In this paper we study identification and estimation of a correlated random coefficients (CRC) panel data model. The outcome of interest varies linearly with a vector of endogenous regressors. The coefficients on these regressors are heterogenous across units and may covary with them. We consider the average partial effect (APE) of a small change in the regressor vector on the outcome (cf. Chamberlain (1984), Wooldridge (2005a)). Chamberlain (1992) calculated the semiparametric efficiency bound for the APE in our model and proposed a √N-consistent estimator. Nonsingularity of the APE's information bound, and hence the appropriateness of Chamberlain's (1992) estimator, requires (i) the time dimension of the panel (T) to strictly exceed the number of random coefficients (p) and (ii) strong conditions on the time series properties of the regressor vector. We demonstrate irregular identification of the APE when T = p and for more persistent regressor processes. Our approach exploits the different identifying content of the subpopulations of stayers—or units whose regressor values change little across periods—and movers—or units whose regressor values change substantially across periods. We propose a feasible estimator based on our identification result and characterize its large sample properties. While irregularity precludes our estimator from attaining parametric rates of convergence, its limiting distribution is normal and inference is straightforward to conduct. Standard software may be used to compute point estimates and standard errors. We use our methods to estimate the average elasticity of calorie consumption with respect to total outlay for a sample of poor Nicaraguan households.

[This paper considers the interpolation of percentiles when the value of the c.d.f. F(x) is specified at n points. Upper and lower bounds on the percentile are obtained assuming that data is generated by a unimodal density. Sharper bounds are derived when the average of the observations in each interval is given. In addition to improving the standard linear interpolation, our results indicate that much information can be gained by reporting group means as well as frequency counts.]

Ž. We extend Kreps’ 1979 analysis of preference for flexibility, reinterpreted by Kreps Ž. 1992 as a model of unforeseen contingencies. We enrich the choice set, consequently obtaining uniqueness results that were not possible in Kreps’ model. We consider several representations and allow the agent to prefer commitment in some contingencies. In the representations, the agent acts as if she had coherent beliefs about a set of possible future Ž. ex post preferences, each of which is an expected-utility preference. We show that this set of ex post preferences, called the subjectie state space, is essentially unique given the restriction that all ex post preferences are expected-utility preferences and is minimal even without this restriction. Because the subjective state space is identified, the way ex post utilities are aggregated into an ex ante ranking is also essentially unique. Hence when a representation that is additive across states exists, the additivity is meaningful in the sense that all representations are intrinsically additive. Uniqueness enables us to show that the size of the subjective state space provides a measure of the agent’s uncertainty about future contingencies and that the way the states are aggregated indicates whether these contingencies lead to a desire for flexibility or commitment.

anonymous referees for comments and Tel–Aviv University for its hospitality during part of the work on this paper. Dekel thanks the NSF and Lipman thanks SSHRCC for financial support for this research. Dekel and Lipman particularly thank Phil Reny for a series of discussions which led to this project. This paper was formerly titled “Possibility Correspondences Preclude Unawareness.” 2

What is the role of a country's financial system in determining technology adoption? To examine this, a dynamic contract model is embedded into a general equilibrium setting with competitive intermediation. The terms of finance are dictated by an intermediary's ability to monitor and control a firm's cash flow, in conjunction with the structure of the technology that the firm adopts. It is not always profitable to finance promising technologies. A quantitative illustration is presented where financial frictions induce entrepreneurs in India and Mexico to adopt less‐promising ventures than in the United States, despite lower input prices.