Knowledge that Transforms

This paper studies shareholder derivative lawsuits related to CEO compensation. We document that compensation lawsuits are more likely to be filed against firms with higher CEO pay, especially in the presence of poor firm performance. Firms reduce the level of CEO compensation after lawsuits, which leads to CEO departures and declines in CEO effort provisions, and consequently, results in deteriorated firm performance. Interestingly, compensation lawsuits accompanied by low support in the preceding Say‐on‐Pay votes, which likely capture the quality of pay practices, are associated with even higher pay cuts, but do not harm firm performance or lead to departures of talented CEOs, supporting the idea that suboptimal pay and deteriorated performance after compensation lawsuits are driven by the lack of a sophisticated understanding of CEO pay by plaintiff shareholders.

Complex accounting estimates are becoming increasingly important to financial statements. Yet, such estimates create ample opportunities for bias. Although both management and independent auditors are tasked with ensuring these estimates are free from error and bias, evaluating the appropriateness of these measures can be quite difficult. Drawing on unconscious thought theory, we predict and find across three experiments that engaging in unconscious thought can improve accounting practitioners’ evaluations of accounting estimates. In Experiment 1, we use practicing auditors as participants and find that unconscious thought improves less‐experienced auditors’ ability to recognize income‐decreasing patterns of bias. In contrast, more‐experienced auditors respond similarly to both incoming‐increasing and income‐decreasing bias, regardless of whether they use conscious or unconscious processing. In Experiments 2 and 3, we provide evidence that prompting managers to engage in unconscious thought also improves their recognition of patterns of bias within estimates. Overall, our findings demonstrate how unconscious processing can be intentionally prompted to improve accounting professionals’ ability to recognize subtle patterns of bias that they might otherwise overlook.

This paper examines investors’ perceptions of auditor involvement in non‐GAAP reporting as captured by non‐GAAP disclosures in 10‐K filings. We find that firm‐years with auditor involvement in non‐GAAP reporting have higher CARs, lower bid–ask spreads, lower stock volatility, and lower abnormal trading volume on 10‐K filing dates. To sharpen identification of auditor involvement, we hand‐collect non‐GAAP measures and reconciliations for S&P 500 firms and identify which exclusions reconcile directly to the audited financial statements. As the percentage of exclusions that reconcile directly to the audited financial statements increases, bid–ask spreads and stock volatility on 10‐K filing dates decrease. We find that the results are not driven by strategic reporting or managers’ responses to perceived litigation risk. This study provides new insights into non‐GAAP disclosures outside of earnings announcements, which have been largely ignored in prior literature. Collectively, our results suggest investors value auditor involvement in non‐GAAP reporting and inform policymakers and standard setters considering the usefulness of assurance over non‐GAAP measures.

Leveraging micro‐level data on individual employees’ bank and credit card transactions, we examine the impact of earnings announcement (EA) news on employee spending. Utilizing an event study methodology, we find strong evidence that EA news elicits significant reactions in employee spending. These reactions are stronger for employees located in the firm's headquarters state, with longer tenure, possessing investment experience, or earning higher wages, consistent with these employees being more likely to attend to their firm's EAs. The reactions are also stronger for the fourth fiscal quarter than interim quarters, suggesting that year‐end results garner greater employee attention. Furthermore, consistent with media facilitating employee processing of EA news, the reactions are stronger for EAs covered by a larger number of news articles. Finally, in line with the notion that EAs contain information about employees’ future cash flows, we find that EA news predicts changes in employee wages and that employees with higher past wage‐to‐EA news sensitivity exhibit stronger spending reactions. Overall, our findings provide evidence of the role of financial reporting in employees’ spending decisions.

This paper studies the effect of reporting regulation on private firms' bank credit and its economic consequences. I exploit the Spanish institutional setting, which provides a unique combination of confidential loan data and regulatory features that generate quasi‐exogenous variation in reporting regulation. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that firms subject to incremental reporting regulation obtain more bank credit primarily through cash flow–based lending, term loans, and long‐term debt, without higher interest rates. These findings are explained by stronger banking competition and greater reliance on financial statement data. However, firms do not expand their net financial position, as bank credit substitutes for other liabilities, and exhibit weaker performance consistent with the costs of reporting regulation. This evidence from a different setting offers new insights into how reporting regulation influences credit contracting for private firms and strengthens the empirical basis for policy‐making.

Research shows that investors acquire and process less firm‐specific information on days when many firms announce earnings (hereafter earnings clusters). We show that investors gather more macroeconomic information during earnings clusters, that this behavior is amplified during negative economic shocks and concurrent macroeconomic announcements, and that these information acquisition patterns have implications for equity valuations. Our findings are consistent with the benefit of extracting macroeconomic information from earnings announcements increasing during earnings clusters, which we confirm empirically. Thus, our results help explain why investors focus less on individual firm news during earnings clusters: They rationally redirect their attention to the most beneficial information.

We study plaintiff law firms in corporate litigation, focusing on “star” firms that dominate settlement outcomes. Stars are associated with larger settlements; however, much of this effect is predicted by the defendant's litigation insurance coverage, suggesting assortative matching of stars with lawsuits that have ex ante larger expected payoffs. Moreover, stars charge higher fees for a given settlement size. Additional tests suggest that visibility and information asymmetry vis‐à‐vis less sophisticated plaintiffs help sustain the stars’ market share. These findings advance our understanding of corporate litigation and the agency relationship between plaintiff law firms and their clients.

This paper explores U.S. public firms’ cryptocurrency holdings and accounting practices from 2013 to 2022 against the backdrop of the recently enacted crypto accounting rule, ASU 2023‐08. Descriptive analyses suggest exponential growth in corporate crypto holdings and significant variation in crypto accounting practices, underscoring the rule's necessity. Hypothesis tests using the pre‐rule data reveal three insights with direct relevance to the rule. First, firms appear to view crypto assets more akin to investments than intangible assets, consistent with the rule's mandate of the fair value model. Second, Big 4 auditors steer firms toward the impairment model and less detailed presentation choices. This conservative approach is unlikely to meet the new rule's goal of providing the most decision‐useful information. Third, increased liquidity of crypto markets prompts the use of the fair value model and a more detailed presentation, consistent with the rule's focus on more actively traded tokens. However, within our sample, we find some evidence consistent with fair value reporting increasing stock return volatility and no evidence that it enhances earnings informativeness.

Sell‐side analysts commonly transition to buy‐side money managers. I examine whether and how these career transitions shape sell‐side analysts' behavior, relying on the granular career information of 6,310 analysts in the United States. I identify analysts who transition from the sell‐side to the buy‐side and find that these analysts issue inflated recommendations on stocks of interest to their future buy‐side employers. This favoritism is (1) present only during the year preceding their transition, (2) more pronounced among stocks where a single analyst is more influential in moving the stock price; and (3) present only among transitions likely to be strategically planned. Importantly, stocks receiving inflated recommendations experience a significant price decline following the departure of transitioning analysts from the sell‐side. Overall, these findings suggest that analyst career transitions are an important source of conflicts of interest.