification. The results of the experiment indicate that verification significantly increased the relative frequency of honest messages and the level of social efficiency. However, the improvements from verification were greater in settings where subjects did not interact repeatedly. The data also indicate that, in the continuous matching treatments, responses depended on the history of behavior of the message sender. However, this behavior was not observed in the random matching treatments. Thus, both the efficacy of verification and the extent of reputation formation depended on the institutional setting.