Knowledge that Transforms

We characterize a generalization of discounted logistic choice that incorporates a parameter to capture different views the agent might have about the costs and benefits of larger choice sets. The discounted logit model used in the empirical literature is the special case that displays a “preference for flexibility” in the sense that the agent always prefers to add additional items to a menu. Other cases display varying levels of “choice aversion,” where the agent prefers to remove items from a menu if their ex ante value is below a threshold. We show that higher choice aversion, as measured by dislike of bigger menus, also corresponds to an increased preference for putting off decisions as late as possible.

We introduce methods for estimating nonparametric, nonadditive models with simultaneity. The methods are developed by directly connecting the elements of the structural system to be estimated with features of the density of the observable variables, such as ratios of derivatives or averages of products of derivatives of this density. The estimators are therefore easily computed functionals of a nonparametric estimator of the density of the observable variables. We consider in detail a model where to each structural equation there corresponds an exclusive regressor and a model with one equation of interest and one instrument that is included in a second equation. For both models, we provide new characterizations of observational equivalence on a set, in terms of the density of the observable variables and derivatives of the structural functions. Based on those characterizations, we develop two estimation methods. In the first method, the estimators of the structural derivatives are calculated by a simple matrix inversion and matrix multiplication, analogous to a standard least squares estimator, but with the elements of the matrices being averages of products of derivatives of nonparametric density estimators. In the second method, the estimators of the structural derivatives are calculated in two steps. In a first step, values of the instrument are found at which the density of the observable variables satisfies some properties. In the second step, the estimators are calculated directly from the values of derivatives of the density of the observable variables evaluated at the found values of the instrument. We show that both pointwise estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal.

This paper provides conditions under which the inequality constraints generated by either single agent optimizing behavior or the best response condition of multiple agent problems can be used as a basis for estimation and inference. An application illustrates how the use of these inequality constraints can simplify the analysis of complex behavioral models.

We develop a new parametric estimation procedure for option panels observed with error. We exploit asymptotic approximations assuming an ever increasing set of option prices in the moneyness (cross-sectional) dimension, but with a fixed time span. We develop consistent estimators for the parameters and the dynamic realization of the state vector governing the option price dynamics. The estimators converge stably to a mixed-Gaussian law and we develop feasible estimators for the limiting variance. We also provide semiparametric tests for the option price dynamics based on the distance between the spot volatility extracted from the options and one constructed nonparametrically from high-frequency data on the underlying asset. Furthermore, we develop new tests for the day-by-day model fit over specific regions of the volatility surface and for the stability of the risk-neutral dynamics over time. A comprehensive Monte Carlo study indicates that the inference procedures work well in empirically realistic settings. In an empirical application to S&P 500 index options, guided by the new diagnostic tests, we extend existing asset pricing models by allowing for a flexible dynamic relation between volatility and priced jump tail risk. Importantly, we document that the priced jump tail risk typically responds in a more pronounced and persistent manner than volatility to large negative market shocks.

This paper considers inference on functionals of semi/nonparametric conditional moment restrictions with possibly nonsmooth generalized residuals, which include all of the (nonlinear) nonparametric instrumental variables (IV) as special cases. These models are often ill-posed and hence it is difficult to verify whether a (possibly nonlinear) functional is root-n estimable or not. We provide computationally simple, unified inference procedures that are asymptotically valid regardless of whether a functional is root-n estimable or not. We establish the following new useful results: (1) the asymptotic normality of a plug-in penalized sieve minimum distance (PSMD) estimator of a (possibly nonlinear) functional; (2) the consistency of simple sieve variance estimators for the plug-in PSMD estimator, and hence the asymptotic chi-square distribution of the sieve Wald statistic; (3) the asymptotic chi-square distribution of an optimally weighted sieve quasi likelihood ratio (QLR) test under the null hypothesis; (4) the asymptotic tight distribution of a non-optimally weighted sieve QLR statistic under the null; (5) the consistency of generalized residual bootstrap sieve Wald and QLR tests; (6) local power properties of sieve Wald and QLR tests and of their bootstrap versions; (7) asymptotic properties of sieve Wald and SQLR for functionals of increasing dimension. Simulation studies and an empirical illustration of a nonparametric quantile IV regression are presented.

This paper makes the following original contributions to the literature. (i) We develop a simpler analytical characterization and numerical algorithm for Bayesian inference in structural vector autoregressions (VARs) that can be used for models that are overidentified, just-identified, or underidentified. (ii) We analyze the asymptotic properties of Bayesian inference and show that in the underidentified case, the asymptotic posterior distribution of contemporaneous coefficients in an n-variable VAR is confined to the set of values that orthogonalize the population variance–covariance matrix of ordinary least squares residuals, with the height of the posterior proportional to the height of the prior at any point within that set. For example, in a bivariate VAR for supply and demand identified solely by sign restrictions, if the population correlation between the VAR residuals is positive, then even if one has available an infinite sample of data, any inference about the demand elasticity is coming exclusively from the prior distribution. (iii) We provide analytical characterizations of the informative prior distributions for impulse-response functions that are implicit in the traditional sign-restriction approach to VARs, and we note, as a special case of result (ii), that the influence of these priors does not vanish asymptotically. (iv) We illustrate how Bayesian inference with informative priors can be both a strict generalization and an unambiguous improvement over frequentist inference in just-identified models. (v) We propose that researchers need to explicitly acknowledge and defend the role of prior beliefs in influencing structural conclusions and we illustrate how this could be done using a simple model of the U.S. labor market

We argue that poverty can perpetuate itself by undermining the capacity for self-control. In line with a distinguished psychological literature, we consider modes of self-control that involve the self-imposed use of contingent punishments and rewards. We study settings in which consumers with quasi-hyperbolic preferences confront an otherwise standard intertemporal allocation problem with credit constraints. Our main result demonstrates that low initial assets can limit self-control, trapping people in poverty, while individuals with high initial assets can accumulate indefinitely. Thus, even temporary policies that initiate accumulation among the poor may be effective. We examine implications concerning the effect of access to credit on saving, the demand for commitment devices, the design of financial accounts to promote accumulation, and the variation of the marginal propensity to consume across income from different sources. We also explore the nature of optimal self-control, demonstrating that it has a simple and behaviorally plausible structure that is immune to self-renegotiation.

Mechanism design enables a social planner to obtain a desired outcome by leveraging the players’ rationality and their beliefs. It is thus a fundamental, but yet unproven, intuition that the higher the level of rationality of the players, the better the set of obtainable outcomes. In this paper, we prove this fundamental intuition for players with possibilistic beliefs, a model long considered in epistemic game theory. Specifically, • We define a sequence of monotonically increasing revenue benchmarks for single- good auctions, G0 ≤ G1 ≤ G2 ≤ · · ·, where each Gi is defined over the players’ beliefs and G0 is the second-highest valuation (i.e., the revenue benchmark achieved by the second-price mechanism). • We (1) construct a single, interim individually rational, auction mechanism that, without any clue about the rationality level of the players, guarantees revenue Gk if all players have rationality levels ≥ k + 1, and (2) prove that no such mechanism can guarantee revenue even close to Gk when at least two players are at most level-k rational.

We examine the link between the threat of violence and democratization in the context of the Great Reform Act passed by the British Parliament in 1832. We geo-reference the so-called Swing riots, which occurred between the 1830 and 1831 parliamentary elections, and compute the number of these riots that happened within a 10 km radius of the 244 English constituencies. Our empirical analysis relates this constituency-specific measure of the threat perceptions held by the 344,000 voters in the Unreformed Parliament to the share of seats won in each constituency by pro-reform politicians in 1831. We find that the Swing riots induced voters to vote for pro-reform politicians after experiencing first-hand the violence of the riots.

Internet advertising has been the fastest growing advertising channel in recent years, with paid search ads comprising the bulk of this revenue. We present results from a series of large-scale field experiments done at eBay that were designed to measure the causal effectiveness of paid search ads. Because search clicks and purchase intent are correlated, we show that returns from paid search are a fraction of non-experimental estimates. As an extreme case, we show that brand keyword ads have no measurable short-term benefits. For non-brand keywords, we find that new and infrequent users are positively influenced by ads but that more frequent users whose purchasing behavior is not influenced by ads account for most of the advertising expenses, resulting in average returns that are negative.