We analyze equilibria in exchange economies following the approach taken by Borch and Wilson. We correct Wilson's main result by showing that linear contracts are sufficient but not necessary for the existence of syndicates under heterogeneous beliefs. We introduce the concept of the decomposability of syndicates and demonstrate that linear contracts are necessary only for arbitrarily decomposable syndicates. This implies that groups that form syndicates under an arbitrary set of beliefs must also employ linear contracts.

[Under the assumption that demand behavior depends on intertemporal preferences as well as (point) expectations concerning future prices, it is demonstrated that under plausible conditions rationality imposes no observable restrictions on the demand function and expectations and preferences are observationally indistinguishable.]

The effects of minimum wage legislation on the employment and wage rates of youth are estimated using a new statistical approach. We find that without the minimum, not only would the percent of out-of-school youth who are employed be 4 to 6 percent higher than it is, but also that these youth would earn more.