Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle (2010) use a common-value second-price auction experiment to reject beliefs-based explanations for the winner's curse. ILN's conclusion, however, stems from the misuse of theoretical arguments. Beliefs-based models are even compatible with some observations from ILN's experiment.
This study provides causal evidence that a shock to the relative supply of inputs to production can (1) affect the direction of technological progress and (2) lead to a rebound in the relative price of the input that became relatively more abundant (the strong induced-bias hypothesis). I exploit the impact of the U.S. Civil War on the British cotton textile industry, which reduced supplies of cotton from the Southern United States, forcing British producers to shift to lower-quality Indian cotton. Using detailed new data, I show that this shift induced the development of new technologies that augmented Indian cotton. As these new technologies became available, I show that the relative price of Indian/U.S. cotton rebounded to its pre-war level, despite the increased relative supply of Indian cotton. This is the first paper to establish both of these patterns empirically, lending support to the two key predictions of leading directed technical change theories.
Many violations of the Independence axiom of Expected Utility can be traced to subjects' attraction to risk-free prospects.Negative Certainty Independence, the key axiom in this paper, formalizes this tendency.Our main result is a utility representation of all preferences over monetary lotteries that satisfy Negative Certainty Independence together with basic rationality postulates.Such preferences can be represented as if the agent were unsure of how risk averse to be when evaluating a lottery p; instead, she has in mind a set of possible utility functions over outcomes and displays a cautious behavior: she computes the certainty equivalent of p with respect to each possible function in the set and picks the smallest one.The set of utilities is unique in a well-defined sense.We show that our representation can also be derived from a 'cautious' completion of an incomplete preference relation.
We propose a method to set identify bounds on the sharing rule for a general collective household consumption model. Unlike the effects of distribution factors, the level of the sharing rule cannot be uniquely identified without strong assumptions on preferences across households. Our new results show that, though not point identified without these assumptions, strong bounds on the sharing rule can be obtained. We get these bounds by applying revealed preference restrictions implied by the collective model to the household's continuous aggregate demand functions. We obtain informative bounds even if nothing is known about whether each good is public, private, or assignable within the household, though having such information tightens the bounds. We apply our method to US PSID data, obtaining narrow bounds that yield useful conclusions regarding the effects of income and wages on intrahousehold resource sharing, and on the prevalence of individual (as opposed to household level) poverty.
This paper develops a specification test for instrument validity in the heterogeneous treatment effect model with a binary treatment and a discrete instrument. The strongest testable implication for instrument validity is given by the condition for nonnegativity of point‐identifiable compliers' outcome densities. Our specification test infers this testable implication using a variance‐weighted Kolmogorov–Smirnov test statistic. The test can be applied to both discrete and continuous outcome cases, and an extension of the test to settings with conditioning covariates is provided.
We develop a parsimonious model to study the equilibrium and socially optimal decisions of banks to enter, trade in, and possibly exit, an OTC market. Although we endow all banks with the same trading technology, banks' optimal entry and trading decisions endogenously lead to a realistic market structure composed of dealers and customers with distinct trading patterns. We decompose banks' entry incentives into incentives to hedge risk and incentives to make intermediation profits. We show that dealer banks enter more than is socially optimal. In the face of large negative shocks, they may also exit more than is socially optimal when markets are not perfectly resilient.
This paper analyzes South Africa's Free Basic Water Policy, under which households receive a free water allowance equal to the World Health Organization's recommended minimum of 6 kiloliters per month. I structurally estimate residential water demand, evaluate the welfare eects of free water, and provide optimal price schedules derived from a social planner's problem. I use a unique dataset of monthly metered billing data for 60,000 households for 2002-2008 from a particularly disadvantaged suburb of Pretoria. The dataset contains rich price variation across 18 dierent nonlinear tarischedules, and includes a policy experiment which removed the free allowance. I …nd that without government subsidy, the mean monthly consumption would decrease from 12.6 to 5.6 kiloliters, which is below the clean water consumption recommended by the WHO. However, it is possible to reallocate the current subsidy to form an optimal tari¤ without a free allowance, which would increase welfare while leaving the water provider's revenue unchanged. This optimal tariwould also reduce the number of households consuming below the WHO-recommended level.
We develop a strategic theory of counterfeiting as a multi-market large game. Bad guys choose whether to counterfeit, and what quality to produce. Opposing them is a continuum of good guys who select a costly verification effort. In equilibrium, counterfeiters produce better quality at higher notes, but verifiers try sufficiently harder that verification still improves. We develop a graphical framework for deducing comparative statics. Passed and counterfeiting rates vanish for low and high notes. Our predictions are consistent with time series and cross-sectional patterns in a unique data set assembled largely from the Secret Service.
This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for Markovian games with private information as discounting vanishes. Monitoring might be imperfect, transitions depend on actions, types correlated or not, values private or interdependent. It focuses on equilibria in which players report their information truthfully. This characterization generalizes those for repeated games, and reduces to a collection of one-shot Bayesian games with transfers. With independent private values, the restriction to truthful equilibria is shown to be without loss, except for individual rationality; in the case of correlated types, results from static mechanism design can be applied, resulting in a folk theorem.
This paper develops a quantitative model of internal city structure that features agglomeration and dispersion forces and an arbitrary number of heterogeneous city blocks. The model remains tractable and amenable to empirical analysis because of stochastic shocks to commuting decisions, which yield a gravity equation for commuting flows. To structurally estimate agglomeration and dispersion forces, we use data on thousands of city blocks in Berlin for 1936, 1986 and 2006 and exogenous variation from the city’s division and reunification. We estimate substantial and highly localized production and residential externalities. We show that the model with the estimated agglomeration parameters can account both qualitatively and quantitatively for the observed changes in city structure. We show how our quantitative framework can be used to undertake counterfactuals for changes in the organization of economic activity within cities in response for example to changes in the transport network.