Reward systems based on balanced scorecards often connect pay to an index, that is, a weighted sum of multiple performance measures. We show that such an index contract may indeed be optimal if performance measures are nonverifiable so that the contracting parties must rely on self‐enforcement. Under commonly invoked assumptions (including normally distributed measurements), we show that the weights in the index reflect a tradeoff between distortion and precision for the measures. The efficiency of the contract improves with higher precision of the index measure, because this strengthens incentives, and correlations between measurements may for this reason be beneficial. There is a caveat, however, because the index contract is not necessarily optimal for very precise measurements, although it is shown to be asymptotically optimal. We also consider hybrid measurements, and show that the principal may want to include verifiable performance measures in the relational index contract in order to improve incentives, and that this has noteworthy implications for the formal contract.

This paper finds that the disclosure of supervisory actions by bank regulators is associated with changes in their enforcement behavior. Using a novel sample of enforcement decisions and orders (EDOs) and a change in the disclosure regime, we find that regulators issue more EDOs, intervene sooner, and rely more on publicly observable signals following the regime change. EDO documents become longer, more complex, and contain more boilerplate language. Our results also indicate that intervention happens sooner and more frequently in counties with higher news circulation, which suggests that regulators take into account the public perception of their actions. We evaluate potentially confounding factors, including the savings and loan (S&L) crisis and competition from thrifts, and find robust results. We also study bank outcomes and document that uninsured deposits decline at EDO banks in the disclosure regime, especially for those covered in the news. Finally, we observe that bank failure accelerates despite improvements in capital ratios and asset quality. Overall, our research provides new insights on the disclosure of regulatory actions.

We assess how forms of disagreement among investors affect a firm's cost of capital. Firms experience a lower cost of capital if investors perceive that other investors are ignoring relevant disclosures (perceived errors of omission), but a higher cost of capital if investors perceive that others are responding to irrelevant disclosures (perceived errors of commission). The impact of these two sources of disagreement on the cost of capital is determined by the distribution of opinion and the nature of disclosure. For example, even though aggregated disclosures reveal less to investors, aggregated disclosures may decrease the cost of capital by eliminating disagreement associated with perceived errors of commission. These and additional results arise because the cost of capital is driven not only by investors’ uncertainty about the firm's future earnings performance, but also by investors’ uncertainty about the evolution of beliefs, which partly determines the path of prices.

Christian Leuz, Robert E. Verrecchia, The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38, Supplement: Studies on Accounting Information and the Economics of the Firm (2000), pp. 91-124

Auditing, Technical knowledge, Audit planning, Performance evaluation

Charles E. Boynton, Paul S. Dobbins, George A. Plesko, Earnings Management and the Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 30, Studies on Accounting and Taxation (1992), pp. 131-153

William R. Baber, Eugene H. Brooks, William E. Ricks, An Empirical Investigation of the Market for Audit Services in the Public Sector, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Autumn, 1987), pp. 293-305

Louis J. Billera, David C. Heath, Robert E. Verrecchia, A Unique Procedure for Allocating Common Costs from a Production Process, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring, 1981), pp. 185-196

Roland E. Dukes, Thomas R. Dyckman, John A. Elliott, [Discussion of The Economic Effects of Involuntary Uniformity in the Financial Reporting of R&D Expenditures and Accounting for Research and Development Costs: The Impact on Research and Development Expenditures]: A Reply, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 18, Studies on Economic Consequences of Financial and Managerial Accounting: Effects on Corporate Incentives and Decisions (1980), pp. 91-95

In October 1974, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued FASB Statement No. 2, Accounting for Research and Development Costs (henceforth FAS2). The essence of the mandated accounting treatment is stated in paragraph 12 of the Statement: All research and development [R&D] costs encompassed by this Statement shall be charged to expense when incurred. This accounting treatment was contrary to the practice followed by many firms which capitalized and amortized R&D costs. The Board's definition of R&D costs is quite inclusive following, with some modifications, the commonly used interpretation by the National Science Foundation. The Board defines R&D, in paragraph 8, as follows: