Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether accounting standards harmonization enhances the comparability of financial information across countries. I hypothesize that a firm yet to announce earnings reacts more strongly to the earnings announcement of a foreign firm when both report under the same rather than different accounting standards. My analysis of abnormal price reactions for a global sample of firms supports the prediction. Next, in an attempt to control for the underlying economic comparability and the effects of changes in reporting quality, I use a difference‐in‐differences design around the mandatory introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards. I find that mandatory adopters experience a significant increase in market reactions to the release of earnings by voluntary adopters compared to the period preceding mandatory adoption. This increase is not observed for nonadopters. Taken together, the results show that accounting standards harmonization facilitates transnational information transfer and suggest financial statement comparability as a direct mechanism.

ABSTRACT We examine changes in firms’ dividend payouts following an exogenous shock to the information asymmetry problem between managers and investors. Agency theories predict a decrease in dividend payments to the extent that improved public information lowers managers’ need to convey their commitment to avoid overinvestment via costly dividend payouts. Conversely, dividends could increase if minority investors are in a better position to extract cash dividends. We test these predictions by analyzing the dividend payment behavior of a global sample of firms around the mandatory adoption of IFRS and the initial enforcement of new insider trading laws. Both events serve as proxies for a general improvement of the information environment and, hence, the corporate governance structure in the economy. We find that, following the two events, firms are less likely to pay (increase) dividends, but more likely to cut (stop) such payments. The changes occur around the time of the informational shock, and only in countries and for firms subject to the regulatory change. They are more pronounced when the inherent agency issues or the informational shocks are stronger. We further find that the information content of dividends decreases after the events. The results highlight the importance of the agency costs of free cash flows (and changes therein) for shaping firms’ payout policies.

ABSTRACT We study optimal compensation contracts that (1) are designed to address a joint moral hazard and adverse selection problem and that (2) are based on performance measures, which may be manipulated by the agent at a cost. In the model, a manager is privately informed about his productivity prior to being hired by a firm. In order to incentivize the manager to exert productive effort, the firm designs a compensation contract that is based on reported earnings, which can be manipulated by the manager. Our model predicts that (1) the optimal compensation contract is convex in reported earnings; (2) the optimal contract is less sensitive to reported earnings than it would be absent the manager's ability to manipulate earnings; and (3) higher costs of manipulating reported earnings (e.g., due to higher governance quality) are associated with higher firm value, lower expected level of earnings management, and higher output.

ABSTRACT This study investigates why countries mandate accruals in the definition of corporate taxable income. Accruals alleviate timing and matching problems in cash flows, which smoothes taxable income and thus better aligns it with underlying economic performance. These accrual properties can be desirable in the tax setting as tax authorities seek more predictable corporate tax revenues. However, they can also make tax revenues procyclical by increasing the correlation between aggregate corporate tax revenues and aggregate economic activity. We argue that accruals shape the distribution of corporate tax revenues, which leads regulators to incorporate accruals into the definition of taxable income to balance the portfolio of government revenues and expenditures. Using a sample of 26 OECD countries, we find support for several theoretically motivated factors explaining the use of accruals in tax codes. We first provide evidence that corporate tax revenues are less volatile in high accrual countries, but high accrual countries collect relatively higher (lower) tax revenues when the corporate sector grows (contracts). Critically, we then show that accruals and smoother tax revenues are favored by countries with higher levels of government spending on public services and uncertain future expenditures, while countries with procyclical other tax collections favor cash rules and lower procyclicality of corporate tax revenues.

ABSTRACT I examine whether declines in banks’ financial health affect their borrowers’ disclosures. Prior studies indicate that, in relationship lending, banks and borrowers rely on private communication, rather than public disclosures, to resolve information asymmetries. When banking relationships are threatened, borrowers must turn to new funding sources, inducing them to reconsider their disclosure policies. This paper predicts that borrowers, whose banking relationships are threatened by declining bank health, change their public disclosures of forward‐looking information. Using the emerging‐market financial crises in the late 1990s as shocks to the health of certain U.S. banks, I find that affected banks’ U.S. borrowers increase both the quantity and informativeness of their management forecasts following these shocks compared to borrowers of unaffected banks. The results are similar using conference calls or the length of the Management's Discussion and Analysis section as alternative proxies for voluntary disclosure. Overall, these results provide new insights into the impact of availability of relationship lending on firms’ disclosure choices.

ABSTRACT I examine the previously unexplored relation between aggregate earnings changes and corporate bond market returns. I find that aggregate earnings changes have a negative relation to investment‐grade corporate bond market returns and a positive relation to high‐yield corporate bond market returns. The aggregate earnings‐returns relation is lower (i.e., less positive or more negative) for bonds with higher credit ratings and longer maturities. Further, I show that the aggregate earnings‐returns relation is driven by both the expected and the news component of aggregate earnings changes. The expected component is negatively related to expected returns, and the news component is positively related to cash flow news and changes in nominal interest rates, and negatively related to changes in default premia. My results contribute to the understanding of the role of earnings in corporate bond markets as well as the macroeconomic role of accounting information.

ABSTRACT We examine the relation between a measure of male CEOs’ facial masculinity and financial misreporting. Facial masculinity is associated with a complex of masculine behaviors (including aggression, egocentrism, riskseeking, and maintenance of social status) in males . One possible mechanism for this relation is that the hormone testosterone influences both behavior and the development of the face shape. We document a positive association between CEO facial masculinity and various misreporting proxies in a broad sample of S&P1500 firms during 1996–2010. We complement this evidence by documenting that a CEO's facial masculinity predicts his firm's likelihood of being subject to an SEC enforcement action. We also show that an executive's facial masculinity is associated with the likelihood of the SEC naming him as a perpetrator. We find that facial masculinity is not a measure of overconfidence. Finally, we demonstrate that facial masculinity also predicts the incidence of insider trading and option backdating.

ABSTRACT Financial accounting standards increasingly require fair value measurements. I experimentally examine how uncertainty affects auditors’ adjustment decisions when evaluating fair values. I manipulate two types of uncertainty, input subjectivity and outcome imprecision , and one reporting choice, supplemental disclosure . I find that auditors are most likely to require adjustments when fair values contain both more input subjectivity and more outcome imprecision, but that this likelihood diminishes when clients supplement recognized fair values with additional disclosure. Thus, consistent with moral licensing, I find that auditors tolerate greater potential misstatement in the financial statements when clients provide disclosure, suggesting that the SEC's preference for supplemental disclosure may have the unintended consequence of affecting fair values recognized in the body of the financial statements. I also provide evidence that auditors determine adjustment size by comparing recorded fair value to the nearest bound, rather than the midpoint, of the auditors’ own range estimate, consistent with strict application of auditing standards.

ABSTRACT We derive the optimal compensation contract in a principal–agent setting in which outcome is used to provide incentives for both effort and risky investments. To motivate investment, optimal compensation entails rewards for high as well as low outcomes, and it is increasing at the mean outcome to motivate effort. If rewarding low outcomes is infeasible, compensation consisting of stocks and options is a near‐efficient means of overcoming the manager's induced aversion to undertaking risky investments, whereas stock compensation is not. However, stock plus option compensation may induce excessively risky investments, and capping pay can be important in curbing such behavior.