Auditing, Internal control judgement, Meta Analysis

This study tests whether mutual fund shareholders continue to trade in response to fund returns after they make their initial investment in fund shares. It decomposes the relationship between fund returns and shareholder flow in a large, proprietary panel of all shareholder transactions in one midsize no-load mutual fund family. Results show that both new and old shareholders buy shares during periods of good returns; however, shareholder outflow is essentially unrelated to fund returns. This lack of a return-sell relationship is not driven by locked-in pension assets, shareholders’ ignorance of ongoing fund returns, or embedded capital gains. However, there is evidence that exchanges between equity funds in the family are related more strongly to returns of the destination fund than to returns of the origination fund. This may indicate that flow between equity mutual funds is driven by shareholders buying new funds rather than selling old funds. Supermarket shareholders are smart insofar as they exchange into funds that subsequently outperform their prior funds during their individual holding periods.

Cost variance, Cost control, Capital investment decision

This paper examines how the firm’s choice of investment horizon interacts with rent-seeking by privately informed, multitasking managers and the labor market. Two main results surface. First, managers prefer longer-horizon projects that permit them to extract higher rents from firms, so short-termism involves lower agency costs and is value maximizing for some firms. Second, when firms compete for managers, firms practicing short-termism attract better managerial talent when talent is unobservable, but larger firms that invest in long-horizon projects hire more talented managers when talent is revealed. (JEL D82, D86, G31, G32, J41) Received July 25, 2019; editorial decision July 7, 2020 by Editor Uday Rajan.

Recent Statistics on Wages Get access T. T. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 13, Issue 1, October 1898, Pages 105–110, https://doi.org/10.2307/1882986 Published: 01 October 1898

This article estimates worker switching costs and how much the employer switching of experienced engineers responds to outside wage offers. I use data on engineers across Swedish private sector firms to estimate the relative importance of employer wage policies and switching costs in a dynamic programming, discrete choice model of employer choice. The differentiated firms are modeled in employer characteristic space, and each firm has its own age‐wage profile. A majority of engineers have moderately high switching costs and a minority of experienced workers are responsive to outside wage offers. Younger workers are more sensitive to outside wage offers.

I present the fact that wage gaps due to firm size increase with job responsibility. I use Swedish data to determine whether wage gaps increase with a direct measure of job responsibility, to compare the age patterns of the wage gaps for blue‐ and white‐collar workers, and to compare wages by job responsibility and spans of control. With U.S. data, I compare supervisory to nonsupervisory occupations and find that wage gaps increase with job responsibility for most occupational ladders. This fact is consistent with hierarchical matching models in which the larger number of subordinates amplifies managerial talent.

Estimates of the intertemporal labor supply behavior of males in Canada using micro data are reported. Individuals make the intertemporal labor supply decision on the basis of annual hours and weeks. Precision of the parameter estimates is improved by using tenure variables as instruments for the wage. Further, the age and tenure variables are allowed to have taste parameters in the structural equations. The evidence suggests that this is required only for the two age variables. Elasticity evidence suggests that evolutionary changes in the wage cause changes in the number of weeks with the elasticity being 0.6 and statistically significant.