Knowledge that Transforms

Does switching the composition of jobs between low-paying and high-paying industries have important effects on wages in other sectors? In this paper, we build on search and bargaining theory to clarify a key general equilibrium channel through which changes in industrial composition could have substantial effects on wages in all sectors. In this class of models, wage determination takes the form of a social interaction problem and we illustrate how the implied sectoral linkages can be empirically explored using U.S. Census data. We find that sector-level wages interact as implied by the model and that the predicted general equilibrium effects are present and substantial. We interpret our results as highlighting the relevance of search and bargaining theory for understanding the determination of wages, and we argue that the results provide support for the view that industrial composition is important for understanding wage outcomes.

Kim, Minchul Shin, and Martin Weidner for research assistance. Moon gratefully acknowledges financial

In many financial markets, dealers have the advantage of observing the orders of their customers. To quantify the economic benefit that dealers derive from this advantage, we study detailed data from Canadian Treasury auctions, where dealers observe customer bids while preparing their own bids. In this setting, dealers can use information on customer bids to learn about (i) competition, that is, the distribution of competing bids in the auction, and (ii) fundamentals, that is, the ex post value of the security being auctioned. We devise formal hypothesis tests for both sources of informational advantage. In our data, we do not find evidence that dealers are learning about fundamentals. We find that the “information about competition” contained in customer bids accounts for 13–27% of dealers' expected profits.

Observers often interpret boom–bust episodes in asset markets as speculative frenzies where asymmetrically informed investors buy overvalued assets hoping to sell to a greater fool before the crash. Despite its intuitive appeal, however, this notion of speculative bubbles has proven difficult to reconcile with economic theory. Existing models have been criticized on the basis that they assume irrationality, that prices are somewhat unresponsive to sales, or that they depend on fragile, knife-edge restrictions. To address these issues, I construct a rational version of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), where agents invest growing endowments into an asset, fueling appreciation and eventual overvaluation. Riding bubbles is optimal as long as the growth rate of the bubble and the probability of selling before the crash are high enough. This probability increases with the amount of noise in the economy, as random short-term fluctuations make it difficult for agents to infer information from prices.

We study mixed hitting-time models that specify durations as the first time a Lévy process-a continuous-time process with stationary and independent incrementscrosses a heterogeneous threshold.Such models of substantial interest because they can be deduced from optimal-stopping models with heterogeneous agents that do not naturally produce a mixed proportional hazards structure.We show how strategies for analyzing the identifiability of the mixed proportional hazards model can be adapted to prove identifiability of a hitting-time model with observed covariates and unobserved heterogeneity.We discuss inference from censored data and give examples of structural applications.We conclude by discussing the relative merits of both models as complementary frameworks for econometric duration analysis.

We analyze subprime consumer lending and the role played by down payment requirements in screening high-risk borrowers and limiting defaults. To do this, we develop an empirical model of the demand for financed purchases that incorporates both adverse selection and repayment incentives. We estimate the model using detailed transaction-level data on subprime auto loans. We show how different elements of loan contracts affect the quality of the borrower pool and subsequent loan performance. We also evaluate the returns to credit scoring that allows sellers to customize financing terms to individual applicants. Our approach shows how standard econometric tools for analyzing demand and supply under imperfect competition extend to settings in which firms care about the identity of their customers and their postpurchase behavior.

International audience

This paper develops a new estimation procedure for characteristic-based factor models of stock returns. We treat the factor model as a weighted additive nonparametric regression model, with the factor returns serving as time-varying weights and a set of univariate nonparametric functions relating security characteristic to the associated factor betas. We use a time-series and cross-sectional pooled weighted additive nonparametric regression methodology to simultaneously estimate the factor returns and characteristic-beta functions. By avoiding the curse of dimensionality, our methodology allows for a larger number of factors than existing semiparametric methods. We apply the technique to the three-factor Fama–French model, Carhart’s four-factor extension of it that adds a momentum factor, and a five-factor extension that adds an own-volatility factor. We find that momentum and own-volatility factors are at least as important, if not more important, than size and value in explaining equity return comovements. We test the multifactor beta pricing theory against a general alternative using a new nonparametric test

In this paper, we derive and experimentally test a theoretical model of speculation in multi-period asset markets with public information flows. The speculation arises from the traders’ heterogeneous posteriors as they make different inferences from sequences of public information. This leads to overpricing in the sense that price exceeds the most optimistic belief about the real value of the asset. We find evidence of speculative overpricing in both incomplete and complete markets, where the information flow is a gradually revealed sequence of imperfect public signals about the state of the world. We also find evidence of asymmetric price reaction to good news and bad news, another feature of equilibrium price dynamics under our model. Markets with a relaxed short-sale constraint exhibit less overpricing.

This paper examines the problem of testing and confidence set construction for one-dimensional functions of the coefficients in autoregressive (AR(p)) models with potentially persistent time series. The primary example concerns inference on impulse responses. A new asymptotic framework is suggested and some new theoretical properties of known procedures are demonstrated. I show that the likelihood ratio (LR) and LR± statistics for a linear hypothesis in an AR(p) can be uniformly approximated by a weighted average of local-to-unity and normal distributions. The corresponding weights depend on the weight placed on the largest root in the null hypothesis. The suggested approximation is uniform over the set of all linear hypotheses. The same family of distributions approximates the LR and LR± statistics for tests about impulse responses, and the approximation is uniform over the horizon of the impulse response. I establish the size properties of tests about impulse responses proposed by Inoue and Kilian (2002) and Gospodinov (2004), and theoretically explain some of the empirical findings of Pesavento and Rossi (2007). An adaptation of the grid bootstrap for impulse response functions is suggested and its properties are examined.