Knowledge that Transforms

A generalization of the multinomial logit (MNL) model is developed for cases in which discrete alternatives are ordered so as to induce stochastic correlation among alternatives in close proximity. The model belongs to the Generalized Extreme Value class introduced by McFadden, and is therefore consistent with random utility maximization. If the true model is nearly MNL, iterative estimation on an ordinary MNL computer package provides approximate parameter estimates and a test for the hypothesized failure of the MNL'S "independence from irrelevant alternatives" assumption. A straightforward extension can handle cases where observations have been selected on the basis of a truncated choice set. The model's properties are investigated through a numerical example, and through two empirical applications whose rather unsatisfactory results are very briefly described.

The paper deals with infinite horizon optimization problems. The existence of optimal solutions is obtained as a consequence of an asymptotic growth condition. We also exhibit finite horizon approximates that yield upper and lower bounds for the optimal values and whose optimal solutions converge to the long-term optimal trajectories.

Cet article donne des conditions suffisantes pour que la matrice Jacobienne de la demande concurrentielle agrge soit dfinie ngative.Cette proprit forte implique en particulier que l'axiome faible de la prfrence rvle est satisfait par la demande agrge, et que la demande totale pour chaque bien augmente lorsque son prix dc1'0 i t.Ces cond i tians suffisantes portent sur la distribution des prfrences et sont indpendantes de la distribution des revenus.L'approche repose sur la.notion de transformation homothtique d'une relatiof\de prfrence.On discute galement la porte pour ce type de problme de la notion de transformation affine d'une prfrence, qui introduit une structure algbrique intressante sur l'espace des prfrences.On montre galement comment le rsultat est li celui obenu par W. Hildenbrand (Econometrica (1983)) en posant des restrictions sur la distribution des revenus.

This paper demonstrates how time consistency of the Ramsey policy–the optimal fiscal and monetary policy under commitment–can be achieved. Each government should leave its successor with a unique maturity structure for the nominal and indexed debt, such that the marginal benefit of a surprise inflation exactly balances the marginal cost. Unlike in earlier papers on the topic, the result holds for quite general Ramsey policies, including timevarying polices with positive inflation and positive nominal interest rates. We compare our results with

In this paper we analyze an aggregative general equilibriiri model in which the use of money is motivated by a cash-in-advance constraint, applied to purchases of a subset of consumption goods. The system is subject to both real and nxnetary shocks, which are economy-wide and observed by all. We develop methods for verifying the existence of, characterizing, and explicitly calculating equilibria. A main result of the analysis is that current money growth affects the current real allocation only insofar as it affects expectations about future money growth, i.e., only through its value as a signal.

In recent years, preferences without transitive indifference have been much discussed in consumer theory.Surprisingly, we can show that their singleton valued choice functions turn out to be indistinguishable from those of classical transitive preferences.Let 2: be a preference relation on any set X, with choice function h.We prove that J: is reflexive, total, and semitransitive (or pseudotransitive) if and only if h satisfies the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference.It follows that choice behavior generated by classical transitive preferences is indistinguishable from that generated by the more general preferences discussed in [2J, [3J, [4J, and [10J.INTRANSITIVE INDIFFERENCE AND REVEALED PREFERENCEl by

If it is common knowledge that the players in a game are Bayesian utility maximizers who treat uncertainty about other players' actions like any other uncertainty, then the outcome is necessarily a correlated equilibrium. Random strategies appear as an expression of each player's uncertainty about what the others will do, not as the result of willful randomization. Use is made of the common prior assumption, according to which differences in probability assessments by different individuals are due to the different information that they have (where "information" may be interpreted broadly, to include experience, upbringing, and genetic makeup). Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.

The analogy principle proposes that population parameters be estimated by sample statistics which make known properties of the population hold as closely as possible in the sample. Applications of the analogy principle are ubiquitous. Nevertheless, estimation theory has not been studied from a consistent analog perspective. This paper makes a start.

Several partners jointly own an asset that may be traded among them. Each partner has a valuation for the asset; the valuations are known privately and drawn independently from a common probability distribution. We characterize the set of all incentive-compatible and interim-individually-rational trading mechanisms, and give a simple necessary and sufficient condition for such mechanisms to dissolve the partnership ex post efficiently. A bidding game is constructed that achieves such dissolution whenever it is possible. Despite incomplete information about the valuation of the asset, a partnership can be dissolved ex post efficiently provided no single partner owns too large a share; this contrasts with Myerson and Satterthwaite's result that ex post efficiency cannot be achieved when the asset is owned by a single party.