We hypothesize that managers use their hierarchical role as reviewers of accounting judgments and estimates to manage earnings, which we call indirect earnings management (IEM). Across a series of experiments using highly experienced financial executives as participants, we provide evidence that IEM (1) is likely used by managers to achieve current and future earnings targets, (2) reduces both cognitive dissonance associated with managing earnings and the extent to which managers think that their behaviors constitute earnings management, and (3) is more likely to be used when corporate governance is strong than when corporate governance is weak. The results of this study suggest new directions for future research on earnings management and highlight the important role of the hierarchical structure of the accounting function in efforts to understand how earnings are managed.

This study uses valuation allowances (VAs) for deferred tax assets to examine whether hedge fund activists (HFAs) use and affect financial reporting of income taxes. Specifically, we investigate whether HFAs target firms with VAs and whether target firms are more likely to release VAs post‐intervention. We find that the existence, magnitude, and increases in VAs increase the marginal probability that HFAs will target a firm by between 12% and 24%. We also find that target firms are 4.6% more likely to release VAs following the intervention, and this effect persists for up to 2 years. Releases of VAs appear to stem from implemented tax avoidance strategies and changes in financial reporting of income taxes rather than real changes in operating performance or earnings management. Overall, HFAs appear to understand the interplay between tax planning and financial reporting of income taxes and use both to unlock value in target firms.

Researchers have studied the entry of professionals into the public accounting field, their careers at an organization, and their exit from the field. However, they have largely overlooked the mobility of these professionals, whose careers involve firm transfers. Drawing on Bourdieu's sociology and interviews with 31 transferees and 7 non–Big 4 legacy partners, we examine the move of Big 4 professionals to non–Big 4 firms. Our findings show that transferees have an ingrained belief that a Big 4 career is the ideal professional trajectory. But they experience points of disjuncture at these firms, prompting them to reevaluate this organizational illusio and their career aspirations and ultimately reinforcing their transfer decision. After moving, transferees learn by trial and error how to valorize and layer their habitus and different forms of capital in order to adjust to the non–Big 4 firms. Our findings challenge prior assumptions about the superiority of Big 4 professionals and the distinctive forms of their capital by showing that the capital needed to obtain powerful positions at Big 4 and non–Big 4 firms are similar, but that its nature and relative value varies. Our findings reveal a paradoxical dynamic in which transferees' Big 4 habitus and capital undergo a complex, iterative process of valorization and layering when these professionals move within the public accounting field. This contrasts with a materialization of professional domination that occurs when former Big 4 employees move outside the public accounting field. For most of our transferees, dissonance also develops between the Big 4 and non–Big 4 layers of their habitus, and they never completely deconstruct their organizational illusio. These findings reveal that the reflexivity of transferees is both shaped and limited by their Big 4 habitus and illusio. Overall, our results contribute to the understanding of professional mobility within the public accounting field.

Many CEOs engage in activism by publicly expressing their views on social, environmental, and political issues, while other CEOs refrain from doing so—a behavior we term CEO inactivism. We use two experiments to examine how CEO (in)activism impacts investor decisions. Our results are consistent with our theoretical predictions. When a CEO expresses an activist position that is consistent versus inconsistent with investors' views, investors invest more in the CEO's firm because they perceive the CEO more positively. We also find that CEO inactivism can lead to investment decisions that are as favorable as when the CEO expresses a position consistent with investors' views; our process evidence suggests that this may occur because CEO inactivism increases the likelihood that investors believe the CEO shares their position on a social issue. Finally, we do not find evidence that investor decisions are influenced by whether CEO (in)activism is in response to an external prompt. This study contributes to the emerging literature on CEO activism, a unique form of voluntary disclosure, by providing evidence about how CEO (in)activism influences investors. We also contribute to the literature examining the impact of social media disclosure on investor decisions. Finally, our findings have practical implications for CEOs, who increasingly face external pressures to engage in activism.