This study investigates how sophisticated market participants use tax‐based information by examining whether analysts' street effective tax rates (ETRs) are informative. When assessing firm performance, analysts exclude items they believe do not reflect current performance, resulting in “street” metrics such as street ETR. However, evidence on the properties of the components of street earnings is limited. Examining the informativeness of street ETRs is important because taxes are a significant component of earnings, and the extent to which analysts understand taxes and incorporate them into their analyses is not clear. Using a hand‐collected sample of analyst reports, we find that while approximately 35% of street ETRs have at least one tax‐specific exclusion, over 90% reflect the tax effects of pre‐tax exclusions. Further, both tax‐specific exclusions and the tax effects of pre‐tax exclusions significantly contribute to differences between GAAP and street ETRs. Consistent with analysts' understanding of the implications of tax and nontax exclusions, our results suggest that street tax metrics exhibit greater predictive ability about future tax outcomes and provide more information to investors than GAAP tax metrics. We also find that ETR exclusions are of higher quality when the magnitude of the potentially excluded item is greater and when managers disclose pro forma earnings. Collectively, our findings suggest that analysts understand taxes, but selectively exert effort to incorporate tax‐based information into their assessment of firm performance. Our study should be informative to regulators and users of financial information because it provides evidence regarding the usefulness of street earnings metrics.

The purpose of this paper is to increase our understanding of how enabling perceptions of new management controls (MCs) can be fostered. Prior research suggests that employees are more likely to use new MCs if they perceive them as enabling. However, rapid implementation of new MCs due to circumstances such as mergers and acquisitions can leave employees feeling coerced into using them, making it difficult to foster enabling perceptions. Based on a case study where an acquirer faces pressure to impose rigid controls on an acquired firm, we suggest factors contributing to enabling perceptions. Using interviews, observation, and document analysis, we find that positive relationships and mutual trust between the acquirer and the acquiree facilitated enabling perceptions of the MCs. We show that managers at the acquirer actively fostered trust using trust‐building activities and communicated their intentions underlying the implementation of new MCs. Doing so helped employees rationalize the controls as tools to help them do their work tasks. We also find that positive relationships reinforced by regular meetings were a way of providing assistance to employees in dealing with rigid MCs. This study contributes to the literature on enabling controls by developing a processual framework that suggests how trust can foster enabling perceptions from the intentions behind the implementation of new MCs, to their development process and daily use. In doing so, the study further develops our understanding of the relationship between enabling control and trust and helps in understanding how rigid controls can be implemented without generating mistrust.

Recent amendments to Auditing Standard (AS) 3101 require disclosure of the initial year of the auditor‐client relationship in the audit report. As the standard was being discussed, auditors, clients, and some PCAOB members expressed reservations about the necessity of tenure disclosures and were particularly concerned about disclosing tenure in the audit report. Our purpose is to investigate whether the tenure disclosures mandated by AS 3101 are associated with changes in stakeholder behavior. We predict and find that after the implementation date, ratification votes against the auditor and the probability of subsequent auditor dismissal increase for long‐tenured versus short‐tenured auditors. Results from a path analysis further suggest that the relative increase in dismissal for long‐tenured auditors appears to be influenced directly through tenure disclosures and indirectly through ratification voting. We also predict and find that negotiating power decreases for long‐tenured auditors as evidenced by lower audit fees. Our results are comparable for companies that voluntarily disclosed and companies that did not disclose auditor tenure in their proxy statements prior to the AS 3101 amendment. Overall, our study suggests that mandatory disclosure of auditor tenure in the audit report significantly affects stakeholder behavior. The PCAOB should consider our findings carefully as they evaluate whether AS 3101 is achieving its intended purpose.

We use a novel data set to examine the across‐time consistency and across‐firm comparability of firms' non‐GAAP earnings disclosures. Given widespread concern about non‐GAAP reporting among regulators, standard setters, the investor community, and academics, our investigation provides timely evidence on how managers' deviations from their own non‐GAAP disclosure history, or the reporting of industry peers, affects how well earnings inform on firm performance. We begin by identifying firms that change their non‐GAAP earnings definition from one year to the next. These deviations are uncommon, but when managers change the items they exclude in calculating non‐GAAP earnings, the changes generally enhance the information in earnings about firms' core performance. We also examine whether non‐GAAP earnings are more comparable than GAAP earnings and find that firms' non‐GAAP adjustments result in greater earnings comparability. Finally, we examine instances in which firms deviate from common sector‐wide definitions of non‐GAAP earnings. We find that these deviations also result in earnings metrics that better represent firms' core operations. Overall, our results suggest that when managers vary their non‐GAAP calculations, either across time or across firms, the resulting non‐GAAP metrics generally enhance the information in earnings about firms' ongoing performance. Thus, our analysis helps mitigate concerns about why managers might vary their non‐GAAP reporting calculations.

We examine the relation between low‐quality internal controls and audit fee premiums. Using a novel data set of audit hours and audit fees we find, consistent with the audit risk model, that auditors increase their effort (hours) owing to low internal control quality. We find that auditors also charge a significant fee premium to clients with internal control weaknesses. This premium is observed for severe internal control weaknesses and companies with low‐quality alternative governance mechanisms. The results are robust to multiple methods to address endogeneity, including company fixed effects, difference‐in‐differences design, and a propensity score‐matched sample. Taken as a whole, low internal control quality leads to fee premiums, which are a deadweight loss to client companies.